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29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/63
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 1024/2013
of 15 October 2013
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
(5) Competence
for
supervision
of
individual
credit
insti
tutions in the Union remains mostly at national level.
Coordination between supervisors is vital but the crisis
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in
Union, and in particular Article 127(6) thereof,
particular in the context of a single currency. In order
to preserve financial stability in the Union and increase
the positive effects of market integration on growth and
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should
therefore be enhanced. This is particularly important to
ensure a smooth and sound overview over an entire
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national
banking group and its overall health and would reduce
parliaments,
the risk of different interpretations and contradictory
decisions on the individual entity level.
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank,
(6) The
stability
of
credit
institutions
is
in
many
instances
still closely linked to the Member State in which they are
established. Doubts about the sustainability of public
Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,
debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of
credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually
reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks to the
Whereas:
viability of some credit institutions and to the stability of
the financial system in the euro area and the Union as a
whole, and may impose a heavy burden for already
(1)
Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable
strained public finances of the Member States concerned.
progress in creating an internal market for banking
services. Consequently, in many Member States,
banking groups with their headquarters established in
other Member States hold a significant market share,
and credit institutions have geographically diversified
(7) The
European
Supervisory
Authority
(European
Banking
their business, within both the euro area and non-euro
Authority) (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU)
area.
No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), ( 1 ),
(2) The
present
financial
and
economic
crisis
has
shown
that
and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)
the integrity of the single currency and the internal
established by Article 2 of that Regulation, and Article 2
market may be threatened by the fragmentation of the
of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European
financial sector. It is therefore essential to intensify the
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
integration of banking supervision in order to bolster the
establishing a European Supervisory Authority
Union, restore financial stability and lay the basis for
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Auth
economic recovery.
ority) ( 2 ) (EIOPA) and Article 2 of Regulation (EU)
No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
(3) Maintaining
and
deepening
the
internal
market
for
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets
banking services is essential in order to foster
Authority) ( 3 ) (ESMA) have significantly improved
economic growth in the Union and adequate funding
cooperation between banking supervisors within the
of the real economy. However this proves increasingly
Union. EBA is making important contributions to the
challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of
creation of a single rulebook for financial services in
banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt.
the Union, and has been crucial in implementing in a
consistent way the recapitalisation agreed by the euro
Summit of 26 October 2011 of major Union credit
(4)
At the same time, in addition to the adoption of an
institutions, consistent with the guidelines and conditions
enhanced Union regulatory framework, supervisors
relating to State aid adopted by the Commission.
must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account
of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and
( 1 ) OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12.
be able to oversee highly complex and inter-connected
( 2 ) OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48.
markets and institutions.
( 3 ) OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84.

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L 287/64
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
(8)
The European Parliament has called on various occasions
movement of capital. A single supervisory mechanism is
for a European body to be directly responsible for certain
the basis for the next steps towards the banking union.
supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with
This reflects the principle that the ESM will, following a
its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission
regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalise banks
communication on implementing the framework for
directly when an effective single supervisory mechanism
financial markets: Action Plan ( 1 ) and of 21 November
is established. The European Council noted in its
2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European
conclusions of 13/14 December 2012 that ‘In a
Union ( 2 ).
context where banking supervision is effectively moved
to a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution
mechanism will be required, with the necessary powers
(9) The
European
Council
conclusions
of
29
June
2012
to ensure that any bank in participating Member States
invited the President of the European Council to
can be resolved with the appropriate tools’ and that ‘the
develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine
single resolution mechanism should be based on
economic and monetary union. On the same day, the
contributions by the financial sector itself and include
euro Summit pointed out that when an effective single
appropriate and effective backstop arrangements’.
supervisory mechanism is established involving the
European Central Bank (ECB) for banks in the euro
area, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could,
(13) As the euro area’s central bank with extensive expertise
following a regular decision, have the possibility to recap
in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB
italise banks directly which would rely on appropriate
is well placed to carry out clearly defined supervisory
conditionality, including compliance with State aid rules.
tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of the
financial system of the Union. Indeed many Member
States’ central banks are already responsible for banking
(10) The
European
Council
on
19
October
2012
concluded
supervision. Specific tasks should therefore be conferred
that the process towards deeper economic and monetary
on the ECB concerning policies relating to the super
union should build on the Union institutional and legal
vision of credit institutions within the participating
framework and be characterised by openness and trans
Member States.
parency towards Member States whose currency is not
the euro and by respect for the integrity of the internal
market. The integrated financial framework will have a
(14) The
ECB
and
the
competent
authorities
of
Member
States
single supervisory mechanism which will be open to the
that are not participating Member States (‘non-partici
extent possible to all Member States wishing to
pating Member States’) should conclude a memorandum
participate.
of understanding describing in general terms how they
will cooperate with one another in the performance of
their supervisory tasks under Union law in relation to the
(11) A banking union should therefore be set up in the
financial institutions referred to in this Regulation. The
Union, underpinned by a comprehensive and detailed
memorandum of understanding could, inter alia, clarify
single rulebook for financial services for the internal
the consultation relating to decisions of the ECB having
market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory
effect on subsidiaries or branches established in the non-
mechanism and new frameworks for deposit insurance
participating Member State whose parent undertaking is
and resolution. In view of the close links and interactions
established in a participating Member State, and the
between Member States whose currency is the euro, the
cooperation in emergency situations, including early
banking union should apply at least to all euro area
warning mechanisms in accordance with the procedures
Member States. With a view to maintaining and
set out in relevant Union law. The memorandum should
deepening the internal market, and to the extent that
be reviewed on a regular basis.
this is institutionally possible, the banking union
should also be open to the participation of other
Member States.
(15) Specific
supervisory
tasks
which
are
crucial
to
ensure
a
coherent and effective implementation of the Union’s
policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit
(12) As a first step towards a banking union, a single super
institutions should be conferred on the ECB, while
visory mechanism should ensure that the Union’s policy
other tasks should remain with national authorities.
relating to the prudential supervision of credit insti
The ECB’s tasks should include measures taken in
tutions is implemented in a coherent and effective
pursuance of macroprudential stability, subject to
manner, that the single rulebook for financial services
specific arrangements reflecting the role of national auth
is applied in the same manner to credit institutions in
orities.
all Member States concerned, and that those credit insti
tutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality,
unfettered by other, non-prudential considerations. In
(16) The
safety
and
soundness
of
large
credit
institutions
is
particular, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
essential to ensure the stability of the financial system.
should be consistent with the functioning of the
However, recent experience shows that smaller credit
internal market for financial services and with the free
institutions can also pose a threat to financial stability.
Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory
( 1 ) OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p. 453.
tasks in relation to all credit institutions authorised in,
( 2 ) OJ C 25 E, 29.1.2004, p. 394.
and branches established in, participating Member States.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/65
(17) When
carrying
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it,
and
without
the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of
prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and
exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly
soundness of credit institutions, the ECB should have
disclose information on credit institutions’ financial situ
full regard to the diversity of credit institutions and
ation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand
their size and business models, as well as the systemic
situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a
benefits of diversity in the banking industry of the
prerequisite for credit institutions’ prudential soundness.
Union.
The ECB should have the task of ensuring compliance
with those rules, including in particular by granting
approvals, permissions, derogations, or exemptions
(18) The
exercise
of
the
ECB’s
tasks
should
contribute
in
foreseen for the purposes of those rules.
particular to ensure that credit institutions fully inter
nalise all costs caused by their activities so as to avoid
moral hazard and the excessive risk taking arising from
(24) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conser
it. It should take full account of the relevant macro
vation buffer, a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure
economic conditions in Member States, in particular
that credit institutions accumulate, during periods of
the stability of the supply of credit and facilitation of
economic growth, a sufficient capital base to absorb
productive activities for the economy at large.
losses in stressed periods, global and other systemic insti
tution buffers, and other measures aimed at addressing
systemic or macroprudential risk, are key prudential
(19) Nothing
in
this
Regulation
should
be
understood
as
tools. In order to ensure full coordination, where
changing the accounting framework applicable pursuant
national competent authorities or national designated
to other acts of Union and national law.
authorities impose such measures, the ECB should be
duly notified. Moreover, where necessary the ECB
should be able to apply higher requirements and more
(20) Prior
authorisation
for
taking
up
the
business
of
credit
stringent measures, subject to close coordination with
institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that
national authorities. The provisions in this Regulation
only operators with a sound economic basis, an organi
on measures aimed at addressing systemic or macropru
sation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent
dential risk are without prejudice to any coordination
to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable
procedures provided for in other acts of Union law.
directors carry out those activities. The ECB should
National competent authorities or national designated
therefore have the task of authorising credit institutions
authorities and the ECB shall act in respect of any coor
that are to be established in a participating Member State
dination procedure provided for in such acts after having
and should be responsible for the withdrawal of auth
followed the procedures provided for in this Regulation.
orisations, subject to specific arrangements reflecting the
role of national authorities.
(25) The
safety
and
soundness
of
a
credit
institution
depend
also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having
(21) In
addition
to
the
conditions
set
out
in
Union
law
for
the
regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on
authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for with
the availability of appropriate internal organisation
drawal of such authorisations, Member States may
structures and corporate governance arrangements. The
currently provide for further conditions for authorisation
ECB should therefore have the task of applying
and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB
requirements ensuring that credit institutions in the
should therefore carry out its task with regard to auth
participating Member States have in place robust
orisation of credit institutions and withdrawal of the
governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms,
authorisation in case of non-compliance with national
including strategies and processes for assessing and main
law on a proposal by the relevant national competent
taining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of
authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant
deficiencies it should also have the task of imposing
conditions laid down in national law.
appropriate measures including specific additional own
funds requirements, specific disclosure requirements,
and specific liquidity requirements.
(22) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior
to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit insti
tution is an indispensable tool for ensuring the
(26) Risks
for
the
safety
and
soundness
of
a
credit
institution
continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit
can arise both at the level of an individual credit insti
institutions’ owners. The ECB as a Union institution is
tution and at the level of a banking group or of a
well placed to carry out such an assessment without
financial conglomerate. Specific supervisory arrangements
imposing undue restrictions on the internal market.
to mitigate those risks are important to ensure the safety
The ECB should have the task of assessing the acquisition
and soundness of credit institutions. In addition to super
and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions,
vision of individual credit institutions, the ECB’s tasks
except in the context of bank resolution.
should include supervision at the consolidated level,
supplementary supervision, supervision of financial
holding companies and supervision of mixed financial
(23) Compliance
with
Union
rules
requiring
credit
institutions
holding companies, excluding the supervision of
to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to
insurance undertakings.

