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23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/33
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 1177/2011
of 8 November 2011
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
1056/2005 ( 7 ) respectively. In addition, the Council
Report of 20 March 2005 on ‘Improving the implemen
tation of the Stability and Growth Pact’ ( 8 ) was adopted.
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and in particular the second subparagraph of
Article 126(14) thereof,
(3) The SGP is based on the objective of sound and
sustainable government finances as a means of
strengthening the conditions for price stability and for
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial
stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the
Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national
employment.
parliaments,
(4)
Experience gained and mistakes made during the first
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (
decade of the economic and monetary union show a

1 ),
need for improved economic governance in the Union,
which should be built on stronger national ownership of
commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank ( 2 ),
robust framework at the level of the Union for the
surveillance of national economic policies.
Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,
(5) The
common
framework
for
economic
governance
needs
to be enhanced, including improved budgetary
Whereas:
surveillance, in line with the high degree of integration
between Member States’ economies within the Union,
and particularly within the euro area.
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the
Member States within the Union, as provided for by
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(6) The
improved
economic
governance
framework
should
(TFEU), should entail compliance with the guiding prin
rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for
ciples of stable prices, sound public finances and
sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union
monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of
strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on
payments.
developing and strengthening the internal market,
fostering international trade and competitiveness, a
European Semester for strengthened coordination of
(2) The
Stability
and
Growth
Pact
(SGP)
initially
consisted
of
economic and budgetary policies, an effective
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on
framework for preventing and correcting excessive
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
government deficits (the SGP), a robust framework for
positions and the surveillance and coordination of
preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances,
economic policies
( 3 ), Council Regulation (EC) No
minimum requirements for national budgetary
1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying
frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure ( 4 )
and supervision, including macroprudential supervision
and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June
by the European Systemic Risk Board.
1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact ( 5 ). Regulations
(EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97 were amended
by Regulations (EC) No 1055/2005 ( 6 ) and (EC) No
(7) Achieving
and
maintaining
a
dynamic
internal
market
should be considered an element of the proper and
( 1 ) European Parliament opinion of 28 September 2011 (not yet
smooth functioning of the economic and monetary
published in the Official Journal).
union.
( 2 ) OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.
( 3 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
( 4 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.
( 7 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending
( 5 ) OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the
( 6 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 174,
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the
7.7.2005, p. 5).
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor
( 8 ) See document 7423/3/05 on http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
dination of economic policies (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1).
documents.aspx?lang=en

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L 306/34
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Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(8) The
SGP
and
the
complete
economic
governance
existence of an excessive deficit, which should take into
framework should complement and support the Union
account the whole range of relevant factors covered by
strategy for growth and jobs. The interlinks between
the Commission’s report under Article 126(3) TFEU. In
different strands should not provide for exemptions
particular, the assessment of the effect of the cycle and
from the provisions of the SGP.
the composition of the stock-flow adjustment on debt
developments may be sufficient to avoid that the
existence of an excessive deficit be established on the
basis of the debt criterion.
(9) The
strengthening
of
economic
governance
should
include a closer and more timely involvement of the
European Parliament and the national parliaments.
While recognising that the counterparts of the
(15) In establishing the existence of an excessive deficit based
European Parliament in the framework of this dialogue
on the deficit criterion and the steps leading to it, there is
are the relevant institutions of the Union and their repre
a need to take into account the whole range of relevant
sentatives, the competent committee of the European
factors covered by the Commission’s report under
Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in
Article 126(3) TFEU if the ratio of government debt to
an exchange of views to a Member State to which the
GDP does not exceed the reference value.
Council has addressed a decision under Article 126(6)
TFEU, a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU, a
notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or a decision under
Article 126(11) TFEU. The Member State’s participation
(16) In
taking
into
account
systemic
pension
reforms
among
in such an exchange of views is voluntary.
the relevant factors, the central consideration should be
whether those reforms enhance the long-term sustain
ability of the overall pension system, while not increasing
the risks to the medium-term budgetary position.
(10) The
Commission
should
have
a
stronger
role
in
the
enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments
that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-
site missions, recommendations and warnings.
(17) The
Commission’s
report
under
Article
126(3) TFEU
should consider appropriately the quality of the
national budgetary framework, as that plays a crucial
(11) The
Council
and
the
Commission
should,
when
applying
role in supporting fiscal consolidation and sustainable
this Regulation, take into account, as appropriate, all
public finances. That consideration should include the
relevant factors and the economic and budgetary
minimum requirements as laid down in Council
situation of the Member States concerned.
Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member
States ( 1 ) and other agreed desirable requirements for
fiscal discipline.
(12) The
rules
on
budgetary
discipline
should
be
strengthened,
in particular by giving a more prominent role to the level
and evolution of debt and to overall sustainability. The
mechanisms to ensure compliance with, and enforcement
(18) In
order
to
support
the
monitoring
of
compliance
with
of, those rules should also be strengthened.
Council recommendations and notices for the correction
of situations of excessive deficit, there is a need that these
specify annual budgetary targets consistent with the
required fiscal improvement in cyclically adjusted terms,
(13) Implementing
the
existing
excessive
deficit
procedure
on
net of one-off and temporary measures. In that context,
the basis of both the deficit criterion and the debt
the 0,5
% of GDP annual benchmark should be
criterion requires a numerical benchmark, which takes
understood as an annual average.
into account the business cycle, against which to assess
whether the ratio of the government debt to gross
domestic product (GDP) is sufficiently diminishing and
is approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
(19) The
assessment of effective
action will benefit from
taking compliance with general government expenditure
targets as a reference, in conjunction with the implemen
A transitional period should be introduced in order to
tation of planned specific revenue measures.
allow Member States subject to an excessive deficit
procedure at the date of adoption of this Regulation to
adapt their policies to the numerical benchmark for debt
reduction. This should also apply to Member States
(20) In assessing the case for an extension of the deadline for
correcting the excessive deficit, particular consideration
which are subject to a Union or International Monetary
should be given to severe economic downturns in the
Fund adjustment programme.
euro area or in the Union as a whole, provided that this
does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium
term.
(14) Non-compliance
with
the
numerical
benchmark
for
debt
reduction should not be sufficient to establish the
( 1 ) See page 41 of this Official Journal

