HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"L 164/10
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.6.2012
DECISIONS
COMMISSION DECISION
of 25 January 2012
concerning the aid granted by Greece to cereal-producing farmers and cereal-collecting cooperatives
(SA 27354 (C 36/10) (ex NN 3/10, ex CP 11/09))
(notified under document C(2011) 9335)
(Only the Greek text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2012/320/EU)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
on the measure in question. The Greek authorities did
not reply by the deadline set in that letter and the
Commission sent them a reminder on 24 March 2009.
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2)
thereof,
(4) On
14
May
2009,
the
Greek
authorities
sent
the
Commission a letter, providing only very limited
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
information on the aid that was the subject of the
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,
complaint. On 11 June 2009, the Commission sent the
Greek authorities a second request for information, with
more detailed questions regarding the alleged State aid.
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 108(2) of the
Treaty ( 1 ) and having regard to their comments,
(5) On
20
July
2009,
the
Greek
authorities
asked
for
the
deadline for providing the relevant information to be
extended until 30 August 2009. By letter dated 23 July
Whereas:
2009, the Commission agreed to this extension. By e-
mail of 1 September 2009, the Greek authorities asked
for the deadline to be extended by another month. By
I. PROCEDURE
letter dated 14 September, the Commission granted a
second deadline extension, until 30 September 2009.
(1) On
18
November
2008,
the
Commission
received
by
e-
mail information regarding aid allegedly granted by the
Greek State to cereal-producing farmers and to Unions of
Agricultural Cooperatives that collect cereals. The alleged
aid took the form of interest-free loans. By letter dated
(6)
Over two months after the set deadline the Commission
21 November 2008, the Commission asked the Greek
had still not received a reply and on 1 December 2009 it
authorities to provide information on the aid in question.
sent the Greek authorities a reminder, giving them one
more month to provide the information. In the reminder,
the Commission brought the Greek authorities’ attention
to the fact that if they did not reply within the period
(2) By
letter
dated
24
November
2008,
the
Commission
prescribed, the Commission would require information
asked the complainant to submit a complete complaint
to be provided (an ‘information injunction’) pursuant to
form. The Commission received the form on 8 January
Article 10(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of
2009.
22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the appli
cation of Article 93 of the EC Treaty ( 2 ) (*). In addition,
on 26 January 2010 the case was entered in the register
(3) Following
receipt
of
the
complaint
form,
and
as
the
of non-notified aid, under number NN 3/10.
Greek authorities had not replied to its letter of
21 November 2008, the Commission sent them a
( 2 ) OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.
second letter on 23 January 2009 requesting information
(*) Subsequently Article 88 of the EC Treaty. As of 1 December 2009,
Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty were replaced by Articles 107
and 108 respectively of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
( 1 ) OJ C 90, 22.3.2011, p. 11.
European Union.

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23.6.2012 Official
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(7)
The deadline set by the Commission passed without the
II.2. Background
Greek authorities having provided any information.
Therefore, on 10 March 2010 the Commission adopted
(12) According
to
the
information
submitted
by
the
Greek
a decision pursuant to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC)
authorities, during 2008 Greek farmers sowed an
No 659/1999 requiring the Greek authorities to provide
additional 60 thousand hectares (600 thousand
the information required.
stremmata) of maize compared to the previous year.
This resulted in significant over-production of maize,
and subsequently a fall in prices. The same occurred
with wheat. Due to this fact, and due to the economic
(8) The
Greek
authorities
replied
on
19
March
2010.