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L 287/66
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
(27) In
order
to
preserve
financial
stability,
the
deterioration
institutions operating also in the insurance and securities
of an institution’s financial and economic situation must
sectors. The ECB should therefore be required to
be remedied at an early stage. The ECB should have the
cooperate closely with EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, the
task of carrying out early intervention actions as laid
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the other
down in relevant Union law. It should however coor
authorities which form part of the ESFS. The ECB
dinate its early intervention action with the relevant
should carry out its tasks in accordance with the
resolution authorities. As long as national authorities
provisions of this Regulation and without prejudice to
remain competent to resolve credit institutions, the
the competence and the tasks of the other participants
ECB should, moreover, coordinate appropriately with
within the ESFS. It should also be required to cooperate
the national authorities concerned to ensure a common
with relevant resolution authorities and facilities
understanding about respective responsibilities in case of
financing direct or indirect public financial assistance.
crises, in particular in the context of the cross-border
crisis management groups and the future resolution
colleges established for those purposes.
(32) The
ECB
should
carry
out
its
tasks
subject
to
and
in
compliance with relevant Union law including the
whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission
(28) Supervisory
tasks not conferred on the ECB should
decisions in the area of State aid, competition rules and
remain with the national authorities. Those tasks
merger control and the single rulebook applying to all
should include the power to receive notifications from
Member States. EBA is entrusted with developing draft
credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment
technical standards and guidelines and recommendations
and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies
ensuring supervisory convergence and consistency of
which are not covered by the definition of credit insti
supervisory outcomes within the Union. The ECB
tutions under Union law but which are supervised as
should not replace the exercise of those tasks by EBA,
credit institutions under national law, to supervise
and should therefore exercise powers to adopt regu
credit institutions from third countries establishing a
lations in accordance with Article 132 of the Treaty on
branch or providing cross-border services in the Union,
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in
to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day
compliance with Union acts adopted by the Commission
verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the
on the basis of drafts developed by EBA and subject to
function of competent authorities over credit institutions
Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
in relation to markets in financial instruments, the
prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing
and consumer protection.
(33) Where
necessary
the
ECB
should
enter
into
memoranda
of understanding with competent authorities responsible
for markets in financial instruments describing in general
terms how they will cooperate with one another in the
performance of their supervisory tasks under Union law
(29) The
ECB
should
cooperate,
as
appropriate,
fully
with
the
in relation to financial institutions referred to in this
national authorities which are competent to ensure a
Regulation. Such memoranda should be made available
high level of consumer protection and the fight against
to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the
money laundering.
competent authorities of all Member States.
(30) The
ECB
should
carry
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
with
(34) For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its
a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit
supervisory powers, the ECB should apply the material
institutions and the stability of the financial system of
rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit insti
the Union as well as of individual participating Member
tutions. Those rules are composed of the relevant Union
States and the unity and integrity of the internal market,
law, in particular directly applicable Regulations or Direc
thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and
tives, such as those on capital requirements for credit
improving the functioning of the internal market, in
institutions and on financial conglomerates. Where the
accordance with the single rulebook for financial
material rules relating to the prudential supervision of
services in the Union. In particular the ECB should
credit institutions are laid down in Directives, the ECB
duly take into account the principles of equality and
should apply the national legislation transposing those
non-discrimination.
Directives. Where the relevant Union law is composed
of Regulations and in areas where, on the date of entry
into force of this Regulation, those Regulations explicitly
grant options for Member States, the ECB should also
(31) The
conferral
of
supervisory
tasks
on
the
ECB
should
be
apply the national legislation exercising such options.
consistent with the framework of the ESFS and its
Such options should be construed as excluding options
underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and
available only to competent or designated authorities.
enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the
This is without prejudice to the principle of the
whole Union. Cooperation between the banking super
primacy of Union law. It follows that the ECB should,
visors and the supervisors of insurance and securities
when adopting guidelines or recommendations or when
markets is important to deal with issues of joint
taking decisions, base itself on, and act in accordance
interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit
with, the relevant binding Union law.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/67
(35) Within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB,
(39) The
criteria
laid
down
in
this
Regulation
defining
the
national law confers on national competent authorities
scope of institutions that are less significant should be
certain powers which are currently not required by
specified in a framework adopted and published by the
Union law, including certain early intervention and
ECB in consultation with national competent authorities.
precautionary powers. The ECB should be able to
On that basis, the ECB should be responsible to apply
require national authorities in the participating Member
those criteria and verify, through its own calculations,
States to make use of those powers in order to ensure
whether those criteria are met. The ECB’s request for
the performance of full and effective supervision within
information to perform its calculation should not force
the SSM.
the institutions to apply accounting frameworks differing
from those applicable to them pursuant to other acts of
Union and national law.
(36) In
order
to
ensure
that
supervisory
rules
and
decisions
are applied by credit institutions, financial holding
companies and mixed financial holding companies,
effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties should
(40) Where
a
credit
institution
has
been
considered
significant
be imposed in case of a breach. In accordance with
or less significant, that assessment should generally not
Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC)
be modified more often than once every 12 months,
No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the
except if there are structural changes in the banking
powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanc
groups, such as mergers or divestitures.
tions ( 1 ), the ECB is entitled to impose fines or periodic
penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply
with obligations under its regulations and decisions.
Moreover, in order to enable the ECB to effectively
carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of super
(41) When deciding, following a notification by a national
visory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the
competent authority, whether an institution is of
ECB should be empowered to impose pecuniary penalties
significant relevance with regard to the domestic
on credit institutions, financial holding companies and
economy and should therefore be supervised by the
mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such
ECB, the ECB should take into account all relevant
rules. National authorities should remain able to apply
circumstances, including level-playing field consider
penalties in case of failure to comply with obligations
ations.
stemming from national law transposing Union Direc
tives. Where the ECB considers it appropriate for the
fulfilment of its tasks that a penalty is applied for such
breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national
(42) As
regards
the
supervision
of
cross-border
credit
insti
competent authorities for those purposes.
tutions active both inside and outside the euro area the
ECB should cooperate closely with the competent auth
orities of non-participating Member States. As a
(37) National
supervisors
have
important
and
long-established
competent authority the ECB should be subject to the
expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within
related obligations to cooperate and exchange
their territory and their economic, organisational and
information under Union law and should participate
cultural specificities. They have established a large body
fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since
of dedicated and highly qualified staff for those purposes.
the exercise of supervisory tasks by a Union institution
Therefore, in order to ensure high-quality, Union-wide
brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability
supervision, national competent authorities should be
and sustainable market integration, Member States whose
responsible for assisting the ECB in the preparation and
currency is not the euro should therefore also have the
implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the
possibility to participate in the SSM. However, it is a
ECB supervisory tasks. This should include, in particular,
necessary pre-condition for an effective exercise of super
the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a credit institu
visory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented
tion’s situation and related on-site verifications.
fully and without delay. Member States wishing to
participate in the SSM should therefore undertake to
ensure that their national competent authorities will
(38) The
criteria
laid
down
in
this
Regulation
defining
the
abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit
scope of institutions that are less significant should be
institutions requested by the ECB. The ECB should be
applied at the highest level of consolidation within
able to establish a close cooperation with the
participating Member States based on consolidated data.
competent authorities of a Member State whose
Where the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by
currency is not the euro. It should be obliged to
this Regulation with regard to a group of credit insti
establish the cooperation where the conditions set out
tutions that is not less significant on a consolidated
in this Regulation are met.
basis, it should carry out those tasks on a consolidated
basis with regard to the group of credit institutions and
on an individual basis with regard to the banking
subsidiaries and branches of that group established in
(43) Taking
into
account
that
participating
Member
States
participating Member States.
whose currency is not the euro are not present in the
Governing Council for as long as they have not adopted
( 1 ) OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4.
the euro in accordance with the TFEU, and they cannot

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L 287/68
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
fully benefit from other mechanisms provided for
authorities. The ECB and the national competent auth
Member States whose currency is the euro, additional
orities should have access to the same information
safeguards in the decision-making process are provided
without credit institutions being subject to double
for in this Regulation. However, those safeguards, in
reporting requirements.
particular the possibility of the participating Member
States whose currency is not the euro to request the
immediate termination of the close cooperation after
(48) Legal
profession
privilege
is
a
fundamental
principle
of
informing the Governing Council of its reasoned
Union law, protecting the confidentiality of communi
disagreement with a draft decision of the Supervisory
cations between natural or legal persons and their
Board, should be used in duly justified, exceptional
advisors, in accordance with the conditions laid down
cases. They should only be used as long as those
in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European
specific circumstances apply. The safeguards are due to
Union (CJEU).
the specific circumstances in which participating Member
States whose currency is not the euro are under this
Regulation, since they are not present in the Governing
Council and cannot fully benefit from other mechanisms
(49) When
the
ECB
needs
to
require
information
from
a
provided for Member States whose currency is the euro.
person established in a non-participating Member State
Therefore, the safeguards cannot and should not be
but belonging to a credit institution, financial holding
construed as a precedent for other areas of Union policy.
company or mixed financial holding company estab
lished in a participating Member State, or to which
such credit institution, financial holding company or
mixed financial holding company has outsourced oper
(44) Nothing in this Regulation should alter in any way the
ational functions or activities, and when such
current framework regulating the change of legal form of
requirements will not apply and will not be enforceable
subsidiaries or branches and the application of such
in the non-participating Member State, the ECB should
framework, or be understood or applied as providing
coordinate with the competent authority in the non-
incentives in favour of such change. In this respect, the
participating Member State concerned.
responsibility of competent authorities of non-partici
pating Member States should be fully respected, so that
those authorities continue to enjoy sufficient supervisory
(50) This
Regulation
does
not
affect
the
application
of
the
tools and powers over credit institutions operating in
rules established by Articles 34 and 42 of Protocol
their territory in order to have the capacity to fulfil
No 4 on the statute of the European System of Central
this responsibility and effectively safeguard financial
Banks and of the European Central Bank, attached to the
stability and public interest. Moreover, in order to assist
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU
those competent authorities in fulfilling their responsibil
(‘Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB’). The acts
ities, timely information on a change of legal form of
adopted by the ECB under this Regulation should not
subsidiaries or branches should be provided to depositors
create any rights or impose any obligations in non-
and to the competent authorities.
participating Member States, except where such acts are
in accordance with relevant Union law, in accordance
with that Protocol and with Protocol No 15 on certain
(45) In
order
to
carry
out
its
tasks,
the
ECB
should
have
provisions related to the United Kingdom of Great Britain
appropriate supervisory powers. Union law on the
and Northern Ireland, attached to the TEU and to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for
TFEU.
certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities
designated by the Member States for those purposes. To
the extent that those powers fall within the scope of the
(51) Where
credit
institutions
exercise
their
right
of
estab
supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating
lishment or to provide services in another Member
Member States the ECB should be considered the
State, or where several entities in a group are established
competent authority and should have the powers
in different Member States, Union law provides for
conferred on competent authorities by Union law. This
specific procedures and for attribution of competences
includes powers conferred by those acts on the
between the Member States concerned. To the extent
competent authorities of the home and the host
that the ECB takes over certain supervisory tasks for all
Member States and the powers conferred on designated
participating Member States, those procedures and
authorities.
attributions should not apply to the exercise of the
right of establishment or to provide services in another
participating Member State.
(46) The
ECB
should
have
the
supervisory
power
to
remove
a
member of a management body in accordance with this
Regulation.
(52) When
carrying
out
its
tasks
under
this
Regulation
and
when requesting assistance from national competent
authorities, the ECB should have due regard to a fair
balance between the involvement of all national
(47) In
order
to
carry
out
its
tasks
effectively,
the
ECB
should
competent authorities involved, in line with the respon
be able to require all necessary information, and to
sibilities set out in applicable Union law for solo super
conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where
vision and for supervision on a sub-consolidated basis
appropriate in cooperation with national competent
and on a consolidated basis.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/69
(53) Nothing
in
this
Regulation
should
be
understood
as
institutions, their customers and employees, and the
conferring on the ECB the power to impose penalties
markets in the participating Member States. Where
on natural or legal persons other than credit institutions,
national competent authorities take action under this
financial holding companies or mixed financial holding
Regulation, accountability arrangements provided for
companies, without prejudice to the ECB’s power to
under national law should continue to apply.
require national competent authorities to act in order
to ensure that appropriate penalties are imposed.
(57) This
Regulation
is
without
prejudice
to
the
right
of
the
European Parliament to set up a temporary Committee of
(54) As established by the Treaties, the ECB is an institution
Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or
of the Union as a whole. It should be bound in its
maladministration in the implementation of Union law
decision-making procedures by Union rules and general
pursuant to Article 226 TFEU or to the exercise of its
principles on due process and transparency. The right of
functions of political control as laid down in the Treaties,
the addressees of the ECB’s decisions to be heard should
including the right for the European Parliament to take a
be fully respected as well as their right to request a
position or adopt a resolution on matters which it
review of the decisions of the ECB according to the
considers appropriate.
rules set out in this Regulation.
(58) In
its
action,
the
ECB
should
comply
with
the
principles
(55) The
conferral
of
supervisory
tasks
implies
a
significant
of due process and transparency.
responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability
in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the
most effective and proportionate way. Any shift of super
visory powers from the Member State to the Union level
(59) The
regulation
referred
to
in
Article
15(3)
TFEU
should
should be balanced by appropriate transparency and
determine detailed rules enabling access to documents
accountability requirements. The ECB should therefore
held by the ECB resulting from the carrying out of super
be accountable for the exercise of those tasks towards
visory tasks, in accordance with the TFEU.
the European Parliament and the Council as demo
cratically legitimised institutions representing the
citizens of the Union and the Member States. That
should include regular reporting, and responding to
(60) Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the CJEU is to review the
questions by the European Parliament in accordance
legality of acts of, inter alia, the ECB, other than recom
with its Rules of Procedure, and by the euro Group in
mendations and opinions, intended to produce legal
accordance with its procedures. Any reporting
effects vis-à-vis third parties.
obligations should be subject to the relevant professional
secrecy requirements.
(61) In
accordance
with
Article
340
TFEU,
the
ECB
should,
in
accordance with the general principles common to the
(56) The
ECB should also forward the reports, which it
laws of the Member States, make good any damage
addresses to the European Parliament and to the
caused by it or by its servants in the performance of
Council, to the national parliaments of the participating
their duties. This should be without prejudice to the
Member States. National parliaments of the participating
liability of national competent authorities to make
Member States should be able to address any obser
good any damage caused by them or by their servants
vations or questions to the ECB on the performance of
in the performance of their duties in accordance with
its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB may reply. The
national legislation.
internal rules of those national parliaments should take