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EN
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Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/35
(21) It
is appropriate
to step up the application of the
(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:
financial sanctions provided for in Article 126(11)
TFEU so that they constitute a real incentive for
compliance with the notices under Article 126(9) TFEU.
(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by
the following:
(22) In
order
to
ensure
compliance
with
the
fiscal
surveillance
framework of the Union for Member States whose
currency is the euro, rules-based sanctions should be
‘1. The
excess
of
a
government
deficit
over
the
designed on the basis of Article 136 TFEU, ensuring
reference value shall be considered exceptional, in
fair, timely and effective mechanisms for compliance
accordance with the second indent of point (a) of
with the SGP.
Article 126(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU), when resulting from an
unusual event outside the control of the Member State
(23) Fines
referred
to
in
this
Regulation
shall
constitute
other
concerned and with a major impact on the financial
revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and should
position of general government, or when resulting
be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial
from a severe economic downturn.’;
assistance, created by Member States whose currency is
the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro
area as a whole.
(b) the following paragraph is inserted:
(24) References
contained
in
Regulation
(EC)
No
1467/97
should take account of the new Article numbering of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
‘1a. When
it
exceeds
the
reference
value,
the
ratio
and to the replacement of Council Regulation (EC) No
of the government debt to gross domestic product
3605/93 (
(GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing

1 ) by Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of
25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty estab
pace in accordance with point (b) of Article 126(2)
lishing the European Community (
TFEU if the differential with respect to the reference

2 ).
value has decreased over the previous three years at an
average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,
based on changes over the last three years for which
(25) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 should therefore be
the data is available.
amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
The requirement under the debt criterion shall also be
considered to be fulfilled if the budgetary forecasts of
the Commission indicate that the required reduction in
Article 1
the differential will occur over the three-year period
encompassing the two years following the final year
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is hereby amended as follows:
for which the data is available. For a Member State that
is subject to an excessive deficit procedure on
8 November 2011 and for a period of three years
(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:
from the correction of the excessive deficit, the
requirement under the debt criterion shall be
considered fulfilled if the Member State concerned
‘Article 1
makes sufficient progress towards compliance as
1. This
Regulation
lays
down
the
provisions
for
assessed in the opinion adopted by the Council on
speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit procedure.
its stability or convergence programme.
The objective of the excessive deficit procedure is to deter
excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further
prompt their correction, where compliance with the
In implementing the debt ratio adjustment benchmark,
budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the
account shall be taken of the influence of the cycle on
government deficit and government debt criteria.
the pace of debt reduction.’;
2. For
the
purposes
of
this
Regulation,
“participating
Member States” shall mean those Member States whose
(c) paragraphs 3 to 7 are replaced by the following:
currency is the euro.’;
( 1 ) Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the
‘3. The
Commission,
when
preparing
a
report
under
application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure
Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account all
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community
(OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7).
relevant factors as indicated in that Article, in so far
( 2 ) OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.
as they significantly affect the assessment of