In
their
crisis, the Greek government decided to grant support to
reply, they claimed that they had replied to the Commis
Greek producers.
sion’s letter of 1 December 2009 by letter dated
9 February 2010. By letter dated 17 May 2010, the
Commission sent the Greek authorities a number of
additional questions. It also asked them to provide
(13) According to the Greek authorities, the support was
proof that they had sent the Commission a letter on
granted to producer organisations, i.e. Unions of Agri
9 February 2010. Meanwhile, the Commission received
cultural Cooperatives (UACs). The UACs did not have the
additional information from the complainant concerning
necessary funds to support farmers’ incomes, nor had
the aid in question. It therefore sent another letter to the
they access to financial markets in order to arrange
Greek authorities, dated 18 June 2010, giving them the
loans, because of the financial crisis. The Greek auth
opportunity to comment on the new information. The
orities argued further that if, during the winter of
Greek authorities replied to the Commission’s letter of
2008, the Cooperatives had sold the amounts of
17 May 2010, but did not provide any proof that they
cereals collected, prices would have fallen significantly
had sent the Commission a letter on 9 February 2010.
and producers would have suffered significant losses.
On 30 September 2010, the Greek authorities replied to
Therefore, in order to prevent a drop in cereal prices,
the Commission’s letter of 18 June 2010.
and to ensure a minimum income for farmers, the
Greek government decided to grant UACs, and indirectly
farmers (who had delivered their produce to the Cooper
atives), aid in the form of a State-guaranteed loan with an
(9) By
letter
dated
15
December
2010,
the
Commission
interest-rate subsidy. According to the Greek authorities,
notified Greece of its decision to initiate the procedure
the loan amounts granted to the UACs would then be
laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty concerning the
passed on to the producers for the amounts of cereals
aid concerned. By letter dated 21 January 2011, the
purchased or received by UACs in 2008. Owing to the
Greek authorities submitted their comments on the
protracted crisis in the cereals market the Greek auth
Commission’s decision of 15 December 2010. The
orities extended the deadline set for the repayment of the
Commission sent the Greek authorities some additional
loans until 30 September 2010.
questions in a letter dated 5 May 2011, to which they
replied on 6 June 2011.
ΙΙ.3. Measure
(14) The
Greek
authorities
adopted
a
number
of
Decisions
(10) The
Commission’s
decision
to
initiate
the
procedure
was
putting the aid into effect.
published in the Official Journal of the European Union (


3 ).
The Commission called on interested parties to submit
their comments regarding the measure in question. The
Commission received comments from one interested
party, who argued that the measures in question were
(15) Decision No 56700/B.3033 of 8 December 2008 of the
illegal. These comments were notified to the Greek auth
Greek Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance stipu
orities, who then submitted their comments in a letter
lates, inter alia, the following:
dated 1 December 2011.
‘Article 1. Approval is hereby granted for an interest-rate
II. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE AID
subsidy for loans which have been, or will be, granted in
2008 by financial institutions to Unions of Agricultural
ΙΙ.1. Complaint
Cooperatives (UACs) and Primary Agricultural Cooper
atives in Greece, to be used to pay producers for quan
(11) On
18
November
2008,
the
Commission
received
by
e-
tities of cereals purchased or received in 2008. The loans
mail information regarding aid allegedly granted by the
in question shall be subsidised from the date they are
Greek State to cereal-producing farmers and to Unions of
granted. […]
Agricultural Cooperatives. According to this complaint,
the aid took the form of the interest-free loans
amounting to EUR 150 million granted to Unions of
Agricultural Cooperatives in the cereals sector.
Article 3. The duration of the loans in question shall be
from the date of granting to the date of repayment,
( 3 ) See footnote 1.
which shall not be later than 30 September 2009. […].’

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L 164/12
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Official Journal of the European Union
23.6.2012
(16) Decision No 2/88675/0025 of 9 December 2008 of the
(20) Under Article 1 of the Loan Agreement between ATE
Greek Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance stipu
Bank and the UACs (the ‘Loan Agreement’), the loan
lates, inter alia, the following:
granted by ATE Bank should only be used by the
borrower for the purchase or receipt of cereals
produced in 2008.