into account details of the relevant procedures and
arrangements for addressing the observations and
questions to the ECB. In this context particular
attention should be attached to observations or
(62) Council
Regulation
No
1
determining
the
languages
to
be
questions related to the withdrawal of authorisations of
used by the European Economic Community ( 1 ) applies
credit institutions in respect of which actions necessary
to the ECB by virtue of Article 342 TFEU.
for resolution or to maintain financial stability have been
taken by national authorities in accordance with the
procedure set out in this Regulation. The national
parliament of a participating Member State should also
(63) When
determining
whether
the
right
of
access
to
the
file
be able to invite the Chair or a representative of the
by persons concerned should be limited, the ECB should
Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of
respect the fundamental rights and observe the principles
views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions
recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
in that Member State together with a representative of
European Union, in particular the right to an effective
the national competent authority. This role for national
remedy and to a fair trial.
parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that
supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit
( 1 ) OJ 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385.

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L 287/70
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
(64) The
ECB
should
provide
natural
and
legal
persons
with
(68) When
exercising
its
tasks,
the
Supervisory
Board
should
the possibility to request a review of decisions taken
take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the
under the powers conferred on it by this Regulation
participating Member States and should perform its
and addressed to them, or which are of direct and indi
duties in the interest of the Union as a whole.
vidual concern to them. The scope of the review should
pertain to the procedural and substantive conformity
with this regulation of such decisions while respecting
the margin of discretion left to the ECB to decide on
(69) With full respect to the institutional and voting
the opportunity to take those decisions. For that
arrangements set by the Treaties, the Supervisory Board
purpose, and for reasons of procedural economy, the
should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory
ECB should establish an administrative board of review
tasks by the ECB, tasks which until now have always
to carry out such internal review. To compose the board,
been in the hands of national competent authorities.
the Governing Council of the ECB should appoint indi
For this reason, the Council should be given the power
viduals of a high repute. In making its decision, the
to adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair
Governing Council should, to the extent possible,
and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. After
ensure an appropriate geographical and gender balance
hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB should submit
across the Member States. The procedure laid down for
a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the
the review should provide for the Supervisory Board to
Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval.
reconsider its former draft decision as appropriate.
Following the approval of this proposal, the Council
should adopt that implementing decision. The Chair
should be chosen on the basis of an open selection
procedure, on which the European Parliament and the
Council should be kept duly informed.
(65) The
ECB
is
responsible
for
carrying
out
monetary
policy
functions with a view to maintaining price stability in
accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of
supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety
(70) In
order
to
allow
for
an
appropriate
rotation
while
and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of
ensuring the full independence of the Chair, the Chair’s
the financial system. They should therefore be carried out
term of office should not exceed five years and should
in full separation, in order to avoid conflicts of interests
not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination
and to ensure that each function is exercised in
with the activities of EBA and with the prudential policies
accordance with the applicable objectives. The ECB
of the Union, the Supervisory Board should be able to
should be able to ensure that the Governing Council
invite EBA and the Commission as observers. The Chair
operates in a completely differentiated manner as
of the European Resolution Authority, once established,
regards monetary and supervisory functions. Such differ
should participate as observer in the meetings of the
entiation should at least include strictly separated
Supervisory Board.
meetings and agendas.
(71) The Supervisory Board should be supported by a steering
committee with a more limited composition. The
steering committee should prepare the meetings of the
(66) Organisational
separation
of staff should concern all
Supervisory Board, perform its duties solely in the
services needed for independent monetary policy
interest of the Union as a whole, and work in full trans
purposes and should ensure that the exercise of the
parency with the Supervisory Board.
tasks conferred by this Regulation is fully subject to

democratic accountability and oversight as provided for
by this Regulation. The staff involved in carrying out the
tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation should
(72) The
Governing
Council
of
the
ECB
should
invite
the
report to the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
representatives from participating Member States whose
currency is not the euro whenever it is contemplated by
the Governing Council to object to a draft decision
prepared by the Supervisory Board or whenever the
concerned national competent authorities inform the
(67) In particular, a Supervisory Board responsible for
Governing Council of their reasoned disagreement with
preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be
a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, when such
set up within the ECB encompassing the specific
decision is addressed to the national authorities in
expertise of national supervisors. The board should
respect of credit institutions from participating Member
therefore be chaired by a Chair, have a Vice Chair and
States whose currency is not the euro.
include representatives from the ECB and from national
competent authorities. The appointments for the Super
visory Board in accordance with this Regulation should
respect the principles of gender balance, experience and
(73) With
a
view
to
ensuring
separation
between
monetary
qualification. All members of the Supervisory Board
policy and supervisory tasks, the ECB should be required
should be timely and fully informed on the items on
to create a mediation panel. The setting up of the panel,
the agenda of its meetings, so as to facilitate the effec
and in particular its composition, should ensure that it
tiveness of the discussion and the draft decision making
resolves differences of views in a balanced way, in the
process.
interest of the Union as a whole.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/71
(74) The
Supervisory
Board,
the
steering
committee
and
staff
established in a participating Member State and included
of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties should be
in the supervision on a consolidated basis, based on
subject to appropriate professional secrecy requirements.
objective criteria relating to the importance and risk
Similar requirements should apply to the exchange of
profile, including the risk weighted assets.
information with the staff of the ECB not involved in
supervisory activities. This should not prevent the ECB
from exchanging information within the limits and under
the conditions set out in the relevant Union legislation,
(79) Highly
motivated,
well-trained
and
impartial
staff
is
indis
including with the Commission for the purposes of its
pensable to effective supervision. In order to create a
tasks under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and under Union
truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate
law on enhanced economic and budgetary surveillance.
exchange and secondment of staff with and among all
national competent authorities and the ECB should be
provided for. To ensure a peer control on an on-going
basis, particularly in the supervision of large credit insti
(75) In
order
to
carry
out
its
supervisory
tasks
effectively,
the
tutions, the ECB should be able to request that national
ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it
supervisory teams involve also staff from competent
in full independence, in particular free from undue
authorities of other participating Member States,
political influence and from industry interference which
making it possible to install supervisory teams of
would affect its operational independence.
geographical diversity with specific expertise and
profile. The exchange and secondment of staff should
establish a common supervisory culture. On a regular
basis the ECB should provide information on how
many staff members from the national competent auth
(76) The
use
of
cooling-off
periods
in
supervisory
authorities
orities are seconded to the ECB for the purposes of the
forms an important part of ensuring the effectiveness and
SSM.
independence of the supervision conducted by those
authorities. To this end, and without prejudice to the
application of stricter national rules, the ECB should
establish and maintain comprehensive and formal
procedures, including proportionate review periods, to
(80) Given
the globalisation of banking services and the
assess in advance and prevent possible conflicts with
increased importance of international standards, the
the legitimate interest of the SSM/ECB where a former
ECB should carry out its tasks in respect of international
member of the Supervisory Board begins work within the
standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with
banking industry he or she once supervised.
supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating the

international role of EBA. It should be empowered to
develop contacts and enter into administrative
arrangements with the supervisory authorities and
administrations of third countries and with international
(77) In
order
to
carry
out
its
supervisory
tasks
effectively,
the
organisations, while coordinating with EBA and while
ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those
fully respecting the existing roles and respective
resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the
competences of the Member States and the institutions
ECB’s independence from undue influences by national
of the Union.
competent authorities and market participants, and
separation between monetary policy and supervisory
tasks. The costs of supervision should be borne by the
entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of super
(81) Directive
95/46/EC
of
the
European
Parliament
and
of
visory tasks by the ECB should be financed by annual
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
fees charged to credit institutions established in the
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
participating Member States. It should also be able to
and on the free movement of such data ( 1 ) and Regu
levy fees on branches established in a participating
lation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and
Member State by a credit institution established in a
of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection
non-participating Member State to cover the expenditure
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
incurred by the ECB when carrying out its tasks as a host
data by the Community institutions and bodies and on
supervisor over these branches. In the case a credit insti
the free movement of such data ( 2 ) are fully applicable to
tution or a branch is supervised on a consolidated basis,
the processing of personal data by the ECB for the
the fee should be levied on the highest level of a credit
purposes of this Regulation.
institution within the involved group with establishment
in participating Member States. The calculation of the
fees should exclude any subsidiaries established in non-
participating Member States.
(82) Regulation (EC) No
1073/1999 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999
concerning investigations conducted by the European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) ( 3 ) applies to the ECB. The
(78) Where
a
credit
institution
is
included
in
supervision
on
a
consolidated basis, the fee should be calculated at the
( 1 ) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
highest level of consolidation within participating
( 2 ) OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.
Member States and allocated to the credit institutions
( 3 ) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1.

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L 287/72
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
ECB has adopted Decision ECB/2004/11 ( 1 ) concerning
specific supervisory tasks over credit institutions by a
the terms and conditions for European Anti-Fraud
Union institution, and ensuring the consistent application
Office investigations of the European Central Bank.
of the single rulebook to credit institutions, cannot be
sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can
therefore, by reason of the pan-Union structure of the
(83) In
order
to
ensure
that
credit
institutions
are
subject
to
banking market and the impact of failures of credit insti
supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other,
tutions on other Member States, be better achieved at the
non-prudential considerations, and that the negative
Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in
mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out
which concern credit institutions and Member States
in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of
are addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation
should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve
soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory
those objectives,
tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a
certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate
phasing-in period should be provided for.
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
(84) When
adopting
the
detailed
operational
arrangements
for
CHAPTER I
the implementation of the tasks conferred on the ECB by
this Regulation, the ECB should provide for transitional
Subject matter and definitions
arrangements which ensure the completion of ongoing
supervisory procedures, including any decision and/or
Article 1
measure adopted or investigation commenced prior to
the entry into force of this Regulation.
Subject matter and scope