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L 306/36
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the
existence of an excessive deficit provided for in
Member State concerned. The report shall reflect, as
paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 TFEU only if
appropriate:
the double condition of the overarching principle —
that, before these relevant factors are taken into
account, the general government deficit remains close
(a) the developments in the medium-term economic
to the reference value and its excess over the reference
position, in particular potential growth, including
value is temporary — is fully met.
the various contributions provided by labour,
capital accumulation and total factor productivity,
cyclical developments, and the private sector net
However, those factors shall be taken into account in
savings position;
the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an
excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the
basis of the debt criterion.
(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary
positions, including, in particular, the record of
adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary
objective, the level of the primary balance and
5. When
assessing
compliance
with
the
deficit
and
developments in primary expenditure, both
debt criterion and in the subsequent steps of the
current and capital, the implementation of
excessive deficit procedure, the Council and the
policies in the context of the prevention and
Commission shall give due consideration to the imple
correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances,
mentation of pension reforms introducing a multi-
the implementation of policies in the context of
pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded
the common growth strategy of the Union, and
pillar and the net cost of the publicly managed pillar.
the overall quality of public finances, in particular
In particular, consideration shall be given to the
the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks;
features of the overall pension system created by the
reform, namely whether it promotes long-term sustain
ability while not increasing risks for the medium-term
budgetary position.
(c) the developments in the medium-term government
debt position, its dynamics and sustainability,
including, in particular, risk factors including the
maturity structure and currency denomination of
6. If
the
Council,
acting
under
Article
126(6)
TFEU,
the debt, stock-flow adjustment and its
decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member
composition, accumulated reserves and other
State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the
financial assets, guarantees, in particular those
subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the
linked to the financial sector, and any implicit
TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred
liabilities related to ageing and private debt, to
to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the
the extent that it may represent a contingent
situation of the Member State concerned, including
implicit liability for the government.
as specified in Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of this
Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for
the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually
The Commission shall give due and express
extending that deadline. However, those relevant
consideration to any other factors which, in the
factors shall not be taken into account for the
opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant
decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU
in order to comprehensively assess compliance with
on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under
deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State
paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 TFEU.
has put forward to the Council and the Commission.
In that context, particular consideration shall be given
to financial contributions to fostering international
7. In the case of Member States where the excess of
solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the
the deficit over the reference value reflects the imple
Union, the debt incurred in the form of bilateral and
mentation of a pension reform introducing a multi-
multilateral support between Member States in the
pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded
context of safeguarding financial stability, and the
pillar, the Council and the Commission shall also
debt related to financial stabilisation operations
consider the cost of the reform when assessing devel
during major financial disturbances.
opments of deficit figures in excessive deficit
procedures as long as the deficit does not significantly
exceed a level that can be considered close to the
4. The
Council
and
the
Commission
shall
make
a
reference value, and the debt ratio does not exceed
balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors,
the reference value, provided that overall fiscal sustain
specifically, the extent to which they affect the
ability is maintained. The net cost shall be taken into
assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the
account also for the decision of the Council under
debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. When
Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or
assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit
all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of
criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP
Article 126 TFEU, if the deficit has declined
exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken
substantially and continuously and has reached a
into account in the steps leading to the decision on the
level that comes close to the reference value.’;