‘1. The
Greek
State
shall
grant
a
100
%
guarantee
to
secure the loans to be granted by financial institutions to
Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (UACs) and Primary
(21) Concerning the conditions for granting the loan, the
Agricultural Cooperatives in Greece, to be used to pay
Greek authorities indicated that the interest rate was
producers for quantities of cereals purchased or received
the rate applicable to 12-month Greek treasury bonds
in 2008, in accordance with the provisions of Law
(issued just before the date on which the interest
2322/1995. The loans granted by financial institutions
started to run), plus 30 %. They further argued that the
to UACs and Primary Agricultural Cooperatives in 2008
Loan Agreement between ATE Bank and the UACs
for the purchase of cereals shall be subject to the
included a condition that proves that no State aid was
provisions of this Decision from the date they are
involved. That condition stated: ‘The borrower hereby
granted. The total amount of loans which have been,
assumes the obligation, prior to disbursement of the
or will be, granted shall not exceed EUR 150 million.
loan, to sign with the Greek State, as represented by
[…]
the Bank for the purposes hereof, a collateral contract
over the products, by-products and other movables that
the borrower will purchase with this loan, and over all
the goods that are under his ownership or management,
3. […]
In
the
event
of
failure
to
repay
the
unpaid
part
pursuant to the provisions of Law 2844/2000.’ In other
of the loan upon maturity, such amount shall become
words, the collateral is provided by the UACs to the State
due and payable. In order to have their guaranteed claims
(as represented by ATE Bank), and is constituted by the
reimbursed by the State, the Banks shall submit the
products purchased by the UACs using the loan.
supporting documents specified in Decision No
2/478/0025/04.01.2006 (Government Gazette, Series II,
No 16, 13.1.2006) of the Minister for Economic Affairs
and Finance within three months of maturity of the loan.’
(22) Decision No 2/21304/0025 was taken by the Deputy
Minister for Finance on 26 October 2010. According
to this Decision:
(17) By virtue of Decisions No 46825/B.2248 of
29 September 2009 and No 2/69591/0025 of
‘A. The
Unions
of
Agricultural
Cooperatives
(UACs)
2 October 2009 of the Minister for Economic Affairs
and Primary Agricultural Cooperatives in Greece that
and Finance, the deadline for repayment of the loans
have obtained Greek State-guaranteed loans under
was extended to 30 December 2010.
Decision No 2/88675/0025/9.12.2008 of the Deputy
Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, as currently
in force, shall have the option of restructuring loans
guaranteed by the Greek State under the above
(18) Decision No 8264 of 9 December 2008 of the Greek
Decision maturing on 30 September 2010 as follows:
Minister for Rural Development and Food provided for
the allocation of the amount of EUR 150 million to 57
Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives. It also referred to a
Decision of 12 November 2008 of the Governmental
The total duration of the restructured loan shall be five
Commission concerning the granting of loans
years, payable in half-yearly instalments (principal and
amounting to EUR 150 million to the Unions of Agri
interest), with the first instalment due on 30 March
cultural Cooperatives and their members.
2011 and the last on 30 September 2015.
(19) According
to
the
letter
from
the
Greek
authorities
sent
In addition, each borrower shall pay to the Greek State,
on 19 March 2010, all the loans in question (except one)
until maturity of the loan, a safe-harbour premium
were granted by the Agricultural Bank of Greece (here
amounting to 2 % of the current unpaid part of the
inafter ‘ATE Bank’). The Greek authorities added that the
loan. The first premium shall be paid upon payment of
interest-rate subsidy and guarantee granted by the State
the first instalment on 30 March 2011.
in the cereals sector were necessary in order to deal with
the fall of prices in 2008, which was caused by the
overproduction of cereals in Greece. In this letter, the
The existing collateral guarantees in the form of cereals
Greek authorities expressed the opinion that the small
in favour of the Greek State are hereby abolished.
credit facility granted by the State could not be
considered as State aid, as it did not distort or threaten
to distort competition, nor did it affect trade between
Member States. The Greek authorities added that the
The interest rate on the restructured loan shall be the rate
benefit from the measure in question for individual
used by each financial institution for the same category
producers was minimal.
of loans. […]’

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III. COMMENTS MADE BY GREECE
Article 107(1) of the Treaty, the Commission would
point out that there are two aspects of the measure
(23) In
their
reply
dated
21 January
2011, the
Greek
auth
that should be examined in the light of this provision:
orities argued that both the interest-rate subsidy and
(a) the interest-rate subsidy, and (b) the State guarantee.