This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institu
(85) The Commission has stated in its Communication of
tions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness
28 November 2012 on a Blueprint for a deep and
of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system
genuine economic and monetary union that
within the Union and each Member State, with full regard and
Article 127(6) TFEU could be amended to make the
duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market
ordinary legislative procedure applicable and to
based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to
eliminate some of the legal constraints it currently
preventing regulatory arbitrage.
places on the design of the SSM (e.g. enshrine a direct
and irrevocable opt-in by Member States whose currency
is not the euro to the SSM, beyond the model of ‘close
The institutions referred to in Article 2(5) of the Directive
cooperation’, grant Member States whose currency is not
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
the euro participating in the SSM fully equal rights in the
of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions
ECB’s decision-making, and go even further in the
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
internal separation of decision-making on monetary
investment firms ( 2 ) are excluded from the supervisory tasks
policy and on supervision). It has also stated that a
conferred on ECB in accordance with Article 4 of this Regu
specific point to be addressed would be to strengthen
lation. The scope of the ECB’s supervisory tasks is limited to the
democratic accountability over the ECB insofar as it
prudential supervision of credit institutions pursuant to this
acts as a banking supervisor. It is recalled that TEU
Regulation. This Regulation shall not confer on the ECB any
provides that proposals for treaty change may be
other supervisory tasks, such as tasks relating to the prudential
submitted by the Government of any Member State,
supervision of central counterparties.
the European Parliament, or the Commission, and may
relate to any aspect of the Treaties.
When carrying out its tasks according to this Regulation, and
without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and
(86) This
Regulation respects the fundamental rights and
soundness of credit institutions, the ECB shall have full regard
observes the principles recognised in the Charter of
to the different types, business models and sizes of credit insti
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular
tutions.
the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom
to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial, and has to be implemented in
No action, proposal or policy of the ECB shall, directly or indi
accordance with those rights and principles.
rectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of
Member States as a venue for the provision of banking or
financial services in any currency.
(87) Since
the
objectives
of
this
Regulation,
namely
setting
up
an efficient and effective framework for the exercise of
This Regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and
( 1 ) Decision ECB/2004/11 of the European Central Bank of 3 June
related powers of the competent authorities of the participating
2004 concerning the terms and conditions for European Anti-
Member States to carry out supervisory tasks not conferred on
Fraud Office investigations of the European Central Bank, in
the ECB by this Regulation.
relation to the prevention of fraud, corruption and any other
illegal activities detrimental to the European Communities’
financial interests (OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 56).
( 2 ) OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
287/73
This Regulation is also without prejudice to the responsibilities
CHAPTER II
and related powers of the competent or designated authorities
of the participating Member States to apply macroprudential
Cooperation and tasks
tools not provided for in relevant acts of Union law.
Article 3
Cooperation
Article 2
1. The
ECB
shall
cooperate
closely
with
EBA,
ESMA,
EIOPA
Definitions
and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the other
authorities which form part of the ESFS, which ensure an
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions
adequate level of regulation and supervision in the Union.
shall apply:
(1) ‘participating Member State’ means a Member State whose
Where necessary the ECB shall enter into memoranda of under
currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is
standing with competent authorities of Member States
not the euro which has established a close cooperation in
responsible for markets in financial instruments. Such
accordance with Article 7;
memoranda shall be made available to the European Parliament,
to the Council and to competent authorities of all Member
States.
(2) ‘national competent authority’ means a national competent
authority designated by a participating Member State in
accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, the ECB shall
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
participate in the Board of Supervisors of EBA under the
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and
conditions set out in Article 40 of Regulation (EU)
investment firms (
No 1093/2010.

1 ) and Directive 2013/36/EU;
(3) ‘credit institution’ means a credit institution as defined in
3. The
ECB
shall
carry
out
its
tasks
in
accordance
with
this
point 1 of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
Regulation and without prejudice to the competence and the
tasks of EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and the ESRB.
(4) ‘financial holding company’ means a financial holding
company as defined in point 20 of Article 4(1) of Regu
4. The
ECB
shall
cooperate
closely
with
the
authorities
lation (EU) No 575/2013;
empowered to resolve credit institutions, including in the prep
aration of resolution plans.
(5) ‘mixed financial holding company’ means a mixed financial
holding company as defined in point 15 of Article 2 of
5. Subject to Articles 1, 4 and 6, the ECB shall cooperate
Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of
closely with any public financial assistance facility including the
the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM, in
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings
particular where such a facility has granted or is likely to
and investment firms in a financial conglomerate ( 2 );
grant, direct or indirect financial assistance to a credit institution
which is subject to Article 4.
(6) ‘financial conglomerate’ means a financial conglomerate as
defined in point 14 of Article 2 of Directive 2002/87/EC;
6. The
ECB
and
the
competent
authorities
of
non-partici
pating Member States shall conclude a memorandum of under
standing describing in general terms how they will cooperate
(7) ‘national designated authority’ means a designated authority
with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks
of a participating Member State, within the meaning of the
under Union law in relation to the financial institutions referred
relevant Union law;
to in Article 2. The memorandum shall be reviewed on a
regular basis.
(8) ‘qualifying holding’ means a qualifying holding as defined in
point 36 of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
Without prejudice to the first subparagraph the ECB shall
conclude a memorandum of understanding with the
competent authority of each non-participating Member State
(9) ‘Single supervisory mechanism’ (SSM) means the system of
that is home to at least one global systemically important insti
financial supervision composed by the ECB and national
tution, as defined in Union law.
competent authorities of participating Member States as
described in Article 6 of this Regulation.
Each memorandum shall be reviewed on a regular basis and
( 1 ) OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1.
shall be published subject to appropriate treatment of
( 2 ) OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1.
confidential information.

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L 287/74
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
Article 4
national competent authorities in those colleges as
observers, in relation to parents not established in one of
Tasks conferred on the ECB
the participating Member State;
1. Within the framework of Article 6, the ECB shall, in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, be exclusively
competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes,
(h) to participate in supplementary supervision of a financial
the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions estab
conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included
lished in the participating Member States:
in it and to assume the tasks of a coordinator where the
ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial
conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out in
(a) to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authori
relevant Union law;
sations of credit institutions subject to Article 14;
(i) to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans,
(b) for credit institutions established in a participating Member
and early intervention where a credit institution or group in
State, which wish to establish a branch or provide cross-
relation to which the ECB is the consolidating supervisor,
border services in a non participating Member State, to
does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable
carry out the tasks which the competent authority of the
prudential requirements, and, only in the cases explicitly
home Member State shall have under the relevant Union
stipulated by relevant Union law for competent authorities,
law;
structural changes required from credit institutions to
prevent financial stress or failure, excluding any resolution
powers.
(c) to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of
qualifying holdings in credit institutions, except in the
case of a bank resolution, and subject to Article 15;
2. For
credit
institutions
established
in
a
non-participating
Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross-
border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall
(d) to ensure compliance with the acts referred to in the first
carry out, within the scope of paragraph 1, the tasks for which
subparagraph of Article 4(3), which impose prudential
the national competent authorities are competent in accordance
requirements on credit institutions in the areas of own
with relevant Union law.
funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits,
liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of
information on those matters;
3. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it
by this Regulation, and with the objective of ensuring high
(e) to ensure compliance with the acts referred to in the first
standards of supervision, the ECB shall apply all relevant
subparagraph of Article 4(3), which impose requirements on
Union law, and where this Union law is composed of Direc
credit institutions to have in place robust governance
tives, the national legislation transposing those Directives.
arrangements, including the fit and proper requirements
Where the relevant Union law is composed of Regulations
for the persons responsible for the management of credit
and where currently those Regulations explicitly grant options
institutions, risk management processes, internal control
for Member States, the ECB shall apply also the national legis
mechanisms, remuneration policies and practices and
lation exercising those options.
effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes,
including Internal Ratings Based models;
To that effect, the ECB shall adopt guidelines and recommen
dations, and take decisions subject to and in compliance with
(f) to carry out supervisory reviews, including where appro
the relevant Union law and in particular any legislative and
priate in coordination with EBA, stress tests and their
non-legislative act, including those referred to in Articles 290
possible publication, in order to determine whether the
and 291 TFEU. It shall in particular be subject to binding
arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms put in
regulatory and implementing technical standards developed by
place by credit institutions and the own funds held by these
EBA and adopted by the Commission in accordance with
institutions ensure a sound management and coverage of
Article 10 to 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, to
their risks, and on the basis of that supervisory review to
Article 16 of that Regulation, and to the provisions of that
impose on credit institutions specific additional own funds
Regulation on the European supervisory handbook developed
requirements, specific publication requirements, specific
by EBA in accordance with that Regulation. The ECB may also
liquidity requirements and other measures, where
adopt regulations only to the extent necessary to organise or
specifically made available to competent authorities by
specify the arrangements for the carrying out of the tasks
relevant Union law;
conferred on it by this Regulation.
(g) to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit
Before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public
institutions’ parents established in one of the participating
consultations and analyse the potential related costs and
Member States, including over financial holding companies
benefits, unless such consultations and analyses are dispropor
and mixed financial holding companies, and to participate
tionate in relation to the scope and impact of the regulations
in supervision on a consolidated basis, including in colleges
concerned or in relation to the particular urgency of the matter,
of supervisors without prejudice to the participation of
in which case the ECB shall justify that urgency.

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Where necessary the ECB shall contribute in any participating
5. When
carrying
out
the
tasks
referred
to
in
paragraph
2,
role to the development of draft regulatory technical standards
the ECB shall take into account the specific situation of the
or implementing technical standards by EBA in accordance with
financial system, economic situation and the economic cycle
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or shall draw the attention of
in individual Member States or parts thereof.
EBA to a potential need to submit to the Commission draft
standards amending existing regulatory or implementing
technical standards.
Article 6
Cooperation within the SSM
Article 5
1. The
ECB
shall
carry
out
its
tasks
within
a
single
super
visory mechanism composed of the ECB and national
Macroprudential tasks and tools
competent authorities. The ECB shall be responsible for the
effective and consistent functioning of the SSM.
1. Whenever
appropriate
or
deemed
required,
and
without
prejudice to paragraph 2 of this Article, the national competent
authorities or national designated authorities of the participating
2. Both
the
ECB
and
national
competent
authorities
shall
be
Member States shall apply requirements for capital buffers to be
subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an
held by credit institutions at the relevant level in accordance
obligation to exchange information.
with relevant Union law in addition to own funds requirements
referred to in point (d) of Article 4(1) of this Regulation,
including countercyclical buffer rates, and any other measures
Without prejudice to the ECB’s power to receive directly, or
aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks provided
have direct access to information reported, on an ongoing
for, and subject to the procedures set out, in the Regulation
basis, by credit institutions, the national competent authorities
(EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU in the cases
shall in particular provide the ECB with all information
specifically set out in relevant Union law. Ten working days
necessary for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred
prior to taking such a decision, the concerned authority shall
on the ECB by this Regulation.
duly notify its intention to the ECB. Where the ECB objects, it
shall state its reasons in writing within five working days. The
concerned authority shall duly consider the ECB’s reasons prior
3. Where
appropriate
and
without
prejudice
to
the
respon
to proceeding with the decision as appropriate.
sibility and accountability of the ECB for the tasks conferred on
it by this Regulation, national competent authorities shall be
responsible for assisting the ECB, under the conditions set out
2. The
ECB
may,
if
deemed
necessary,
instead
of
the
national in the framework mentioned in paragraph 7 of this Article, with
competent authorities or national designated authorities of the
the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the
participating Member State, apply higher requirements for
tasks referred to in Article 4 related to all credit institutions,
capital buffers than applied by the national competent auth
including assistance in verification activities. They shall follow
orities or national designated authorities of participating
the instructions given by the ECB when performing the tasks
Member States to be held by credit institutions at the relevant
mentioned in Article 4.
level in accordance with relevant Union law in addition to own
funds requirements referred to in point (d) of Article 4(1) of this
4. In
relation
to
the
tasks
defined
in
Article
4
except
for
Regulation, including countercyclical buffer rates, subject to the
points (a) and (c) of paragraph 1 thereof, the ECB shall have
conditions set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, and
the responsibilities set out in paragraph 5 of this Article and the
apply more stringent measures aimed at addressing systemic or
national competent authorities shall have the responsibilities set
macroprudential risks at the level of credit institutions subject to
out in paragraph 6 of this Article, within the framework and
the procedures set out in the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and
subject to the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this
Directive 2013/36/EU in the cases specifically set out in relevant
Article, for the supervision of the following credit institutions,
Union law.
financial holding companies or mixed financial holding
companies, or branches, which are established in participating
Member States, of credit institutions established in non-partici
3.
Any national competent authority or a national designated
pating Member States:
authority may propose to the ECB to act under paragraph 2, in
order to address the specific situation of the financial system
and the economy in its Member State.
— those that are less significant on a consolidated basis, at the
highest level of consolidation within the participating
Member States, or individually in the specific case of
branches, which are established in participating Member
4. Where the ECB intends to act in accordance with
States, of credit institutions established in non-participating
paragraph 2, it shall cooperate closely with the national
Member States. The significance shall be assessed based on
designated authorities in the Member States concerned. It shall
the following criteria:
in particular notify its intention to the concerned national
competent authorities or national designated authorities ten
working days prior to taking such a decision. Where any of
(i) size;
the concerned authorities objects, it shall state its reasons in
writing within five working days. The ECB shall duly consider
those reasons prior to proceeding with the decision as appro
(ii) importance for the economy of the Union or any
priate.
participating Member State;

