16.2.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 39/6

(1)

Avian influenza is an infectious viral disease in birds, including poultry. Infections with avian influenza viruses in domestic poultry cause two main forms of that disease that are distinguished by their virulence. The low pathogenic form generally only causes mild symptoms, while the highly pathogenic form results in very high mortality rates in most poultry species. That disease may have a severe impact on the profitability of poultry farming.

(2)

Directive 2005/94/EC sets out the minimum control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of that disease in poultry or other captive birds and also provides for certain preventive measures relating to the surveillance and the early detection of avian influenza.

(3)

Directive 2005/94/EC also provides that detailed rules, required by the epidemiological situation, to supplement the minimum control measures laid down in that Directive, may be adopted by the Commission.

(4)

Wild birds, in particular wild migratory water birds, are known to be the natural host for avian influenza viruses of low pathogenicity which they carry, usually without showing signs of that disease, during their seasonal migratory movements. However, since mid-2005, evidence has established that a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus strain of subtype H5N1 is able to infect wild birds and be spread by them over long distances (4).

(5)

The presence of avian influenza viruses in wild birds poses a continuing threat for the direct and indirect introduction of these viruses into holdings where poultry or other captive birds are kept with the risk of the subsequent spread of the virus from an infected holding to other holdings.

(6)

Commission Decision 2005/734/EC (5) was adopted following the introduction of the HPAI virus of the H5N1 subtype from South East Asia to Europe by the westward spread of the virus during 2005 in order to reinforce the control measures already laid in Union legislation, in particular in view of the risks posed by the unprecedented intercontinental spread of that HPAI virus by wild birds.

(7)

Decision 2005/734/EC provides for biosecurity and additional risk mitigation measures to reduce the risk of transmission of the HPAI H5N1 virus from wild birds to poultry and other captive birds by preventing direct and indirect contacts between these populations. Decision 2005/734/EC requires Member States to identify the areas of their territory that are at particular risk for the introduction of the HPAI H5N1 virus into holdings where poultry and other captive birds are present, taking into account the epidemiological situation and specific risk factors. Member States are required to apply certain risk mitigation measures in those high risk areas, for example ensure that poultry concerned are confined indoors. Member States are also required to ensure that owners are made more aware of the risks of transmission and of the necessity that biosecurity measures be applied on their holdings.

(8)

Furthermore, Decision 2005/734/EC requires that Member States introduce early detection systems that are aimed at a rapid reporting of any sign of avian influenza in poultry flocks by the owners to the competent veterinary authority which should take into account specific parameters and slight changes in production data.

(9)

Commission Decision 2010/367/EU (6) lays down guidelines for the mandatory implementation by Member States of surveillance programmes for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds including sampling and laboratory testing requirements. It also provides for the competent authorities to be notified without delay of any abnormal mortality or significant disease or mortality in wild birds and in particular in wild migratory water birds.

(10)

During the latter part of 2014 and early part of 2015, the HPAI H5N8 virus was introduced into the Union by wild birds. It caused very low mortality in wild birds, but led to serious outbreaks in poultry or other captive birds in several Member States.

(11)

Since the end of October 2016, a very closely related HPAI H5N8 virus strain has been detected in wild migratory birds, mainly found dead, in 20 Member States, namely in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as in nearby third countries such as Switzerland, Serbia and Ukraine. The majority of outbreaks were confirmed in France, Hungary and Bulgaria in certain areas with a high number of holdings keeping ducks and geese.

(12)

The current epidemiological situation is very dynamic and constantly evolving. Movements of migratory birds continue and Member States' ongoing surveillance activities continue to detect the HPAI H5N8 virus in wild birds. The virus will, therefore, remain a threat for poultry and other captive birds in the Union for the coming months and most likely during further seasonal movements of migratory birds with the risk of further virus transmission between holdings in certain high risk settings.

