HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/41
II
(Non-legislative acts)
DIRECTIVES
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2011/85/EU
of 8 November 2011
on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
outcomes of government finances based on statistical
methodologies, and from forecasts or budgeting actions
which relate to future government finances.
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and in particular the third subparagraph of
Article 126(14) thereof,
(3) Complete
and
reliable
public
accounting
practices
for
all
sub-sectors of general government are a precondition for
the production of high-quality statistics that are
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
comparable across Member States. Internal control
should ensure that existing rules are enforced throughout
the sub-sectors of general government. Independent
audits conducted by public institutions such as courts
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament ( 1 ),
of auditors or by private auditing bodies should
encourage best international practices.
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank ( 2 ),
(4)
The availability of fiscal data is crucial to the proper
functioning of the budgetary surveillance framework of
Whereas:
the Union. The regular availability of timely and reliable
fiscal data is the key to proper and well timed moni
toring, which in turn allows prompt action in the event
(1)
There is a need to build upon the experience gained
of unexpected budgetary developments. A crucial
during the first decade of the economic and monetary
element in ensuring the quality of fiscal data is trans
union. Recent economic developments have posed new
parency, which must entail the regular public availability
challenges to the conduct of fiscal policy across the
of such data.
Union and have in particular highlighted the need for
strengthening national ownership and having uniform
requirements as regards the rules and procedures
(5) With
regard
to
statistics,
Regulation
(EC)
No
223/2009
forming the budgetary frameworks of the Member
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
States. In particular, it is necessary to specify what
11 March 2009 on European statistics ( 3 ) established a
national authorities must do to comply with the
legislative framework for the production of European
provisions of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive
statistics with a view to the formulation, application,
deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European
monitoring and assessment of the policies of the
Union (TEU) and to the Treaty on the Functioning of
Union. That Regulation also laid down the principles
the European Union (TFEU), and in particular Article 3
governing the development, production and dissemi
thereof.
nation of European statistics: professional independence,
impartiality, objectivity, reliability, statistical confiden
tiality and cost-effectiveness, giving precise definitions
(2) Member
State
governments
and
government
sub-sectors
of each of these principles. Council Regulation (EC) No
maintain public accounting systems which include
479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the
elements such as bookkeeping, internal control,
Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to
financial reporting, and auditing. Those systems should
the Treaty establishing the European Community ( 4 ),
be distinguished from statistical data which relate to the
strengthened the Commission’s powers to verify stat
istical data used for the excessive deficit procedure.
( 1 ) European Parliament opinion of 28 September 2011 (not yet
published in the Official Journal).
( 3 ) OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164.
( 2 ) OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.
( 4 ) OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

---

L 306/42
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(6) The
definitions
of
‘government’,
‘deficit’
and
‘investment’
States with a useful benchmark for their most likely
are laid down in the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive
macrofiscal scenario, enhancing the validity of the
deficit procedure by reference to the European System of
forecasts used for budgetary planning. However, the
Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA), replaced by the
extent to which Member States can be expected to
European system of national and regional accounts in
compare the forecasts used for budgetary planning with
the Community, adopted by Council Regulation (EC)
the Commission’s forecasts varies according to the timing
No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the European system
of forecast preparation and the comparability of the
of national and regional accounts in the Community ( 1 )
forecast methodologies and assumptions. Forecasts from
(ESA 95).
other independent bodies can also provide useful
benchmarks.
(7) The
availability
and
quality
of
ESA
95
data
is
crucial
to
ensure the proper functioning of the Union’s fiscal
surveillance framework. ESA 95 relies on information
provided on an accrual basis. However, these accrual
(12) Significant
differences
between
the
chosen
macrofiscal
scenario and the Commission’s forecast should be
fiscal statistics rely on the previous compilation of cash
described and reasons therefor should be given, in
data, or their equivalent. These can play a relevant role in
particular if the level or growth of variables in external
enhancing timely budgetary monitoring, so as to avoid
assumptions departs significantly from the values
the late detection of significant budgetary errors. The
contained in the Commission’s forecasts.
availability of cash-data time series on budgetary devel