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(iii) significance of cross-border activities.
authorities or upon request by a national competent auth
ority, decide to exercise directly itself all the relevant powers
for one or more credit institutions referred to in paragraph
With respect to the first subparagraph above, a credit institution
4, including in the case where financial assistance has been
or financial holding company or mixed financial holding
requested or received indirectly from the EFSF or the ESM;
company shall not be considered less significant, unless
justified by particular circumstances to be specified in the
methodology, if any of the following conditions is met:
(c) the ECB shall exercise oversight over the functioning of the
system, based on the responsibilities and procedures set out
in this Article, and in particular point (c) of paragraph 7;
(i) the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion;
(ii) the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating
(d) the ECB may at any time make use of the powers referred
Member State of establishment exceeds 20 %, unless the
to in Articles 10 to 13;
total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion;
(e) the ECB may also request, on an ad hoc or continuous
(iii) following a notification by its national competent authority
basis, information from the national competent authorities
that it considers such an institution of significant relevance
on the performance of the tasks carried out by them under
with regard to the domestic economy, the ECB takes a
this Article.
decision confirming such significance following a compre
hensive assessment by the ECB, including a balance-sheet
assessment, of that credit institution.
6. Without
prejudice
to
paragraph
5
of
this
Article,
national
competent authorities shall carry out and be responsible for the
The ECB may also, on its own initiative, consider an institution
tasks referred to in points (b), (d) to (g) and (i) of Article 4(1)
to be of significant relevance where it has established banking
and adopting all relevant supervisory decisions with regard to
subsidiaries in more than one participating Member States and
the credit institutions referred to in the first subparagraph of
its cross-border assets or liabilities represent a significant part of
paragraph 4 of this Article, within the framework and subject to
its total assets or liabilities subject to the conditions laid down
the procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article.
in the methodology.
Without prejudice to Articles 10 to 13, the national competent
Those for which public financial assistance has been requested
authorities and national designated authorities shall maintain
or received directly from the EFSF or the ESM shall not be
the powers, in accordance with national law, to obtain
considered less significant.
information from credit institutions, holding companies,
mixed holding companies and undertakings included in the
consolidated financial situation of a credit institution and to
Notwithstanding the previous subparagraphs, the ECB shall
perform on site inspections at those credit institutions,
carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation in
holding companies, mixed holding companies and undertakings.
respect of the three most significant credit institutions in each
The national competent authorities shall inform the ECB, in
of the participating Member States, unless justified by particular
accordance with the framework set out in paragraph 7 of this
circumstances.
Article, of the measures taken pursuant to this paragraph and
closely coordinate those measures with the ECB.
5. With regard to the credit institutions referred to in
paragraph 4, and within the framework defined in paragraph 7:
The national competent authorities shall report to the ECB on a
regular basis on the performance of the activities performed
under this Article.
(a) the ECB shall issue regulations, guidelines or general
instructions to national competent authorities, according
to which the tasks defined in Article 4 excluding points
(a) and (c) of paragraph 1 thereof are performed and super
7. The
ECB
shall,
in
consultation
with
national
competent
visory decisions are adopted by national competent auth
authorities, and on the basis of a proposal from the Supervisory
orities.
Board, adopt and make public a framework to organise the
practical arrangements for the implementation of this Article.
The framework shall include, at least, the following:
Such instructions may refer to the specific powers in
Article 16(2) for groups or categories of credit institutions
for the purposes of ensuring the consistency of supervisory
(a) the specific methodology for the assessment of the criteria
outcomes within the SSM;
referred to in the first, second and third subparagraph of
paragraph 4 and the criteria under which the fourth
subparagraph of paragraph 4 ceases to apply to a specific
(b) when necessary to ensure consistent application of high
credit institution and the resulting arrangements for the
supervisory standards, the ECB may at any time, on its
purposes of implementing paragraphs 5 and 6. Those
own initiative after consulting with national competent
arrangements and the methodology for the assessment of

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the criteria referred to in the first, second and third
2. Close cooperation between the ECB and the national
subparagraph of paragraph 4 shall be reviewed to reflect
competent authority of a participating Member State whose
any relevant changes, and shall ensure that where a credit
currency is not the euro shall be established, by a decision
institution has been considered significant or less significant
adopted by the ECB, where the following conditions are met:
that assessment shall only be modified in case of substantial
and non-transitory changes of circumstances, in particular
those circumstances relating to the situation of the credit
(a) the Member State concerned notifies the other Member
institution which are relevant for that assessment.
States, the Commission, the ECB and EBA the request to
enter into a close cooperation with the ECB in relation to
the exercise of the tasks referred to in Articles 4 and 5 with
(b) the definition of the procedures, including time-limits, and
regard to all credit institutions established in the Member
the possibility to prepare draft decisions to be sent to the
State concerned, in accordance with Article 6;
ECB for consideration, for the relation between the ECB and
the national competent authorities regarding the supervision
of credit institutions not considered as less significant in
(b) in the notification, the Member State concerned undertakes:
accordance with paragraph 4;
— to ensure that its national competent authority or
(c) the definition of the procedures, including time-limits, for
national designated authority will abide by any
the relation between the ECB and the national competent
guidelines or requests issued by the ECB, and
authorities regarding the supervision of credit institutions
considered as less significant in accordance with paragraph
4. Such procedures shall in particular require national
competent authorities, depending on the cases defined in
— to provide all information on the credit institutions
the framework, to:
established in that Member State that the ECB may
require for the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive
assessment of those credit institutions;
(i) notify the ECB of any material supervisory procedure;
(c) the Member State concerned has adopted relevant national
legislation to ensure that its national competent authority
(ii) further assess, on the request of the ECB, specific
will be obliged to adopt any measure in relation to credit
aspects of the procedure;
institutions requested by the ECB, in accordance with
paragraph 4.
(iii) transmit to the ECB material draft supervisory decisions
on which the ECB may express its views.
3. The
decision
referred
to
in
paragraph
2
shall
be
published
in the Official Journal of the European Union. The decision shall
apply 14 days after its publication.
8. Wherever the ECB is assisted by national competent auth
orities or national designated authorities for the purpose of
exercising the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the
4. Where
the
ECB
considers
that
a
measure
relating
to
the
ECB and the national competent authorities shall comply with
tasks referred to in paragraph 1 should be adopted by the
the provisions set out in the relevant Union acts in relation to
national competent authority of a concerned Member State in
the allocation of responsibilities and cooperation between
relation to a credit institution, financial holding company or
competent authorities from different Member States.
mixed-financial holding company, it shall address instructions
to that authority, specifying a relevant timeframe.
Article 7
That timeframe shall be no less than 48 hours unless earlier
Close cooperation with the competent authorities of
adoption is indispensable to prevent irreparable damage. The
participating Member States whose currency is not the
national competent authority of the concerned Member State
euro
shall take all the necessary measures in accordance with the
1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall
obligation referred to in point (c) of paragraph 2.
carry out the tasks in the areas referred to in Articles 4(1),
4(2) and 5 in relation to credit institutions established in a
Member State whose currency is not the euro, where close
5. The ECB may decide to issue a warning to the Member
cooperation has been established between the ECB and the
State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or
national competent authority of such Member State in
terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken in the
accordance with this Article.
following cases:
To that end, the ECB may address instructions to the national
(a) where, in the opinion of the ECB, the conditions set out in
competent authority or to the national designated authority of
points (a) to (c) of paragraph 2 are no longer met by the
the participating Member State whose currency is not the euro.
Member State concerned; or

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(b) where, in the opinion of the ECB, the national competent
adverse consequences as regards the fiscal responsibilities of
authority of the Member State concerned does not act in
the Member States;
accordance with the obligation referred to in point (c) of
paragraph 2.
(b) whether such suspension or termination could have
significant adverse consequences as regards the fiscal
If no such action has been undertaken within 15 days of notifi
responsibilities in the Member State which has notified a
cation of such a warning, the ECB may suspend or terminate
reasoned disagreement in accordance with Article 26(8);
the close cooperation with that Member State.
(c) whether or not it is satisfied that the national competent
The decision to suspend or terminate the close cooperation
authority concerned has adopted measures which, in the
shall be notified to the Member State concerned and shall be
ECB’s opinion:
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The
decision shall indicate the date from which it applies, taking
due consideration of supervisory effectiveness and legitimate
— ensure that credit institutions in the Member State
interests of credit institutions.
which notified its reasoned disagreement pursuant to
the previous subparagraph are not subject to a more
favourable treatment than credit institutions in the
6. The
Member
State
may
request
the
ECB
to
terminate
the
other participating Member States, and
close cooperation at any time after a lapse of three years from
the date of the publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union of the decision adopted by the ECB for the establishment
— are equally effective as the decision of the Governing
of the close cooperation. The request shall explain the reasons
Council under the second subparagraph of this
for the termination, including, when relevant, potential
paragraph in achieving the objectives referred to in
significant adverse consequences as regards the fiscal responsi
Article 1 and in ensuring compliance with relevant
bilities of the Member State. In this case, the ECB shall
Union law.
immediately proceed to adopt a decision terminating the close
cooperation and indicate the date from which it applies within a
maximum period of three months, taking due consideration of
The ECB shall include these considerations in its decision and
supervisory effectiveness and legitimate interests of credit insti
communicate them to the Member State in question.
tutions. The decision shall be published in the Official Journal of
the European Union.
8. If
a
participating
Member
State
whose
currency
is
not
the
euro disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, it
7. If
a
participating
Member
State
whose
currency
is
not
the shall inform the Governing Council of its reasoned
euro notifies the ECB in accordance with Article 26(8) of its
disagreement within five working days of receiving the draft
reasoned disagreement with an objection of the Governing
decision. The Governing Council shall then decide about the
Council to a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, the
matter within five working days, taking fully into account
Governing Council shall, within a period of 30 days, give its
those reasons, and explain in writing its decision to the
opinion on the reasoned disagreement expressed by the Member
Member State concerned. The Member State concerned may
State and, stating its reasons to do so, confirm or withdraw its
request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with
objection.
immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision.
Where the Governing Council confirms its objection, the
9. A Member State which
has terminated the close
participating Member State whose currency is not the euro
cooperation with the ECB may not enter into a new close
may notify the ECB that it will not be bound by the
cooperation before a lapse of three years from the date of the
potential decision related to a possible amended draft decision
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the
by the Supervisory Board.
ECB decision terminating the close cooperation.
The ECB shall then consider the possible suspension or
Article 8
termination of the close cooperation with that Member State,
taking due consideration of supervisory effectiveness, and take a
International relations
decision in that respect.
Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member
States and institutions and bodies of the Union, other than the
ECB, including EBA, in relation to the tasks conferred on the
The ECB shall take into account, in particular, the following
ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may develop contacts and
considerations:
enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory auth
orities, international organisations and the administrations of
third countries, subject to appropriate coordination with EBA.
(a) whether the absence of such suspension or termination
Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect
could jeopardize the integrity of the SSM or have significant
of the Union and its Member States.