State guarantee for the loans must be viewed in the
light of the Communication from the Commission
concerning the temporary Community framework for
State aid measures to support access to finance in the
current financial and economic crisis (
ΙV.1.1. Interest-rate subsidy

4 ) (hereinafter ‘tem
porary framework’). In particular, it was argued that the
(29) The
interest-rate
subsidy
granted
by
the
Greek
State
to
loans in question were granted during the financial and
the cooperatives pursuant to Ministerial Decision No
economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 and were aimed at
56700/B.3033/8.12.2008 meets all the conditions laid
overcoming that crisis.
down in Article 107(1) of the Treaty. The subsidy is
granted by the Greek State and it confers a clear
advantage, as in reality it makes the loan completely
(24) The Greek authorities also held that, due to the large
interest-free. The direct beneficiaries of the aid are the
number of final beneficiaries (cooperative members),
cooperatives. However, given that the intention of the
the benefit from the interest-free loan for each bene
State by granting the loans was to increase the income
ficiary was so limited that it could not be considered
of Greek farmers by artificially increasing the price of
to be causing distortions.
cereals sold by producers to cooperatives, the farmers
(producers) are the indirect beneficiaries of the aid.
Lastly, the selectivity condition is also met, since the
beneficiaries of the aid are those cooperatives only and,
(25) Lastly,
the
Greek
authorities
argued
that
each
borrower’s
in the final instance, farmers who purchased or produced
obligation to pay a 2
% insurance premium, in
cereals in Greece in 2008. The interest-rate subsidy was
accordance with Ministerial Decision No
granted until application of Ministerial Decision No
2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 proves that there was no
2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 and prior to the restructuring
State aid.
of the loans, when it was stipulated that the interest rate
applicable to the restructured loan would be the rate
applied by each financial institution for the same
category of loans.
(26) In
their
letter
of
1
December
2011,
the
Greek
authorities
repeated a number of the arguments presented during the
procedure concerning the need to implement these
measures and the reasons for this. They also argued
(30) Concerning
the
‘distortion
of
competition’
condition,
in
that the issue of Ministerial Decision No
accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice, the
2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 and the application of an
mere fact that the competitive position of an undertaking
interest rate when the loans were restructured (the rate
is strengthened as compared to other competing under
applied by each financial institution for the same
takings, by giving it an economic benefit which it would
category of loans) indicated that the interest-rate
not otherwise have received in the normal course of its
subsidy did not constitute aid. They added that, in the
business, points to a possible distortion of competi
period from 2009 to 28 November 2011, the interest-
tion (
rate subsidies granted by the State amounted to EUR

5 ). Aid to an undertaking appears to affect trade
between Member States where that undertaking
7 762 113.
operates in a market open to intra-Community
trade ( 6 ). Furthermore, according to the case law of the
Court, there is no threshold or percentage below which
ΙV. ASSESSMENT OF THE AID
trade between the Member States can be regarded as not
having been affected. Even the relatively small amount of
ΙV.1. Existence of aid within the meaning of
aid or the relatively small size of the undertakings does
Article 107(1) of the Treaty
not a priori mean that trade between the Member States
is not affected ( 7 ). There is substantial intra-Community
(27) Under
Article
107(1)
of
the
Treaty,
any
aid
granted
by
a
trade in the cereals sector. Therefore, the present measure
Member State or through State resources in any form
is liable to affect trade between Member States.
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade
between Member States, is incompatible with the internal
(31) In the light of the above, it appears that as regards the
market.
interest-rate subsidy all the conditions laid down in
Article 107(1) are met.
(28) Before proceeding to the assessment of whether the
( 5 ) Judgment of the Court in Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v
measure in question meets the conditions laid down in
Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 2671.
( 6 ) See in particular the judgment of the Court in Case 102/87 French
Republic v Commission of the European Communities [1988] ECR 4067.