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Journal
of
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European
Union L
306/37
(3) the following section is inserted:
warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the
deadline for effective action may be three months.
The Council recommendation shall also establish a
‘SECTION 1A
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit,
which shall be completed in the year following its
ECONOMIC DIALOGUE
identification unless there are special circumstances.
Article 2a
In its recommendation, the Council shall request that
the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets
1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the insti
which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the
tutions of the Union, in particular the European
recommendation, are consistent with a minimum
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to
annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a
ensure greater transparency and accountability, the
benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of
competent committee of the European Parliament may
one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure
invite the President of the Council, the Commission and,
the correction of the excessive deficit within the
where appropriate, the President of the European Council
deadline set in the recommendation.
or the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the
committee to discuss Council decisions under
Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under
Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU,
4a. Within
the
deadline
provided
for
in
paragraph
or Council decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU.
4, the Member State concerned shall report to the
Council and the Commission on action taken in
response to the Council’s recommendation under
The Council is, as a rule, expected to follow the recom
Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the
mendations and proposals of the Commission or explain
targets for government expenditure and revenue and
its position publicly.
for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure
and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s
recommendation, as well as information on the
measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to
The competent committee of the European Parliament
achieve the targets. The Member State shall make the
may offer the opportunity to the Member State
report public.
concerned by such decisions, recommendations or
notices to participate in an exchange of views.
5. If
effective
action
has
been
taken
in
compliance
2. The Council and the Commission shall regularly
with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU
inform the European Parliament of the application of
and unexpected adverse economic events with major
this Regulation.’;
unfavourable consequences for government finances
occur after the adoption of that recommendation,
the Council may decide, on a recommendation from
(4) Article 3 is amended as follows:
the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation
under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommen
dation, taking into account the relevant factors
referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in
(a) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the
excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council
shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse
‘2. Taking
fully
into
account
the
opinion
referred
to
economic events with major unfavourable conse
in paragraph 1, the Commission, if it considers that an
quences for government finances against the
excessive deficit exists, shall address an opinion and a
economic forecasts in its recommendation. In the
proposal to the Council in accordance with paragraphs
case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area
5 and 6 of Article 126 TFEU and shall inform the
or in the Union as a whole, the Council may also
European Parliament thereof.’;
decide, on a recommendation from the Commission,
to adopt a revised recommendation under
Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not
(b) in paragraph 3, the reference to ‘Article 4(2) and (3) of
endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.’;
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93’ is replaced by a reference
to ‘Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No
479/2009’;
(5) in Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the
following:
(c) paragraphs 4 and 5 are replaced by the following:
‘1. Any
decision
by
the
Council
under
Article
126(8)
‘4. The Council recommendation made in
TFEU to make public its recommendations where it is
accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a
established that no effective action has been taken, shall
maximum deadline of six months for effective action
be taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in
to be taken by the Member State concerned. When
accordance with Article 3(4) of this Regulation.

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Official Journal of the European Union
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2. The
Council,
when
considering
whether
effective
vourable consequences for government finances against
action has been taken in response to its recommendations
the economic forecasts in its notice. In the case of a
made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU, shall base
severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the
its decision on the report submitted by the Member State
Union as a whole, the Council may also decide, on a
concerned in accordance with Article 3(4a) of this Regu
recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a
lation and its implementation, as well as on any other
revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition
publicly announced decisions by the government of the
that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the
Member State concerned.
medium term.’;
Where the Council establishes, in accordance with
(7) Articles 6 to 8 are replaced by the following:
Article 126(8) TFEU, that the Member State concerned
has failed to take effective action, it shall report to the
European Council accordingly.’;
‘Article 6
1. The
Council,
when
considering
whether
effective
action has been taken in response to its notice made in
(6) in Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the
accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its
following:
decision on the report submitted by the Member State
concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regu
lation and its implementation, as well as on any other
publicly announced decisions by the government of the
‘1. Any Council decision to give notice to the partici
Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance
pating Member State concerned to take measures for the
mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with
deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU
Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.
shall be taken within two months of the Council decision
under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective
action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall
request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary
2. Where
the
conditions
to
apply
Article
126(11)
TFEU
targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning
are met, the Council shall impose sanctions in accordance
the notice, are consistent with a minimum annual
with that Article. Any such decision shall be taken no later
improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark,
than four months after the Council decision under
in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and
Article 126(9) TFEU giving notice to the participating
temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of
Member State concerned to take measures.
the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice.
The Council shall also indicate measures conducive to the
achievement of those targets.
Article 7
If a participating Member State fails to act in compliance
with the successive acts of the Council in accordance with
1a. Following
a
Council
notice
under
Article
126(9)
Article 126(7) and (9) TFEU, the decision of the Council
TFEU, the Member State concerned shall report to the
under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions shall be
Council and the Commission on action taken in
taken as a rule within 16 months of the reporting dates
response thereto. The report shall include the targets for
established in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No
the government expenditure and revenue and for the
479/2009. Where Article 3(5) or Article 5(2) of this Regu
discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the
lation is applied, the 16-month deadline shall be adjusted
revenue side, as well as information on the actions being
accordingly. An expedited procedure shall be used in the
taken in response to the specific Council recommendations
case of a deliberately planned deficit which the Council
so as to allow the Council to take, if necessary, a decision
decides is excessive.
in accordance with Article 6(2) of this Regulation. The
Member State shall make the report public.
Article 8
Any Council decision under Article 126(11) TFEU to
2. If effective action has been taken in compliance with
intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two
a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU and unexpected
months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation
adverse economic events with major unfavourable conse
(EC) No 479/2009. Any Council decision under
quences for government finances occur after the adoption
Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its
of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommen
decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any
dation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice
event no later than two months after the reporting dates
under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.’;
into account the relevant factors referred to in
Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend
the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by
one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of
(8) in Article 9(3), the reference to ‘Article 6’ is replaced by a
unexpected adverse economic events with major unfa
reference to ‘Article 6(2)’;