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CHAPTER III
(b) financial holding companies established in the participating
Member States;
Powers of the ECB
Article 9
(c) mixed financial holding companies established in the
Supervisory and investigatory powers
participating Member States;
1. For
the
exclusive
purpose
of
carrying
out
the
tasks
conferred on it by Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 5(2), the ECB shall
(d) mixed-activity holding companies established in the partici
be considered, as appropriate, the competent authority or the
pating Member States;
designated authority in the participating Member States as
established by the relevant Union law.
(e) persons belonging to the entities referred to in points (a)
to (d);
For the same exclusive purpose, the ECB shall have all the
powers and obligations set out in this Regulation. It shall also
have all the powers and obligations, which competent and
(f) third parties to whom the entities referred to in points (a) to
designated authorities shall have under the relevant Union
(d) have outsourced functions or activities.
law, unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation. In
particular, the ECB shall have the powers listed in Sections 1
and 2 of this Chapter.
2. The
persons
referred
to
in
paragraph
1
shall
supply
the
information requested. Professional secrecy provisions do not
exempt those persons from the duty to supply that information.
Supplying that information shall not be deemed to be in breach
To the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred on it by
of professional secrecy.
this Regulation, the ECB may require, by way of instructions,
those national authorities to make use of their powers, under
and in accordance with the conditions set out in national law,
where this Regulation does not confer such powers on the ECB.
3.
Where the ECB obtains information directly from the legal
Those national authorities shall fully inform the ECB about the
or natural persons referred to in paragraph 1 it shall make that
exercise of those powers.
information available to the national competent authorities
concerned.
2. The
ECB
shall
exercise
the
powers
referred
to
in
paragraph
Article 11
1 of this Article in accordance with the acts referred to in the
first subparagraph of Article 4(3). In the exercise of their
General investigations
respective supervisory and investigatory powers, the ECB and
1. In
order
to
carry
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this
national competent authorities shall cooperate closely.
Regulation, and subject to other conditions set out in relevant
Union law, the ECB may conduct all necessary investigations of
any person referred to in Article 10(1) established or located in
3. By
derogation
from
paragraph
1
of
this
Article,
with a participating Member State.
regard to credit institutions established in participating
Member States whose currency is not the euro, the ECB shall
exercise its powers in accordance with Article 7.
To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:
S e c t i o n 1
(a) require the submission of documents;
I n v e s t i g a t o r y p o w e r s
(b) examine the books and records of the persons referred to in
Article 10
Article 10(1) and take copies or extracts from such books
Request for information
and records;
1.
Without prejudice to the powers referred to in Article 9(1),
and subject to the conditions set out in relevant Union law, the
(c) obtain written or oral explanations from any person referred
ECB may require the following legal or natural persons, subject
to in Article 10(1) or their representatives or staff;
to Article 4, to provide all information that is necessary in order
to carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation,
including information to be provided at recurring intervals
(d) interview any other person who consents to be interviewed
and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical
for the purpose of collecting information relating to the
purposes:
subject matter of an investigation;
(a) credit institutions established in the participating Member
2. The
persons
referred
to
in
Article
10(1)
shall
be
subject
to
States;
investigations launched on the basis of a decision of the ECB.

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When a person obstructs the conduct of the investigation, the
Article 13
national competent authority of the participating Member State
where the relevant premises are located shall afford, in
Authorisation by a judicial authority
compliance with national law, the necessary assistance
1. If
an
on-site
inspection
provided
for
in
Article
12(1)
and
including, in the cases referred to in Articles 12 and 13, facili
(2) or the assistance provided for in Article 12(5) requires auth
tating the access by the ECB to the business premises of the
orisation by a judicial authority according to national rules,
legal persons referred to in Article 10(1), so that the aforemen
such authorisation shall be applied for.
tioned rights can be exercised.
2. Where
authorisation
as
referred
to
in
paragraph
1
of
this
Article 12
Article is applied for, the national judicial authority shall control
that the decision of the ECB is authentic and that the coercive
On-site inspections
measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having
1. In
order
to
carry
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this regard to the subject matter of the inspection. In its control of
Regulation, and subject to other conditions set out in relevant
the proportionality of the coercive measures, the national
Union law, the ECB may in accordance with Article 13 and
judicial authority may ask the ECB for detailed explanations,
subject to prior notification to the national competent authority
in particular relating to the grounds the ECB has for suspecting
concerned conduct all necessary on-site inspections at the
that an infringement of the acts referred to in the first
business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 10(1)
subparagraph of Article 4(3) has taken place and the seriousness
and any other undertaking included in supervision on a
of the suspected infringement and the nature of the
consolidated basis where the ECB is the consolidating supervisor
involvement of the person subject to the coercive measures.
in accordance with point (g) of Article 4(1). Where the proper
However, the national judicial authority shall not review the
conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB
necessity for the inspection or demand to be provided with
may carry out the on-site inspection without prior
the information on the ECB’s file. The lawfulness of the ECB’s
announcement to those legal persons.
decision shall be subject to review only by the CJEU.
S e c t i o n 2
2. The
officials
of
and
other
persons
authorised
by
the
ECB
to conduct an on-site inspection may enter any business
S p e c i f i c s u p e r v i s o r y p o w e r s
premises and land of the legal persons subject to an investi
Article 14
gation decision adopted by the ECB and shall have all the
powers stipulated in Article 11(1).
Authorisation
1. Any
application
for
an
authorisation
to
take
up
the
business of a credit institution to be established in a partici
pating Member State shall be submitted to the national
3. The
legal
persons
referred
to
in
Article
10(1)
shall
be competent authorities of the Member State where the credit
subject to on-site inspections on the basis of a decision of
institution is to be established in accordance with the
the ECB.
requirements set out in relevant national law.
4. Officials
and
other
accompanying
persons
authorised
or 2. If
the
applicant
complies
with
all
conditions
of
authori
appointed by the national competent authority of the Member
sation set out in the relevant national law of that Member State,
State where the inspection is to be conducted shall, under the
the national competent authority shall take, within the period
supervision and coordination of the ECB, actively assist the
provided for by relevant national law, a draft decision to
officials of and other persons authorised by the ECB. To that
propose to the ECB to grant the authorisation. The draft
end, they shall enjoy the powers set out in paragraph 2.
decision shall be notified to the ECB and the applicant for
Officials of the national competent authority of the participating
authorisation. In other cases, the national competent authority
Member State concerned shall also have the right to participate
shall reject the application for authorisation.
in the on-site inspections.
3. The
draft
decision
shall
be
deemed
to
be
adopted
by
the
ECB unless the ECB objects within a maximum period of ten
5. Where
the
officials
of
and
other
accompanying
persons working days, extendable once for the same period in duly
authorised or appointed by the ECB find that a person opposes
justified cases. The ECB shall object to the draft decision only
an inspection ordered pursuant to this Article, the national
where the conditions for authorisation set out in relevant Union
competent authority of the participating Member State
law are not met. It shall state the reasons for the rejection in
concerned shall afford them the necessary assistance in
writing.
accordance with national law. To the extent necessary for the
inspection, this assistance shall include the sealing of any
business premises and books or records. Where that power is
not available to the national competent authority concerned, it
4. The
decision
taken
in
accordance
with
paragraphs
2
and
3
shall use its powers to request the necessary assistance of other
shall be notified by the national competent authority to the
national authorities.
applicant for authorisation.

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5. Subject to paragraph 6, the ECB may withdraw the auth
law and in accordance with the procedure and within the
orisation in the cases set out in relevant Union law on its own
assessment periods set out therein.
initiative, following consultations with the national competent
authority of the participating Member State where the credit
institution is established, or on a proposal from such national
Article 16
competent authority. These consultations shall in particular
ensure that before taking decisions regarding withdrawal, the
Supervisory powers
ECB allows sufficient time for the national authorities to
1. For
the
purpose
of
carrying
out
its
tasks
referred
to
in
decide on the necessary remedial actions, including possible
Article 4(1) and without prejudice to other powers conferred on
resolution measures, and takes these into account.
the ECB, the ECB shall have the powers set out in paragraph 2
of this Article to require any credit institution, financial holding
company or mixed financial holding company in participating
Where the national competent authority which has proposed
Member States to take the necessary measures at an early stage
the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that
to address relevant problems in any of the following circum
the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the
stances:
relevant national law, it shall submit a proposal to the ECB to
that end. In that case, the ECB shall take a decision on the
proposed withdrawal taking full account of the justification
(a) the credit institution does not meet the requirements of the
for withdrawal put forward by the national competent auth
acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3);
ority.
(b) the ECB has evidence that the credit institution is likely to
breach the requirements of the acts referred to in the first
6. As long as national authorities remain competent to
subparagraph of Article 4(3) within the next 12 months;
resolve credit institutions, in cases where they consider that
the withdrawal of the authorisation would prejudice the
adequate implementation of or actions necessary for resolution
(c) based on a determination, in the framework of a super
or to maintain financial stability, they shall duly notify their
visory review in accordance with point (f) of Article 4(1),
objection to the ECB explaining in detail the prejudice that a
that the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms
withdrawal would cause. In those cases, the ECB shall abstain
implemented by the credit institution and the own funds
from proceeding to the withdrawal for a period mutually agreed
and liquidity held by it do not ensure a sound management
with the national authorities. The ECB may extend that period if
and coverage of its risks.
it is of the opinion that sufficient progress has been made. If,
however, the ECB determines in a reasoned decision that proper
actions necessary to maintain financial stability have not been
2. For the purposes of Article 9(1), the ECB shall have, in
implemented by the national authorities, the withdrawal of the
particular, the following powers:
authorisations shall apply immediately.
(a) to require institutions to hold own funds in excess of the
capital requirements laid down in the acts referred to in the
Article 15
first subparagraph of Article 4(3) related to elements of
Assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings
risks and risks not covered by the relevant Union acts;
1. Without
prejudice
to
the
exemptions
provided
for
in
point
(c) of Article 4(1), any notification of an acquisition of a qual
(b) to require the reinforcement of the arrangements,
ifying holding in a credit institution established in a partici
processes, mechanisms and strategies;
pating Member State or any related information shall be
introduced with the national competent authorities of the
Member State where the credit institution is established in
(c) to require institutions to present a plan to restore
accordance with the requirements set out in relevant national
compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to the
law based on the acts referred to in the first subparagraph of
acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) and
Article 4(3).
set a deadline for its implementation, including
improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline;
2. The national competent authority shall assess the
proposed acquisition, and shall forward the notification and a
(d) to require institutions to apply a specific provisioning
proposal for a decision to oppose or not to oppose the
policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds require
acquisition, based on the criteria set out in the acts referred
ments;
to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3), to the ECB, at
least ten working days before the expiry of the relevant
assessment period as defined by relevant Union law, and shall
(e) to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of
assist the ECB in accordance with Article 6.
institutions or to request the divestment of activities that
pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution;
3. The
ECB
shall
decide
whether
to
oppose
the
acquisition (f) to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activ
on the basis of the assessment criteria set out in relevant Union
ities, products and systems of institutions;

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(g) to require institutions to limit variable remuneration as a
companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally
percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the
or negligently, breach a requirement under relevant directly
maintenance of a sound capital base;
applicable acts of Union law in relation to which administrative
pecuniary penalties shall be made available to competent auth
orities under the relevant Union law, the ECB may impose
(h) to require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own
administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount
funds;
of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach
where those can be determined, or up to 10 % of the total
annual turnover, as defined in relevant Union law, of a legal
(i) to restrict or prohibit distributions by the institution to
person in the preceding business year or such other pecuniary
shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1
penalties as may be provided for in relevant Union law.
instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an
event of default of the institution;
2. Where the legal person is a subsidiary of a parent under
(j) to impose additional or more frequent reporting require
taking, the relevant total annual turnover referred to in
ments, including reporting on capital and liquidity posi
paragraph 1 shall be the total annual turnover resulting from
tions;
the consolidated account of the ultimate parent undertaking in
the preceding business year.
(k) to impose specific liquidity requirements, including
restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and
liabilities;
3. The
penalties
applied
shall
be
effective,
proportionate
and
dissuasive. In determining whether to impose a penalty and in
(l) to
require
additional
disclosures;
determining the appropriate penalty, the ECB shall act in
accordance with Article 9(2).
(m) to remove at any time members from the management
body of credit institutions who do not fulfil the
requirements set out in the acts referred to in the first
4. The
ECB
shall
apply
this
Article
in
accordance
with
the
subparagraph of Article 4(3).
acts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of this
Regulation, including the procedures contained in Regulation
(EC) No 2532/98, as appropriate.
Article 17
Powers of host authorities and cooperation on supervision
on a consolidated basis
5. In
the
cases
not
covered
by
paragraph
1
of
this
Article,
1. Between
participating
Member
States
the
procedures
set where necessary for the purpose of carrying out the tasks
out in the relevant Union law for credit institutions wishing
conferred on it by this Regulation, the ECB may require
to establish a branch or to exercise the freedom to provide
national competent authorities to open proceedings with a
services by carrying on their activities within the territory of
view to taking action in order to ensure that appropriate
another Member State and the related competences of home
penalties are imposed in accordance with the acts referred to
and host Member States shall apply only for the purposes of
in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) and any relevant
the tasks not conferred on the ECB by Article 4.
national legislation which confers specific powers which are
currently not required by Union law. The penalties applied by
national competent authorities shall be effective, proportionate
2. The provisions set out in the relevant Union law in
and dissuasive.
relation to the cooperation between competent authorities
from different Member States for conducting supervision on a
consolidated basis shall not apply to the extent that the ECB is
the only competent authority involved.
The first subparagraph of this paragraph shall be applicable in
particular to pecuniary penalties to be imposed on credit insti
tutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding
3. In fulfilling its tasks as defined in Articles 4 and 5 the ECB
companies for breaches of national law transposing relevant
shall respect a fair balance between all participating Member
Directives, and to any administrative penalties or measures to
States in accordance with Article 6(8) and shall, in its rela
be imposed on members of the management board of a credit
tionship with non-participating Member States, respect the
institution, financial holding company or mixed financial
balance between home and host Member States established in
holding company or any other individuals who under
relevant Union law.
national law are responsible for a breach by a credit institution,
financial holding company or mixed financial holding company.
Article 18
Administrative penalties
6. The
ECB
shall
publish
any
penalty
referred
to
paragraph
1,
1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it
whether it has been appealed or not, in the cases and in
by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding
accordance with the conditions set out in relevant Union law.