( 4 ) OJ C 16, 22.1.2009, p. 1. The Communication was amended in
( 7 ) Judgment of the Court in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH
October 2009 (OJ C 261, 31.10.2009).
[2003] ECR I-7741, paragraph 81.

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L 164/14
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Official Journal of the European Union
23.6.2012
ΙV.1.2. State guarantee
(36) Lastly, the Greek authorities argued that the collateral
provided by the UACs to the State, as provided for in
(32) By Ministerial Decision No 2/88675/0025/9.12.2008,
the Loan Agreement, indicates that there is no aid.
the Greek Government decided to grant Cooperatives
However, as decided by the Commission in the
its guarantee for the loans contracted with ATE Bank.
decision on initiating the procedure, this is not the
In general terms, the criteria laid down in Article 107(1)
case for the following reasons: (a) First, if the cooper
of the Treaty apply to guarantees. As indicated in Section
atives fail to pay back the loans, it will be at the
2.1 of the Commission Notice on application of Articles
discretion of the State whether to make use of the
87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of
rights granted by the collateral agreements or not. (b)
guarantees ( 8 ) (hereinafter ‘Notice on Guarantees’), guar
Second, it appears that the collateral does not secure
antees granted directly by the State may indeed constitute
the full amount of the loan, since the price paid by the
State aid. The benefit of a State guarantee is that the risk
UACs to the farmers for the purchase of cereals (which
associated with the guarantee is borne by the State. This
should normally be equal to the loan amounts) is higher
risk should normally be remunerated by an appropriate
than the market price.
premium (Section 2.2 of the Notice on Guarantees).
When the State forgoes such a premium, there is both
a benefit for the undertaking to which the State
guarantee is granted and a drain on the resources of
(37) It
should
also
be
noted
that
this
collateral
was
abolished
the State. The guarantee in this case is therefore
by Ministerial Decision No 2/21304/0025/26.10.2010.
granted through State resources. The Notice on Guar
As referred to in recital 22 above, this collateral was
antees further specifies that if it turns out that no
replaced by the 2 % premium as of the date of the first
payments are ever made by the State under a guarantee
repayment due on 30 March 2011. In their letter of
there may still be State aid.
7 June 2011, the Greek authorities held that, in
accordance with the Notice on Guarantees, the
provision of premium is a ‘safe-harbour’ for small and
medium-sized undertakings whose repayment ability may
(33) The benefit granted to the UACs and, in the final
be affected by adverse conditions. This argument is inad
instance, to farmers from the guarantee is clear: the
missible for the reasons detailed in recitals 38, 39
borrowers did not have to pay, at least until 30 March
and 40.
2011 (see recital 22) the appropriate premium which
should normally be paid to remunerate the appropriate
risk. Also, compared to a situation without a guarantee,
the State guarantee enables the borrowers to obtain
(38) First, the provision on the 2 % safe-harbour premium
better financial terms for loans than those normally
was established as late as October 2010 and pertained
available on the financial markets. Section 3.4 of the
only to the amounts due in September 2010. Even if we
Notice on Guarantees provides a list of all conditions
were to accept, quod non, that this premium removed any
that have to be met in order for a State guarantee
State aid element, the State guarantee would still
scheme not to be considered as State aid. It is clear
constitute State aid until that time.
that the measure under examination does not meet all
the conditions in question. For example, at least two of
these conditions appear not to be met in this case. The
guarantee in question covers more than 80 % of the
(39) Second, it appears from the wording of Ministerial
loans, and the scheme under examination appears not
Decision No 2/21304/0025/26.10.2010 that the UACs
to be closed to borrowers in financial difficulty.