opments can reveal patterns warranting closer
surveillance. The cash-based fiscal data (or equivalent
figures from public accounting if cash-based data are
not available) to be published should at least include
an overall balance, total revenue and total expenditure.
(13) Given the interdependence between Member States’
Where justified, for example where there is a large
budgets and the Union’s budget, in order to support
number of local government bodies, timely publication
Member States in preparing their budgetary forecasts,
of data could rely on suitable estimation techniques
the Commission should provide forecasts for the
based on a sample of bodies, with a subsequent
Union’s expenditure based on the level of expenditure
revision using complete data.
programmed within the multiannual financial framework.
(8) Biased
and
unrealistic
macroeconomic
and
budgetary
forecasts can considerably hamper the effectiveness of
(14) In
order
to
facilitate
the
production
of
the
forecasts
used
fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to
for budgetary planning and to clarify differences between
budgetary discipline, while transparency and discussion
the forecasts of the Member States and those of the
of forecasting methodologies can significantly increase
Commission, each Member State should, on an annual
the quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts
basis, have the opportunity to discuss with the
for fiscal planning.
Commission the assumptions underpinning the prep
aration of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
(9)
A crucial element in ensuring the use of realistic forecasts
for the conduct of budgetary policy is transparency,
which should entail the public availability not only of
the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecast
(15) The
quality
of
official
macroeconomic
and
budgetary
prepared for fiscal planning, but also of the method
forecasts is critically enhanced by regular, unbiased and
ologies, assumptions and relevant parameters on which
comprehensive evaluation based on objective criteria.
such forecasts are based.
Thorough evaluation includes scrutiny of the economic
assumptions, comparison with forecasts prepared by
other institutions, and evaluation of past forecast
performance.
(10) Sensitivity analysis and corresponding budgetary
projections supplementing the most likely macrofiscal
scenario allow the analysis of how main fiscal variables
would evolve under various growth and interest rates
assumptions, and thus greatly reduce the risk of
(16) Considering
the
documented
effectiveness
of
rules-based
budgetary discipline being jeopardised by forecast errors.
budgetary frameworks of the Member States in
enhancing national ownership of the Union’s fiscal
rules promoting budgetary discipline, strong country-
specific numerical fiscal rules that are consistent with
(11) Forecasts
by
the
Commission
and
information
regarding
the budgetary objectives at the level of the Union
the models on which they are based can provide Member
should be a cornerstone of the strengthened budgetary
surveillance framework of the Union. Strong numerical
( 1 ) OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1.
fiscal rules should be equipped with well-specified target

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/43
definitions together with mechanisms for effective and
budgetary policies. In order to incorporate the multi
timely monitoring. Those rules should be based on
annual budgetary perspective of the budgetary
reliable and independent analysis carried out by inde
surveillance framework of the Union, planning of
pendent bodies or bodies endowed with functional
annual budget legislation should be based on multiannual
autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member
fiscal planning stemming from the medium-term
States. In addition, policy experience has shown that for
budgetary framework.
numerical fiscal rules to work effectively, consequences
must be attached to non-compliance, where the costs
involved may be simply reputational.
(21) That
medium-term
budgetary
framework
should
contain,
inter alia, projections of each major expenditure and
revenue item for the budget year and beyond, based on
(17) By
virtue
of
the
Protocol
(No
15)
on
certain
provisions
unchanged policies. Each Member State should be able
relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
appropriately to define unchanged policies and those
Northern Ireland annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU,
definitions should be made public together with the
the reference values mentioned in the Protocol (No 12)
assumptions involved, the methodologies and other
on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to those
relevant parameters.
Treaties are not directly binding on the United
Kingdom. The obligation to have in place numerical
fiscal rules that effectively promote compliance with
the specific reference values for the excessive deficit,
and the related obligation for the multiannual objectives
(22) This
Directive
should
not
prevent
a
Member
State’s
new
in medium-term budgetary frameworks to be consistent
government from updating its medium-term budgetary
with such rules, should therefore not apply to the United
framework to reflect its new policy priorities. In this
Kingdom.
case, the new government should highlight the
differences from the previous medium-term budgetary
framework.
(18) Member
States
should
avoid
pro-cyclical
fiscal
policies,
and fiscal consolidation efforts should be greater in
economic good times. Well-specified numerical fiscal
(23) Provisions
of
the
budgetary
surveillance
framework
estab
rules are conducive to these objectives and should be
lished by the TFEU and in particular the SGP apply to
reflected in the annual budget legislation of the
general government as a whole, which comprises the
Member States.
sub-sectors central government, state government, local
government, and social security funds, as defined in
Regulation (EC) No 2223/96.
(19) National
fiscal
planning
can
be
consistent
with
both
the
preventive and the corrective parts of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) only if it adopts a multiannual
perspective and pursues the achievement, in particular,
(24) A
significant
number
of
Member
States
have
experienced
of the medium-term budgetary objectives. Medium-term
a sizeable fiscal decentralisation with the devolution of
budgetary frameworks are strictly instrumental in
budgetary powers to sub-national governments. The role
ensuring that budgetary frameworks of the Member
of such sub-national governments in ensuring that the
States are consistent with the legislation of the Union.
SGP is complied with has thereby increased considerably,
In the spirit of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of
and particular attention should be paid to ensuring that
7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
all general government sub-sectors are duly covered by
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor
the scope of the obligations and procedures laid down in
dination of economic policies (
domestic budgetary frameworks, in particular, but not