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7. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 6, for the purposes
on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent
of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in
committees of the European Parliament.
case of a breach of ECB regulations or decisions, the ECB may
impose sanctions in accordance with Regulation (EC)
No 2532/98.
6. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put
to it by the European Parliament, or by the euro Group in
accordance with the its own procedures and in the presence
CHAPTER IV
of representatives from any participating Member States whose
currency is not the euro.
Organisational principles
Article 19
7. When the European Court of Auditors examines the oper
Independence
ational efficiency of the management of the ECB under
Article 27.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, it
1. When
carrying
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this
Regu
shall also take into account the supervisory tasks conferred
lation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting
on the ECB by this Regulation.
within the SSM shall act independently. The members of the
Supervisory Board and the steering committee shall act indepen
dently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole
8. Upon request the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the
and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the institutions
ECB shall hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors
or bodies of the Union, from any government of a Member
with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of
State or from any other public or private body.
the European Parliament concerning its supervisory tasks where
such discussions are required for the exercise of the European
Parliament’s powers under the TFEU. An agreement shall be
2. The
institutions,
bodies,
offices
and
agencies
of
the
Union
concluded between the European Parliament and the ECB on
and the governments of the Member States and any other
the detailed arrangements for organising such discussions, with
bodies shall respect that independence.
a view to ensuring full confidentiality in accordance with the
confidentiality obligations imposed on the ECB as a competent
authority under relevant Union law.
3. Following
an
examination
of
the
need
for
a
Code
of
Conduct by the Supervisory Board, the Governing Council
shall establish and publish a Code of Conduct for the ECB
9. The
ECB
shall
cooperate
sincerely
with
any
investigations
staff and management involved in banking supervision
by the European Parliament, subject to the TFEU. The ECB and
concerning in particular conflicts of interest.
the European Parliament shall conclude appropriate
arrangements on the practical modalities of the exercise of
Article 20
democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of
the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation. Those
Accountability and reporting
arrangements shall cover, inter alia, access to information,
cooperation in investigations and information on the selection
1. The
ECB
shall
be
accountable
to
the
European
Parliament procedure of the Chair of the Supervisory Board.
and to the Council for the implementation of this Regulation, in
accordance with this Chapter.
Article 21
2. The
ECB
shall
submit
on
an
annual
basis
to
the
European
National parliaments
Parliament, to the Council, to the Commission and to the euro
Group a report on the execution of the tasks conferred on it by
1. When
submitting
the
report
provided
for
in
Article
20(2),
this Regulation, including information on the envisaged
the ECB shall simultaneously forward that report directly to the
evolution of the structure and amount of the supervisory fees
national parliaments of the participating Member States.
mentioned in Article 30.
National parliaments may address to the ECB their reasoned
3. The Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall
observations on that report.
present that report in public to the European Parliament, and
to the euro Group in the presence of representatives from any
participating Member State whose currency is not the euro.
2. National
parliaments
of
the
participating
Member
States,
through their own procedures, may request the ECB to reply in
writing to any observations or questions submitted by them to
4.
The Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB may, at the
the ECB in respect of the tasks of the ECB under this Regu
request of the euro Group, be heard on the execution of its
lation.
supervisory tasks by the euro Group in the presence of repre
sentatives from any participating Member States whose currency
is not the euro.
3. The
national
parliament
of
a
participating
Member
State
may invite the Chair or a member of the Supervisory Board to
participate in an exchange of views in relation to the super
5. At the request of the European Parliament, the Chair of
vision of credit institutions in that Member State together with
the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall participate in a hearing
a representative of the national competent authority.

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4. This Regulation is without prejudice to the accountability
2. The
Administrative
Board
of
Review
shall
be
composed
of
of national competent authorities to national parliaments in
five individuals of high repute, from Member States and having
accordance with national law for the performance of tasks
a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional
not conferred on the ECB by this Regulation and for the
experience, including supervisory experience, to a sufficiently
performance of activities carried out by them in accordance
high level in the fields of banking or other financial services,
with Article 6.
excluding current staff of the ECB, as well as current staff of
competent authorities or other national or Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies who are involved in the carrying
Article 22
out of the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation. The
Administrative Board of Review shall have sufficient resources
Due process for adopting supervisory decisions
and expertise to assess the exercise of the powers of the ECB
under this Regulation. Members of the Administrative Board of
1. Before
taking
supervisory
decisions
in
accordance
with Review and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a
Article 4 and Section 2 of Chapter III, the ECB shall give the
term of five years, which may be extended once, following a
persons who are the subject of the proceedings the opportunity
public call for expressions of interest published in the Official
of being heard. The ECB shall base its decisions only on
Journal of the European Union. They shall not be bound by any
objections on which the parties concerned have been able to
instructions.
comment.
The first subparagraph shall not apply if urgent action is needed
in order to prevent significant damage to the financial system.
3. The
Administrative
Board
of
Review
shall
decide
on
the
In such a case, the ECB may adopt a provisional decision and
basis of a majority of at least three of its five members.
shall give the persons concerned the opportunity to be heard as
soon as possible after taking its decision.
4. The
members
of
the
Administrative
Board
of
Review
shall
2. The rights of defence of the persons concerned shall be
act independently and in the public interest. For that purpose,
fully respected in the proceedings. They shall be entitled to have
they shall make a public declaration of commitments and a
access to the ECB’s file, subject to the legitimate interest of other
public declaration of interests indicating any direct or indirect
persons in the protection of their business secrets. The right of
interest which might be considered prejudicial to their inde
access to the file shall not extend to confidential information.
pendence or the absence of any such interest.
The decisions of the ECB shall state the reasons on which they
are based.
5. Any
natural
or
legal
person
may
in
the
cases
referred
to
in
paragraph 1 request a review of a decision of the ECB under
this Regulation which is addressed to that person, or is of a
direct and individual concern to that person. A request for a
Article 23
review against a decision of the Governing Council as referred
Reporting of violations
to in paragraph 7 shall not be admissible.
The ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place
for reporting of breaches by credit institutions, financial holding
companies or mixed financial holding companies or competent
6. Any
request
for
review
shall
be
made
in
writing,
including
authorities in the participating Member States of the legal acts
a statement of grounds, and shall be lodged at the ECB within
referred to in Article 4(3), including specific procedures for the
one month of the date of notification of the decision to the
receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Such
person requesting the review, or, in the absence thereof, of the
procedures shall be consistent with relevant Union legislation
day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter as the case
and shall ensure that the following principles are applied:
may be.
appropriate protection for persons who report breaches,
protection of personal data, and appropriate protection for
the accused person.
7.
After ruling on the admissibility of the review, the Admin
istrative Board of Review shall express an opinion within a
Article 24
period appropriate to the urgency of the matter and no later
Administrative Board of Review
than two months from the receipt of the request and remit the
case for preparation of a new draft decision to the Supervisory
1. The
ECB
shall
establish
an
Administrative
Board
of
Review Board. The Supervisory Board shall take into account the
for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative
opinion of the Administrative Board of Review and shall
review of the decisions taken by the ECB in the exercise of
promptly submit a new draft decision to the Governing
the powers conferred on it by this Regulation after a request
Council. The new draft decision shall abrogate the initial
for review submitted in accordance with paragraph 5. The scope
decision, replace it with a decision of identical content, or
of the internal administrative review shall pertain to the
replace it with an amended decision. The new draft decision
procedural and substantive conformity with this Regulation of
shall be deemed adopted unless the Governing Council objects
such decisions.
within a maximum period of ten working days.

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8. A
request
for
review
pursuant
to
paragraph
5
shall
not Council and the Supervisory Board, and shall decide by simple
have suspensory effect. However, the Governing Council, on a
majority, with each member having one vote. The ECB shall
proposal by the Administrative Board of Review may, if it
adopt and make public a regulation setting up such mediation
considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application
panel and its rules of procedure.
of the contested decision.
9. The
opinion
expressed
by
the
Administrative
Board
of
Article 26
Review, the new draft decision submitted by the Supervisory
Board and the decision adopted by the Governing Council
Supervisory board
pursuant to this Article shall be reasoned and notified to the
1. The
planning
and
execution
of
the
tasks
conferred
on
the
parties.
ECB shall be fully undertaken by an internal body composed of
its Chair and Vice Chair, appointed in accordance with
10. The
ECB
shall
adopt
a
decision
establishing
the
Adminis
paragraph 3, and four representatives of the ECB, appointed
trative Board of Review’s operating rules.
in accordance with paragraph 5, and one representative of the
national competent authority in each participating Member
State (‘Supervisory Board’). All members of the Supervisory
11. This Article is without prejudice to the right to bring
Board shall act in the interest of the Union as a whole.
proceedings before the CJEU in accordance with the Treaties.
Article 25
Where the competent authority is not a central bank, the
member of the Supervisory Board referred to in this
Separation from monetary policy function
paragraph may decide to bring a representative from the
Member State’s central bank. For the purposes of the voting
1. When
carrying
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this
Regu
procedure set out in paragraph 6, the representatives of the
lation, the ECB shall pursue only the objectives set by this
authorities of any one Member State shall together be
Regulation.
considered as one member.
2. The
ECB
shall
carry
out
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this
Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its tasks
2. The appointments for the Supervisory Board in
relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The tasks
accordance with this Regulation shall respect the principles of
conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall neither interfere
gender balance, experience and qualification.
with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary
policy. The tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation
shall moreover not interfere with its tasks in relation to the
ESRB or any other tasks. The ECB shall report to the
3. After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB shall submit
European Parliament and to the Council as to how it has
a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair
complied with this provision. The tasks conferred by this Regu
to the European Parliament for approval. Following the
lation on the ECB shall not alter the ongoing monitoring of the
approval of this proposal, the Council shall adopt an imple
solvency of its monetary policy counterparties.
menting decision to appoint the Chair and the Vice-Chair of
the Supervisory Board. The Chair shall be chosen on the basis
of an open selection procedure, on which the European
The staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the
Parliament and the Council shall be kept duly informed, from
ECB by this Regulation shall be organisationally separated from,
among individuals of recognised standing and experience in
and subject to, separate reporting lines from the staff involved
banking and financial matters and who are not members of
in carrying out other tasks conferred on the ECB.
the Governing Council. The Vice Chair of the Supervisory
Board shall be chosen from among the members of the
Executive Board of the ECB. The Council shall act by qualified
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall
majority without taking into account the vote of the members
adopt and make public any necessary internal rules, including
of the Council which are not participating Member States.
rules regarding professional secrecy and information exchanges
between the two functional areas.
Once appointed, the Chair shall be a full-time professional and
4. The ECB shall ensure that the operation of the Governing
shall not hold any offices at national competent authorities. The
Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and
term of office shall be five years and shall not be renewable.
supervisory functions. Such differentiation shall include strictly
separated meetings and agendas.
4. If the Chair of the Supervisory Board no longer fulfils the
5. With
a
view
to
ensuring
separation
between
monetary conditions required for the performance of his duties or has
policy and supervisory tasks, the ECB shall create a mediation
been guilty of serious misconduct, the Council may, following
panel. This panel shall resolve differences of views expressed by
a proposal by the ECB, which has been approved by the
the competent authorities of participating Member States
European Parliament, adopt an implementing decision to
concerned regarding an objection of the Governing Council to
remove the Chair from office. The Council shall act by
a draft decision by the Supervisory Board. This panel shall
qualified majority without taking into account the vote of the
include one member per participating Member State, chosen
members of the Council which are not participating Member
by each Member State among the members of the Governing
States.