may make use, but are under no obligation to make use, of
the relevant provision (see recital 22). The Greek auth
orities noted in this respect that, in fact, the borrowers
had to make use of the provision in question since, as
(34) As mentioned in recital 29, the direct beneficiaries of this
laid down in Article 13 of the Loan Agreement, unless
aid are the cooperatives. However, given that the
they repaid the loan by 30 September 2009, the amount
intention of the Greek State in granting the loans was
due would become payable by the State within three
to increase the income of Greek farmers by artificially
months, and the latter would in turn take administrative
increasing the price of cereals sold by producers to
enforcement action against the borrower. This argument
Cooperatives, the farmers (producers) are the indirect
is also inadmissible: if the State repays the amounts due,
beneficiaries of the aid. The selectivity condition is
it is not certain that it will take action against the original
equally fulfilled, since the beneficiaries of the aid are
debtor with a view to recovering those amounts — it can
only those cooperatives and farmers who purchased or
always use its discretion not to do so.
produced cereals in Greece in 2008.
(40) Lastly, it appears the 2 % premium is not in itself an
element which, pursuant to the Notice on Guarantees,
(35) The same considerations apply to the ‘distortion of
proves that there is no State aid, as argued by the
competition’ and ‘effect on trade’ conditions as those
Greek authorities. Even if we were to accept that all
referred to in recital 30.
the beneficiaries under the measure were small and
medium-sized undertakings, as argued by the Greek auth
( 8 ) OJ C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10.
orities, the part of the Notice on Guarantees that would

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apply is Section 3.5. In this Section, the Notice explains
Greek authorities admit in their letter of 19 March 2010
that, in order for a guarantee granted under a scheme
that one of the purposes of the measure was ‘to ensure a
that requires a single premium to be regarded as not
minimum income for producers’.
constituting State aid, all the other conditions set out
in points 3.4(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) have to be met.
As already explained in recital 33, these conditions are
(46) Furthermore, since the loans of EUR 150 million were
not met in this case: the guarantee in question covers
intended for the purchase by the UACs of cereals
more than 80 % of the loans, and the scheme under
produced by their members (Ministerial Decision No
examination appears not to be closed to borrowers in
8264 of 9 December 2008), the aid appears to have
financial difficulty.
been granted on the basis of the quantities produced.
(47) The type of aid granted by Greece is not provided for in
(41) In the light of the above, as regards the State guarantee
the agricultural guidelines or other Union rules on the
for the loans, all the conditions laid down in
subject, nor have the Greek authorities claimed that it is.
Article 107(1) are met.
It therefore appears to constitute operating aid which was
intended to increase farmers’ incomes by artificially
increasing cereal prices. Such measures are strictly
ΙV.2. Compatibility of the aid
forbidden by Union rules on State aid.
ΙV.2.1. General comments
(48) It
should
be
recalled
that,
according
to
the
case
law
of
(42) The Treaty admits some exceptions to the general
the Court of Justice of the European Union, operating
principle of the incompatibility of State aid with the
aid, i.e. aid aimed at relieving undertakings of costs that
internal market laid down in Article 107(1) of the
they would normally incur in the ordinary management
Treaty. Some of these exceptions obviously do not
of their activities, in principle distorts competition to the
apply in this case. These include those provided for in
extent that, on the one hand, it does not facilitate the
Article 107(2), which cover aid having a social character,
‘development’ of any economic sector and, on the other
aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters,
hand, it gives the beneficiaries artificial financial support
and aid relating to German reunification.
causing an ongoing distortion of competition and
affecting trade in a manner contrary to the common
interest.
(43) The same applies to the exceptions provided for in
Article 107(3)(a), (b) and (d) of the Treaty, given that
(49) In
particular,
the
markets
for
agricultural
products
in
the
the aid in question was neither intended to promote
European Union are thoroughly regulated through
the economic development of areas where the standard
common market organisations (CMOs). One of the
of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
CMOs’ tasks is to ensure fair competition between
underemployment, nor was it intended to promote
operators in the sector concerned within the European
important projects of common European interest or to
Union. Market support measures such as those
promote culture and heritage conservation.
introduced and financed by Greece seem to be contrary
to the aims of the cereals CMO and likely to seriously
disturb its operation.