1 ) and Council Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and
exclusively, in those Member States.
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure ( 2 ), the preventive and corrective parts of the
SGP should not be regarded in isolation.
(25) To be effective in promoting budgetary discipline and the
sustainability of public finance, budgetary frameworks
should comprehensively cover public finances. For this
(20) Although the approval of annual budget legislation is the
reason, operations of those general government bodies
key step in the budget process in which important
and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets
budgetary decisions are adopted in the Member States,
at sub-sector level and that have an immediate or
most fiscal measures have budgetary implications that go
medium-term impact on Member States’ budgetary
well beyond the annual budgetary cycle. A single-year
positions should be given particular consideration. Their
perspective therefore provides a poor basis for sound
combined impact on general government balances and
debts should be presented in the framework of the
( 1 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
annual budgetary processes and in the medium-term
( 2 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.
budgetary plans.

---

L 306/44
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(26) Similarly,
due
attention
should
be
paid
to
the
existence
of
the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed
contingent liabilities. More specifically, contingent
to the TEU and to the TFEU shall apply. The definition of sub-
liabilities encompass possible obligations depending on
sectors of general government set out in point 2.70 of Annex A
whether some uncertain future event occurs, or present
to Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 shall also apply.
obligations where payment is not probable or the
amount of the probable payment cannot be measured
reliably. They comprise for instance relevant information
on government guarantees, non-performing loans, and
In addition, the following definition shall apply:
liabilities stemming from the operation of public
corporations, including, where appropriate, the likelihood
and potential due date of expenditure of contingent
‘budgetary framework’ means the set of arrangements,
liabilities. Market sensitivities should be duly taken into
procedures, rules and institutions that underlie the conduct of
account.
budgetary policies of general government, in particular:
(27) The
Commission
should
regularly
monitor
the
imple
(a) systems of budgetary accounting and statistical reporting;
mentation of this Directive. Best practices concerning
the provisions of this Directive dealing with the
different aspects of national budgetary frameworks
should be identified and shared.
(b) rules and procedures governing the preparation of forecasts
for budgetary planning;
(28) Since
the
objective
of
this
Directive,
namely
uniform
compliance with budgetary discipline as required by the
(c) country-specific numerical fiscal rules, which contribute to
TFEU, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
the consistency of Member States’ conduct of fiscal policy
States and can therefore be better achieved at the level
with their respective obligations under the TFEU, expressed
of the Union, the Union may adopt measures, in
in terms of a summary indicator of budgetary performance,
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out
such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a
in Article 5 of the TEU. In accordance with the principle
major component thereof;
of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve
that objective.
(d) budgetary procedures comprising procedural rules to
underpin the budget process at all stages;
(29) In
accordance
with
point
34
of
the
Interinstitutional
Agreement on better law-making ( 1 ), Member States are
encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the
(e) medium-term budgetary frameworks as a specific set of
interests of the Union, their own tables illustrating, as
national budgetary procedures that extend the horizon for
far as possible, the correlation between this Directive
fiscal policy-making beyond the annual budgetary calendar,
and the transposition measures, and to make them
including the setting of policy priorities and of medium-
public,
term budgetary objectives;

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
(f) arrangements for independent monitoring and analysis, to
enhance the transparency of elements of the budget process;
CHAPTER I
(g) mechanisms and rules that regulate fiscal relationships
SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS
between public authorities across sub-sectors of general
Article 1
government.
This Directive lays down detailed rules concerning the char
acteristics of the budgetary frameworks of the Member States.
Those rules are necessary to ensure Member States’ compliance
CHAPTER II
with obligations under the TFEU with regard to avoiding
ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICS
excessive government deficits.
Article 3
1. As
concerns
national
systems
of
public
accounting,
Article 2
Member States shall have in place public accounting systems
comprehensively and consistently covering all sub-sectors of
For the purposes of this Directive, the definitions of
general government and containing the information needed to
‘government’, ‘deficit’ and ‘investment’ set out in Article 2 of
generate accrual data with a view to preparing data based on
the ESA 95 standard. Those public accounting systems shall be
( 1 ) OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, p. 1.
subject to internal control and independent audits.