(13)

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is currently preparing a comprehensive scientific opinion on avian influenza to be finalised in September 2017. However, in view of the current HPAI H5N8 epidemic, the EFSA was requested to provide an urgent assessment of the epidemiological situation and preliminary scientific advice on the suitability of the protective measures laid down at Union level that are in place in relation to the risks posed by wild birds infected with HPAI H5N8.

(14)

On 20 December 2016, the Animal Health and Welfare Panel of the EFSA published the statement: ‘Urgent request on avian influenza’ (7) confirming that the strict implementation of biosecurity and risk mitigation measures are the most important means to prevent the transmission of HPAI viruses, of both H5 and H7 subtypes, either directly or indirectly from wild birds into holdings keeping poultry and captive birds. Biosecurity on such holdings should be routine practice and be reinforced during periods of increased risk.

(15)

The EFSA further concluded that passive surveillance of wild birds is the most effective means for the early detection of the presence of HPAI viruses in wild birds and recommends targeting the sampling and testing of wild birds, thereby reinforcing certain provisions concerning wild birds set out in the guidelines on the implementation of the surveillance programmes for avian influenza in wild birds laid down in Annex II to Decision 2010/367/EU.

(16)

The EFSA further refers to the assessment (8) performed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) which states that to date, no human infections with the current HPAI H5N8 virus have ever been reported worldwide and that further virus characterisation shows that it is still essentially a bird virus without any specific increased affinity for humans.

(17)

The experience gained by the competent authorities of the Member States in the implementation of the measures laid down in Decision 2005/734/EC show that flexibility should be maintained in order to be able to adapt those measures to the epidemiological situation in the individual Member State.

(18)

In order to target the bird populations that are most at risk and to ensure the effectiveness of the measures laid down in this Decision, certain preventive measures should be targeted at holdings keeping poultry.

(19)

The measures laid down in Decision 2005/734/EC should therefore be reviewed and adapted taking into account the current epidemiological situation in poultry and in wild birds in the Member States, the statement on avian influenza published by EFSA on 20 December 2016 and the experience gained by the Member States in the practical implementation of the measures laid down in that Decision.

(20)

The measures laid down in Decision 2005/734/EC have been amended and prolonged several times and are applicable until 31 December 2017. In the interests of clarity of Union legislation, Decision 2005/734/EC should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.

(21)

The measures laid down in this Decision are to be reviewed, if necessary, in the light of the final outcome of the EFSA's scientific opinion on avian influenza which is to be finalised in September 2017.

(22)

The measures laid down in this Decision should apply until 30 June 2018.

(23)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(a)

the epidemiological situation on their territory or on the territory of nearby Member States or third countries, in particular with respect to:

(b)

the risk factors for the introduction of HPAI viruses into holdings, in particular with respect to:

(c)

additional risk factors for the spread of HPAI viruses within holdings and between such holdings, in particular, where:

(d)

risk assessments in relation to the relevance of the spread of HPAI viruses by wild birds carried out by the European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) and by national and international risk assessment bodies;

(e)

the results of surveillance programmes carried out in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2005/94/EC.

(a)

the keeping of poultry in the open air;

(b)

the use of outdoor water reservoirs for poultry;

(c)

the provision of water to poultry from surface water reservoirs that can be accessed by wild birds;

(d)

the storage of feed for poultry that is unprotected from wild birds or other animals.

(a)

the gathering of poultry and other captive birds at markets, shows, exhibitions and cultural events;

(b)

the use of decoy birds of the orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes (‘decoy birds’).

(a)

the keeping of poultry in the open air subject to compliance with the following conditions:

(b)

the use of outdoor water reservoirs where they are required for animal welfare reasons for certain poultry and they are sufficiently screened against wild water birds;

(c)

the provision of water to poultry from surface water accessed by wild water birds after treatment that ensures the inactivation of avian influenza viruses.

(a)

the gatherings of poultry and other captive birds at markets, shows, exhibitions and cultural events;

(b)

the use of decoy birds: