HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"L 306/8
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
REGULATION (EU) No 1174/2011 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 16 November 2011
on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009
EUROPEAN UNION,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 March 2009 on European statistics ( 4 ). In addition,
the availability of sound fiscal data is also relevant for
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. This
Union, and in particular Article 136, in combination with
requirement should be guaranteed by the rules
Article 121(6) thereof,
provided in this regard by Regulation (EU) No
1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
area ( 5 ), in particular its Article 8.
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national
(3) The
coordination
of
the
economic
policies
of
the
parliaments,
Member States within the Union should be developed
in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines
and the employment guidelines, as provided for by the
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank (
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

1 ),
and should entail compliance with the guiding principles
of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances
and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and
payments.
Social Committee ( 2 ),
(4)
Experience gained and mistakes made during the first
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure ( 3 ),
decade of the economic and monetary union show a
need for improved economic governance in the Union,
which should be built on stronger national ownership of
Whereas:
commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more
robust framework at the level of the Union for the
surveillance of national economic policies.
(1)
The improved economic governance framework should
rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for
sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union
(5) Achieving
and
maintaining
a
dynamic
internal
market
strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus
should be considered an element of the proper and
upon developing and strengthening the internal market,
smooth functioning of the economic and monetary
fostering international trade and competitiveness, a
union.
European Semester for strengthened coordination of
economic and budgetary policies, an effective
framework for preventing and correcting excessive
government deficits (the Stability and Growth Pact
(6) In
particular,
surveillance
of
the
economic
policies
of
the
(SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and correcting
Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary
macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for
surveillance to include a more detailed and formal
national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial
framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic
market regulation and supervision, including macropru
imbalances and to help the Member States affected to
dential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.
establish corrective plans before divergences become

entrenched and before economic and financial devel
opments take a durable turn in an excessively unfa
vourable direction. Such broadening of the surveillance
(2)
Reliable statistical data is the basis for the surveillance of
of economic policies should take place in parallel with a
macroeconomic imbalances. In order to guarantee sound
deepening of fiscal surveillance.
and independent statistics, Member States should ensure
the professional independence of national statistical
authorities, consistent with the European statistics code
(7) To
help correct such excessive macroeconomic
imbalances, it is necessary to lay down a detailed
( 1 ) OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.
procedure in legislation.
( 2 ) OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 53.
( 3 ) Position of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 (not yet
published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of
( 4 ) OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164.
8 November 2011.
( 5 ) See page 1 of this Official Journal.

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EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union
L
306/9
(8) It
is
appropriate
to
supplement
the
multilateral (14) To
ensure
equal
treatment
between
Member
States,
the
surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and
interest-bearing deposit and the fine should be identical
4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the
for all Member States whose currency is the euro and
detection of macroeconomic imbalances as well as the
equal to 0,1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of
prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic
the Member State concerned in the preceding year.
imbalances within the Union. It is essential that the
procedure be embedded in the annual multilateral
surveillance cycle.
(15) The
Commission
should
be
able
to
recommend
reducing
the amount of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of
exceptional economic circumstances.
(9) Strengthening
economic
governance
should
include
a
closer and more timely involvement of the European
Parliament and the national parliaments. While recog
nising that the counterparts of the European Parliament
(16) The
procedure
for
applying
sanctions
to
those
Member
in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant insti
States which fail to take effective measures to correct
tutions of the Union and their representatives, the
excessive macroeconomic imbalances should be
competent committee of the European Parliament may
construed in such a way that the application of the
offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of
sanctions to those Member States would be the rule
views to a Member State which is the subject of a
and not the exception.
Council decision imposing an interest-bearing deposit
or an annual fine in accordance with this Regulation.
The Member State's participation in such an exchange
of views is voluntary.
(17) Fines
referred
to
in
this
Regulation
should
constitute
other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and
should be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide
financial assistance, created by Member States whose
(10) The
Commission
should
have
a
stronger
role
in
the
currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability
enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments
of the euro area as a whole.
that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-
site missions, recommendations and warnings.
(18) The
power
to
adopt
individual
decisions
for
the
appli
cation of the sanctions provided for in this Regulation
(11) Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the
should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coor
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November
dination of the economic policies of the Member States
2011 on the prevention and correction of macro
conducted within the Council as provided for in
economic imbalances ( 1 ) should be strengthened by
Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an
establishing interest-bearing deposits in case of non-
integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the
compliance with the recommendation to take corrective
Council in accordance with Article 121 TFEU and Regu
action. Such deposits should be converted into an annual
lation (EU) No 1176/2011.
fine in the case of continued non-compliance with the
recommendation to address excessive macroeconomic
imbalances within the same imbalances procedure.
Those enforcement measures should be applicable to
Member States whose currency is the euro.
(19) Since
this Regulation contains general rules for the

effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011,
it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) TFEU.
(12) In
the
case
of
failure
to
comply
with
Council
recommen
dations, the interest-bearing deposit or the fine should be
imposed until the Council establishes that the Member
State has taken corrective action to comply with its
(20) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the
effective enforcement of the correction of excessive
recommendations.
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the
deep trade and financial interlinks between Member
States and the spill-over effects of national economic
(13) Moreover,
repeated
failure
of
the
Member
State
to
draw
policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole,
up a corrective action plan to address the Council recom
and can therefore be better achieved at the level of the
mendation should also be subject to an annual fine as a
Union, the Union may adopt measures in accordance
rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State
with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in
has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In
addresses its recommendation.
accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set
out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond
( 1 ) See page 25 of this Official Journal.
what is necessary to achieve that objective,

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L 306/10
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
3. The decisions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be
deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified
majority, to reject the recommendation within 10 days of its
Article 1
adoption by the Commission. The Council may decide, by
qualified majority, to amend the recommendation.
Subject matter and scope
1. This
Regulation
lays
down
a
system
of
sanctions
for
the
effective correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in
the euro area.
4. The
Commission's
recommendation
for
a
Council
decision
shall be issued within 20 days of the conditions referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 being met.
2. This
Regulation
shall
apply
to
Member
States
whose
currency is the euro.
5. The
interest-bearing
deposit
or
the
annual
fine
recom
mended by the Commission shall be 0,1 % of the GDP in the
Article 2
preceding year of the Member State concerned.
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions set out in
Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 shall apply.
6. By
derogation
from
paragraph
5,
the
Commission
may,
on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following
a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to
In addition, the following definition shall apply:
the Commission within 10 days of the conditions referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 being met, propose to reduce or cancel the
interest-bearing deposit or the annual fine.
‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances
where an excess of a government deficit over the reference
value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the
second indent of point (a) of Article 126(2) TFEU and as
7. If
a
Member
State
has
constituted
an
interest-bearing
specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July
deposit or has paid an annual fine for a given calendar year
1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of
and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with
the excessive deficit procedure (
Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 that the

1 ).
Member State has taken the recommended corrective action
in the course of that year, the deposit paid for that year
Article 3
together with the accrued interest or the fine paid for that
year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis.
Sanctions
1. An interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by a Council
decision, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, if
Article 4
a Council decision establishing non-compliance is adopted in
accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU)
Allocation of the fines
No 1176/2011, where the Council concludes that the
Member State concerned has not taken the corrective action
Fines referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute
recommended by the Council.
other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be
assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. When the
Member States whose currency is the euro create another
stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to
2. An
annual
fine
shall
be
imposed
by
a
Council
decision, safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, those fines
acting on a recommendation by the Commission, where:
shall be assigned to that mechanism.
(a) two successive Council recommendations in the same
imbalance procedure are adopted in accordance with
Article 5
Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and the
Council considers that the Member State has submitted an
Voting in the Council
insufficient corrective action plan; or
1. For
the
measures
referred
to
in
Article
3,
only
members
of
the Council representing Member States whose currency is the
euro shall vote, and the Council shall act without taking into
(b) two successive Council decisions in the same imbalance
account the vote of the member of the Council representing the
procedure are adopted establishing non-compliance in
Member State concerned.
accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU)
No 1176/2011. In this case, the annual fine shall be
imposed by means of converting the interest-bearing
deposit into an annual fine.
2. A qualified majority of the members of the Council
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be defined in accordance with
( 1 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.
point (b) of Article 238(3) TFEU.

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EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/11
Article 6
That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
Economic dialogue
(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;
In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union insti
tutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and
(b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic
accountability, the competent committee of the European
policies and sustained convergence of economic
Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the
performances of the Member States in accordance with
Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the
the TFEU.
European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to
appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken
2. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a
pursuant to Article 3.
proposal for amendments to this Regulation.
The competent committee of the European Parliament may
offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such
3. The
Commission
shall
send
the
report
and
any
accom
decisions to participate in an exchange of views.
panying proposals to the European Parliament and to the
Council.
Article 7
Article 8
Review
Entry into force
1. By
14
December
2014
and
every
5
years
thereafter,
the
Commission shall publish a report on the application of this
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following
Regulation.
its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in
accordance with the Treaties.
Done at Strasbourg, 16 November 2011.
For the European Parliament
For the Council
The President
The President
J. BUZEK
W. SZCZUKA

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