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/45
2. Member
States
shall
ensure
timely
and
regular
public 5. Member States shall specify which institution is
availability of fiscal data for all sub-sectors of general
responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary
government as defined by Regulation (EC) No 2223/96. In
forecasts and shall make public the official macroeconomic
particular Member States shall publish:
and budgetary forecasts prepared for fiscal planning, including
the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters under
pinning those forecasts. At least annually, the Member States
(a) cash-based fiscal data (or the equivalent figure from public
and the Commission shall engage in a technical dialogue
accounting if cash-based data are not available) at the
concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of
following frequencies:
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
6. The
macroeconomic
and
budgetary
forecasts
for
fiscal
— monthly for central government, state government and
planning shall be subject to regular, unbiased and compre
social security sub-sectors, before the end of the
hensive evaluation based on objective criteria, including ex
following month, and
post evaluation. The result of that evaluation shall be made
public and taken into account appropriately in future macro
economic and budgetary forecasts. If the evaluation detects a
— quarterly, for the local government sub-sector, before
significant bias affecting macroeconomic forecasts over a period
the end of the following quarter;
of at least 4 consecutive years, the Member State concerned
shall take the necessary action and make it public.
(b) a detailed reconciliation table showing the methodology of
7. Member
States’
quarterly
debt
and
deficit
levels
shall
be
transition between cash-based data (or the equivalent figures
published by the Commission (Eurostat) every 3 months.
from public accounting if cash-based data are not available)
and data based on the ESA 95 standard.
CHAPTER IV
NUMERICAL FISCAL RULES
CHAPTER III
Article 5
FORECASTS
Each Member State shall have in place numerical fiscal rules
Article 4
which are specific to it and which effectively promote
1. Member
States
shall
ensure
that
fiscal
planning
is
based compliance with its obligations deriving from the TFEU in the
on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the
area of budgetary policy over a multiannual horizon for the
most up-to-date information. Budgetary planning shall be based
general government as a whole. Such rules shall promote in
on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent
particular:
scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be
compared with the most updated forecasts of the Commission
and, if appropriate, those of other independent bodies.
(a) compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set
Significant differences between the chosen macrofiscal scenario
in accordance with the TFEU;
and the Commission’s forecast shall be described with
reasoning, in particular if the level or growth of variables in
external assumptions departs significantly from the values
(b) the adoption of a multiannual fiscal planning horizon,
contained in the Commission’s forecasts.
including adherence to the Member State’s medium-term
budgetary objective.
2. The
Commission
shall
make
public
the
methodologies,
Article 6
assumptions and relevant parameters that underpin its macro
economic and budgetary forecasts.
1. Without
prejudice
to
the
provisions
of
the
TFEU
concerning the budgetary surveillance framework of the
Union, country-specific numerical fiscal rules shall contain spec
ifications as to the following elements:
3. In
order
to
support
Member
States
in
preparing
their
budgetary forecasts, the Commission shall provide forecasts
for the expenditure of the Union based on the level of expen
(a) the target definition and scope of the rules;
diture programmed within the multiannual financial framework.
(b) the effective and timely monitoring of compliance with the
4. Within the framework of a sensitivity analysis, the macro
rules, based on reliable and independent analysis carried out
economic and budgetary forecasts shall examine paths of main
by independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional
fiscal variables under different assumptions as to growth and
autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities of the Member
interest rates. The range of alternative assumptions used in
States;
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be guided by
the performance of past forecasts and shall endeavour to take
into account relevant risk scenarios.
(c) the consequences in the event of non-compliance.