(44) Therefore,
the
only
derogation
which
might
apply
in
this
case is the one provided for in Article 107(3)(c) of the
Treaty, which provides that aid to facilitate the devel
(50) As the Court of Justice has repeatedly pointed out ( 10 ),
opment of certain economic activities or of certain
any intervention by a Member State in market mech
economic areas may be considered to be compatible
anisms, excluding those forms specifically provided for
with the internal market where such aid does not
by Union rules, risks interfering with the operation of the
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary
common market organisations and giving unfair
to the common interest. In order to be covered by this
advantages to certain economic groups in the Union.
derogation, aid must comply with the Union rules
In particular, in a more recent ruling ( 11 ), the Court
governing State aid. In the area of agriculture, these
again pointed out that in a sector covered by a
rules are set out in the Community guidelines for State
common market organisation, a fortiori where that
aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to
organisation is based on a common pricing system,
2013 (
Member States can no longer take action, through

9 ) (hereafter the ‘agricultural guidelines’).
national provisions taken unilaterally, affecting the
machinery of price formation at the production and
marketing stages established under the common organi
(45) According to the information available to the
sation.
Commission, the purpose of the measure in question
was to deal with the situation caused by the surplus of
( 10 ) See, for example, the judgment of the Court in Case 83/78 Pigs
cereals produced in Greece in 2008. In particular, the
Marketing Board v Raymond Redmond [1978] ECR 2347,
paragraph 60.
( 11 ) Judgment of the Court in Case C-283/03 Kuipers [2005] ECR
( 9 ) OJ C 319, 27.12.2006, p. 1.
I-04255, paragraphs 42, 49 and 53.

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L 164/16
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.6.2012
(51) It should be noted that national price-support mech
been, or would be, granted in 2008. Consequently, the
anisms such as those in question undermine the
said loans, and therefore the State aid, were granted prior
common pricing system and more generally the
to 31 October 2009.
purpose of mechanisms established by Union rules on
the common organisation of markets, even if their aim is
to support farmers’ incomes.
(56) Second, the Commission would point out that the
measures in question do not meet the condition laid
down in the temporary framework, which states that in
(52) Lastly, the Commission also considered whether the aid
order for such aid to be considered compatible, it must
could be found compatible under the Communication
apply to the entire agricultural sector and not just to one
from the Commission – Community guidelines on
product sector, the cereals sector in the case in question.
State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in
difficulty ( 12 ). However, even if a beneficiary was at the
time the aid was granted a firm in difficulty within the
V. CONCLUSION
meaning of Section 2 of those guidelines (which is not
clear), the Greek authorities have provided no indication
(57) The Commission finds that Greece has illegally imple
that the numerous conditions laid down therein, which
mented the aid scheme in question, in breach of
could possibly justify the granting of aid to a specific
Article 108(3) of the Treaty. Given that the aid is incom
beneficiary, were met in the cases in question.
patible with the internal market, Greece must put an end
to the scheme and recover the aid granted from the
beneficiaries.
IV.2.2. Temporary framework
(58) Individual
aid
granted
under
the
scheme
in
question
does
(53) In order to justify the granting of the aid, the Greek
not constitute aid if, at the time it was granted, it met the
authorities mention the economic crisis and the Cooper
conditions laid down in a regulation adopted pursuant to
atives’ lack of access to financing. In 2009, the
Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of
Commission, having acknowledged the seriousness of
7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93
the financial crisis, adopted the ‘temporary frame
of the Treaty establishing the European Community to
work’ ( 13 ), declaring compatible with the internal
certain categories of horizontal State aid (
market aid of up to EUR 15 000 in the case of

15 ) and that was
applicable at the time the aid was granted.
primary agricultural producers.