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European
Union L
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(9) Article 10 is amended as follows:
(11) Articles 11 and 12 are replaced by the following:
(a) the introductory words of paragraph 1 are replaced by
‘Article 11
the following:
Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU
to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a
fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to
‘1. The Council and the Commission shall regularly
supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for
monitor the implementation of action taken:’;
in Article 126(11) TFEU.
(b) in paragraph 3, the reference to ‘Regulation (EC) No
3605/93’ is replaced by a reference to ‘Regulation (EC)
Article 12
No 479/2009’.;
1. The
amount
of
the
fine
shall
comprise
a
fixed
component equal to 0,2 % of GDP, and a variable
component. The variable component shall amount to
(10) the following Article is inserted:
one tenth of the absolute value of the difference
between the balance as a percentage of GDP in the
preceding year and either the reference value for
government balance or, if non-compliance with
‘Article 10a
budgetary discipline includes the debt criterion, the
1. The
Commission
shall
ensure
a
permanent
dialogue
government balance as a percentage of GDP that should
with authorities of the Member States in accordance with
have been achieved in the same year according to the
the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the
notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.
Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for
the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic
situation in the Member State and the identification of
2. In
each
year
following
that
in
which
a
fine
is
any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives
imposed, until the decision on the existence of an
of this Regulation.
excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess
whether the participating Member State concerned has
taken effective action in response to the Council notice
2. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for
in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this annual
Member States which are the subject of recommendations
assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with
and notices issued following a decision pursuant to
Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless
Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11)
the participating Member State concerned has complied
TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member
with the Council’s notice. If the Council decides to
States concerned shall provide all necessary information
impose an additional fine, it shall be calculated in the
for the preparation and the conduct of the mission.
same way as for the variable component of the fine
referred to in paragraph 1.
3. The
Commission
may
invite
representatives
of
the
European Central Bank, if appropriate, to participate in
3. No single fine referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall
surveillance missions in a Member State whose currency
exceed 0,5 % of GDP.’;
is the euro or which is participating in the Agreement of
16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and
the national central banks of the Member States outside
the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an
(12) Article 13 is hereby deleted and the reference to it in
exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and
Article 15 is replaced by a reference to ‘Article 12’;
Monetary Union (*) (ERM II).
(13) Article 16 is replaced by the following:
4. The
Commission
shall
report
to
the
Council
on
the
outcome of the mission referred to in paragraph 2 and
may decide to make its findings public.
‘Article 16
The fines referred to in Article 12 shall constitute other
5. When
organising
surveillance
missions
referred
to
in
revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be
paragraph 2, the Commission shall transmit its provisional
assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. When
findings to the Member States concerned for comments.;
the participating Member States create another stability
mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the
___________
amount of those fines shall be assigned to that
(*) OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21.’
mechanism.’;

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L 306/40
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(14) the following Article is inserted:
3. The report shall be forwarded to the European
Parliament and to the Council.’;
‘Article 17a
1. By
14
December
2014
and
every
five
years
thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the
(15) throughout Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, all references to
application of this Regulation.
‘Article 104 of the Treaty’ are replaced by references to
‘Article 126 TFEU’;
That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;
(16) in point 2 of the Annex, the references in Column I to
‘Article 4(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No
(b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of
3605/93’ are replaced by references to ‘Article 3(2) and
economic policies and sustained convergence of
(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009’.
economic performances of the Member States in
accordance with the TFEU.
Article 2
2. Where appropriate,
the report referred to in
paragraph 1 shall be accompanied by a proposal for
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following
amendments to this Regulation.
its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 8 November 2011.
For the Council
The President
J. VINCENT-ROSTOWSKI

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