---

L 306/46
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
2. If
numerical
fiscal
rules
contain
escape
clauses,
such
Article 10
clauses shall set out a limited number of specific circumstances
consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from
Annual budget legislation shall be consistent with the
the TFEU in the area of budgetary policy, and stringent
provisions of the medium-term budgetary framework.
procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rule
Specifically, revenue and expenditure projections and priorities
is permitted.
resulting from the medium-term budgetary framework as set
out in Article 9(2) shall constitute the basis for the preparation
of the annual budget. Any departure from those provisions shall
be duly explained.
Article 7
The annual budget legislation of the Member States shall reflect
their country-specific numerical fiscal rules in force.
Article 11
No provision of this Directive shall prevent a Member State’s
Article 8
new government from updating its medium-term budgetary
Articles 5 to 7 shall not apply to the United Kingdom.
framework to reflect its new policy priorities. In this case, the
new government shall indicate the differences from the previous
medium-term budgetary framework.
CHAPTER V
MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS
Article 9
CHAPTER VI
1. Member
States
shall
establish
a
credible,
effective
medium-
TRANSPARENCY OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES AND
term budgetary framework providing for the adoption of a fiscal
COMPREHENSIVE SCOPE OF BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS
planning horizon of at least 3 years, to ensure that national
Article 12
fiscal planning follows a multiannual fiscal planning perspective.
Member States shall ensure that any measures taken to comply
with Chapters II, III and IV are consistent across, and compre
hensive in coverage of, all sub-sectors of general government.
2. Medium-term budgetary frameworks shall include
This shall, in particular, require the consistency of accounting
procedures for establishing the following items:
rules and procedures, and the integrity of their underlying data
collection and processing systems.
(a) comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary
objectives in terms of the general government deficit, debt
and any other summary fiscal indicator such as expenditure,
Article 13
ensuring that these are consistent with any numerical fiscal
rules as provided for in Chapter IV in force;
1. Member
States
shall
establish
appropriate
mechanisms
of
coordination across sub-sectors of general government to
provide for comprehensive and consistent coverage of all sub-
(b) projections of each major expenditure and revenue item of
sectors of general government in fiscal planning, country-
the general government with more specifications on the
specific numerical fiscal rules, and in the preparation of
central government and social security level, for the
budgetary forecasts and setting-up of multiannual planning as
budget year and beyond, based on unchanged policies;
laid down, in particular, in the multiannual budgetary
framework.
(c) a description of medium-term policies envisaged with an
impact on general government finances, broken down by
major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the
2. In
order
to
promote
fiscal
accountability,
the
budgetary
adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objectives
responsibilities of public authorities in the various sub-sectors of
is achieved compared to projections under unchanged
general government shall be clearly laid down.
policies;
(d) an assessment as to how in the light of their direct long-
Article 14
term impact on general government finances, the policies
1. Within the framework of the annual budgetary processes,
envisaged are likely to affect the long-term sustainability of
Member States shall identify and present all general government
the public finances.
bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets
at sub-sector level, together with other relevant information.
The combined impact on general government balances and
3. Projections adopted within medium-term budgetary debts of those general government bodies and funds shall be
frameworks shall be based on realistic macroeconomic and
presented in the framework of the annual budgetary processes
budgetary forecasts in accordance with Chapter III.
and the medium-term budgetary plans.

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/47
2. Member
States
shall
publish
detailed
information
on
the
Article 16
impact of tax expenditures on revenues.
1. By
14
December
2018
the
Commission
shall
publish
a
review of the suitability of this Directive.
3. For
all
sub-sectors
of
general
government,
Member
States
shall publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with
potentially large impacts on public budgets, including
2. The
review
shall
assess,
inter
alia,
the
suitability
of:
government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities
stemming from the operation of public corporations,
including the extent thereof. Member States shall also publish
(a) the statistical requirements for all sub-sectors of
information on the participation of general government in the
government;
capital of private and public corporations in respect of econ
omically significant amounts.
(b) the design and effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules in the
Member States;
CHAPTER VII
FINAL PROVISIONS
(c) the general level of transparency of public finances in the
Article 15
Member States.
1. Member
States
shall
bring
into
force
the
provisions
necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December
2013. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission
3. By
31
December
2012,
the
Commission
shall
assess
the
the text of those provisions. The Council encourages the
suitability of the International Public Sector Accounting
Member States to draw up, for themselves and in the interests
Standards for the Member States.
of the Union, their own correlation tables which will, as far as
possible, illustrate the correlation between this Directive and the
transposition measures, and to make them public.
Article 17
This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th day following
2. When
Member
States
adopt
those
provisions,
they
shall its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such
a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member
States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
Article 18
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
3. The
Commission
shall
prepare
an
interim
progress
report
on the implementation of the main provisions of this Directive
on the basis of relevant information from Member States, which
shall be submitted to the European Parliament and to the
Done at Brussels, 8 November 2011.
Council by 14 December 2012.
For the Council
4. Member
States
shall
communicate
to
the
Commission
the
text of the main provisions which they adopt in the field
The President
covered by this Directive.
J. VINCENT-ROSTOWSKI

---