(59) Individual aid granted under the scheme in question
(54) In
their
letter
dated
21 January
2011,
the
Greek
auth
which, at the time it was granted, met the conditions
orities argued that both the interest-rate subsidy and the
laid down in a regulation adopted pursuant to
State guarantee for the loans were covered by the
Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 994/98 or under
provisions of the temporary framework. In particular, it
another approved aid scheme is compatible with the
was argued that the loans in question were granted
internal market up to the maximum aid intensities that
during the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and
apply to that type of aid,
2009 and were aimed at overcoming that crisis. The
Greek authorities added that, due to the large number
of final beneficiaries (cooperative members), the benefit
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
from the interest-free loan for each beneficiary was so
limited that it could not be considered as causing distor
tions. Lastly, the Greek authorities held that, pursuant to
Article 1
Article 7 of the temporary framework, its provisions also
applied in cases of non-notified State aid schemes.
The scheme established in favour of cereal-producing farmers
and cereal-collecting agricultural cooperatives under Ministerial
Decisions No 56700/Β.3033/8.12.2008 and No
(55) The
Commission
cannot
accept
the
arguments
presented
2/88675/0025/9.2.2008 in the form of a loan guaranteed by
by the Greek authorities and holds that the provisions of
the Greek State with an interest-rate subsidy constitutes State
the temporary framework do not apply in the case in
aid. This State aid granted by Greece illegally, in breach of
question. First, the scope of the temporary framework
Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
was extended to include primary agricultural production
European Union, is incompatible with the internal market.
only on 31 October 2009 ( 14 ). Therefore, any State aid
schemes approved prior to the entry into force of this
extension cannot be covered by the temporary
Article 2
framework. In this particular case, Article 1 of Ministerial
Decision No 56700/B.3033/8.12.2008 stipulated that
Individual aid granted under the scheme referred to in Article 1
the interest-rate subsidy applied to loans which had
does not constitute aid if, at the time it was granted, it met the
conditions laid down in a regulation adopted pursuant to
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 994/98 and that was applicable
( 12 ) OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2.
at the time the aid was granted.
( 13 ) See footnote 4.
( 14 ) See amendment to the temporary framework (OJ C 261,
31.10.2009, p. 2).
( 15 ) OJ L 142, 14.5.1998, p. 1.

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EN
23.6.2012 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
164/17
Article 3
(a) a list of the beneficiaries who have received aid under the
scheme referred to in Article 1 and the total amount of aid
Individual aid granted under the scheme referred to in Article 1
received by each of them;
which, at the time it was granted, met the conditions laid down
in a regulation adopted pursuant to Article 1 of Regulation (EC)
No 994/98 or under another approved aid scheme is
compatible with the internal market up to the maximum aid
(b) the total amount (principal and interest) to be recovered
intensities that apply to that type of aid.
from each beneficiary;
Article 4
(c) a detailed description of the measures already taken and
1. Greece
shall
recover
the
incompatible
aid
granted
under
planned to comply with this Decision;
the scheme referred to in Article 1 from the beneficiaries.
2. The
sums
to
be
recovered
shall
include
interest
calculated (d) documents demonstrating that the beneficiaries have been
from the date on which the aid was put at the disposal of the
asked to refund the aid.
beneficiaries until the date of actual recovery.
2. Greece
shall
keep
the
Commission
informed
of
the
3. The
interest
shall
be
calculated
on
a
compound
basis
in progress of the national measures taken to implement this
accordance with Chapter V of Commission Regulation (EC) No
Decision until recovery of the aid referred to in Article 1 has
794/2004 ( 16 ).
been completed. It shall immediately submit, on simple request
by the Commission, information on the measures already taken
4. Greece
shall
cancel
all
outstanding
payments
under
the
aid and planned to comply with this Decision. It shall also provide
scheme referred to in Article 1 from the date of notification of
detailed information concerning the amounts of aid and interest
this Decision.
already recovered from the beneficiaries.
Article 5
Article 7
1. Recovery
of
the
aid
referred
to
in
Article
1
shall
be
immediate and effective.
This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.
2. Greece
shall
ensure
that
this
Decision
is
implemented
within four months of the date of its notification.
Done at Brussels, 25 January 2012.
Article 6
For the Commission
1. Within two months of notification of this Decision,
Greece shall submit the following information to the
Dacian CIOLO
Commission:
Member of the Commission
( 16 ) OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

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