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Following a compulsory retirement of the Vice-Chair of the
10. The
Supervisory
Board,
voting
in
accordance
with
the
Supervisory Board as a member of the Executive Board,
rule set out in paragraph 6, shall establish a steering
pronounced in accordance with the Statute of the ESCB and
committee from among its members with a more limited
of the ECB, the Council may, following a proposal by the ECB,
composition to support its activities, including preparing the
which has been approved by the European Parliament, adopt an
meetings.
implementing decision to remove the Vice-Chair from office.
The Council shall act by qualified majority without taking
into account the vote of the members of the Council which
are not participating Member States.
The steering committee of the Supervisory Board shall have no
decision-making powers. The steering committee shall be
chaired by the Chair or, in the exceptional absence of the
For those purposes the European Parliament or the Council may
Chair, the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. The composition
inform the ECB that they consider that the conditions for the
of the steering committee shall ensure a fair balance and
removal of the Chair or the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board
rotation between national competent authorities. It shall
from office are fulfilled, to which the ECB shall respond.
consist of no more than ten members including the Chair,
the Vice-Chair and one additional representative from the
ECB. The steering committee shall execute its preparatory
tasks in the interest of the Union as a whole and shall work
5. The
four
representatives
of
the
ECB
appointed
by
the in full transparency with the Supervisory Board.
Governing Council shall not perform duties directly related to
the monetary function of the ECB. All the ECB representatives
shall have voting rights.
11. A
representative
of
the
Commission
may
participate
as
an observer in the meetings of the Supervisory Board upon
6. Decisions
of
the
Supervisory
Board
shall
be
taken
by
a invitation. Observers shall not have access to confidential
simple majority of its members. Each member shall have one
information relating to individual institutions.
vote. In case of a draw, the Chair shall have a casting vote.
12. The
Governing
Council
shall
adopt
internal
rules
setting
7. By
derogation
from
paragraph
6
of
this
Article,
the
Super
out in detail its relation with the Supervisory Board. The Super
visory Board shall take decisions on the adoption of regulations
visory Board shall also adopt its rules of procedure, voting in
pursuant to Article 4(3), on the basis of a qualified majority of
accordance with the rule set out in paragraph 6. Both sets of
its members, as defined in Article 16(4) TEU and in Article 3 of
rules shall be made public. The rules of procedure of the Super
Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions attached to the TEU
visory Board shall ensure equal treatment of all participating
and to the TFEU, for the members representing the participating
Member States.
Member State’s authorities. Each of the four representatives of
the ECB appointed by the Governing Council shall have a vote
equal to the median vote of the other members.
Article 27
8. Without
prejudice
to
Article
6,
the
Supervisory
Board
Professional secrecy and exchange of information
shall carry out preparatory works regarding the supervisory
1. Members of the Supervisory Board, staff of the ECB and
tasks conferred on the ECB and propose to the Governing
staff seconded by participating Member States carrying out
Council of the ECB complete draft decisions to be adopted by
supervisory duties, even after their duties are ceased, shall be
the latter, pursuant to a procedure to be established by the ECB.
subject to the professional secrecy requirements set out in
The draft decisions shall be transmitted at the same time to the
Article 37 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB and in
national competent authorities of the Member States concerned.
the relevant acts of Union law.
A draft decision shall be deemed adopted unless the Governing
Council objects within a period to be defined in the procedure
mentioned above but not exceeding a maximum period of ten
working days. However, if a participating Member State whose
The ECB shall ensure that individuals who provide any service,
currency is not the euro disagrees with a draft decision of the
directly or indirectly, permanently or occasionally, related to the
Supervisory Board, the procedure set out in Article 7(8) shall
discharge of supervisory duties are subject to equivalent profes
apply. In emergency situations the aforementioned period shall
sional secrecy requirements.
not exceed 48 hours. If the Governing Council objects to a draft
decision, it shall state the reasons for doing so in writing, in
particular stating monetary policy concerns. If a decision is
changed following an objection by the Governing Council, a
2. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it
participating Member State whose currency is not the euro
by this Regulation, the ECB shall be authorised, within the limits
may notify the ECB of its reasoned disagreement with the
and under the conditions set out in the relevant Union law, to
objection and the procedure set out in Article 7(7) shall apply.
exchange information with national or Union authorities and
bodies in the cases where the relevant Union law allows
national competent authorities to disclose information to
9. A secretariat shall support the activities of the Supervisory
those entities or where Member States may provide for such
Board, including preparing the meetings on a full time basis.
disclosure under the relevant Union law.

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EN
29.10.2013 Official
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of
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European
Union L
287/87
Article 28
shall communicate with the national competent authority
before deciding on the final fee level so as to ensure that super
Resources
vision remains cost-effective and reasonable for all credit insti
The ECB shall be responsible for devoting the necessary
tutions and branches concerned. The ECB shall communicate to
financial and human resources to the exercise of the tasks
credit institutions and branches the basis for the calculation of
conferred on it by this Regulation.
the annual supervisory fee.
Article 29
4. The
ECB
shall
report
in
accordance
with
Article
20.
Budget and annual accounts
1. The
ECB’s
expenditure
for
carrying
out
the
tasks
conferred 5. This
Article
is
without
prejudice
to
the
right
of
national
on it by this Regulation shall be separately identifiable within
competent authorities to levy fees in accordance with national
the budget of the ECB.
law and, to the extent supervisory tasks have not been conferred
on the ECB, or in respect of costs of cooperating with and
assisting the ECB and acting on its instructions, in accordance
2. The
ECB
shall,
as
part
of
the
report
referred
to
in with relevant Union law and subject to the arrangements made
Article 20, report in detail on the budget for its supervisory
for the implementation of this Regulation, including Articles 6
tasks.The annual accounts of the ECB drawn up and published
and 12.
in accordance with Article 26.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and
of the ECB shall include the income and expenses related to the
supervisory tasks.
Article 31
Staff and staff exchange
3. In line with Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB and of
the ECB the supervisory section of the annual accounts shall be
1. The
ECB
shall
establish,
together
with
all
national
audited.
competent authorities, arrangements to ensure an appropriate
exchange and secondment of staff with and among national
competent authorities.
Article 30
Supervisory fees
2. The
ECB
may
require
as
appropriate
that
supervisory
1. The
ECB
shall
levy
an
annual
supervisory
fee
on
credit teams of national competent authorities taking supervisory
institutions established in the participating Member States and
actions regarding a credit institution, financial holding
branches established in a participating Member State by a credit
company or mixed financial holding company located in one
institution established in a non-participating Member State. The
participating Member State in accordance with this Regulation
fees shall cover expenditure incurred by the ECB in relation to
also involve staff from national competent authorities of other
the tasks conferred on it under Articles 4 to 6 of this Regu
participating Member States.
lation. These fees shall not exceed the expenditure relating to
these tasks.
3. The
ECB
shall
establish
and
maintain
comprehensive
and
formal procedures including ethics procedures and propor
2. The
amount
of
the
fee
levied
on
a
credit
institution
or tionate periods to assess in advance and prevent possible
branch shall be calculated in accordance with the arrangements
conflicts of interest resulting from subsequent employment
established, and published in advance, by the ECB.
within two years of members of the Supervisory Board and
ECB staff members engaged in supervisory activities, and shall
provide for appropriate disclosures subject to applicable data
Before establishing those arrangements, the ECB shall conduct
protection rules.
open public consultations and analyse the potential related costs
and benefits, and publish the results of both.
Those procedures shall be without prejudice to the application
3. The
fees
shall
be
calculated
at
the
highest
level
of
consoli
of stricter national rules. For members of the Supervisory Board
dation within participating Member States, and shall be based
who are representatives of national competent authorities, those
on objective criteria relating to the importance and risk profile
procedures shall be established and implemented in cooperation
of the credit institution concerned, including its risk weighted
with national competent authorities, without prejudice to
assets.
applicable national law.
The basis for calculating the annual supervisory fee for a given
For the ECB staff members engaged in supervisory activities,
calendar year shall be the expenditure relating to the supervision
those procedures shall determine categories of positions to
of credit institutions and branches in that year. The ECB may
which such assessment applies, as well as periods that are
require advance payments in respect of the annual supervisory
proportionate to the functions of those staff members in the
fee which shall be based on a reasonable estimate. The ECB
supervisory activities during their employment at the ECB.

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L 287/88
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
29.10.2013
4. The
procedures
referred
to
in
paragraph
3
shall
provide (e) the effectiveness of independence and accountability
that the ECB shall assess whether there are objections that
arrangements;
members of the Supervisory Board take paid work in private
sector institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsi
bility after they have ceased to hold office.
(f) the interaction between the ECB and the EBA;
The procedures referred to in paragraph 3 shall apply as a rule
(g) the appropriateness of governance arrangements, including
for two years after the members of the Supervisory Board have
the composition of, and voting arrangements in, the Super
ceased to hold office and may be adjusted, on the basis of due
visory Board and its relation with the Governing Council,
justification, proportionate to the functions performed during
as well as the collaboration in the Supervisory Board
that term of office and the length of time that office was held.
between Member States whose currency is the euro and
the other participating Member States in the SSM;
5. The
Annual
Report
of
the
ECB
in
accordance
with (h) the interaction between the ECB and the competent auth
Article 20 shall include detailed information, including statistical
orities of non-participating Member States and the effects
data on the application of the procedures referred to in para
of the SSM on these Member States;
graphs 3 and 4 of this Article.
(i) the effectiveness of the recourse mechanism against
CHAPTER V
decisions of the ECB;
General and final provisions
(j) the cost effectiveness of the SSM;
Article 32
Review
(k) the possible impact of the application of Article 7(6), 7(7)
By 31 December 2015, and subsequently every three years
and 7(8) on the functioning and integrity of the SSM;
thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the appli
cation of this Regulation, with a special emphasis on moni
toring the potential impact on the smooth functioning of the
(l) the effectiveness of the separation between supervisory and
internal market. That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
monetary policy functions within the ECB and of the
separation of financial resources devoted to supervisory
tasks from the budget of the ECB, taking into account
(a) the functioning of the SSM within the ESFS and the impact
any modifications of the relevant legal provisions
of the supervisory activities of the ECB on the interests of
including at the level of primary law;
the Union as a whole and on the coherence and integrity
of the internal market in financial services, including its
possible impact on the structures of the national banking
(m) the fiscal effects that supervisory decisions taken by the
systems within the Union, and regarding the effectiveness
SSM have on participating Member States and the impact
of cooperation and information sharing arrangements
of any developments in relation to resolution financing
between the SSM and competent authorities of non-partici
arrangements;
pating Member States;
(n) the possibilities of developing further the SSM, taking into
account any modifications of the relevant provisions,
(b) the division of tasks between the ECB and the national
including at the level of primary law, and taking into
competent authorities within the SSM, the effectiveness of
account whether the rationale of the institutional
the practical arrangements of organisation adopted by the
provisions in this Regulation is no longer present,
ECB, and the impact of the SSM on the functioning of the
including the possibility to fully align rights and obligations
remaining supervisory colleges;
of Member States whose currency is the euro and other
participating Member States.
(c) the effectiveness of the ECB’s supervisory and sanctioning
powers and the appropriateness of conferring on the ECB
The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and
additional sanctioning powers, including in relation to
to the Council. The Commission shall make accompanying
persons other than credit institutions, financial holding
proposals, as appropriate.
companies or mixed financial holding companies;
Article 33
(d) the appropriateness of the arrangements set out respectively
Transitional provisions
for macroprudential tasks and tools under Article 5 and for
the granting and withdrawal of authorisations under
1. The
ECB
shall
publish
the
framework
referred
to
in
Article 14;
Article 6(7) by 4 May 2014.

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2. The
ECB
shall
assume
the
tasks
conferred
on
it
by
this company or mixed financial holding company, and following a
Regulation on 4 November 2014 subject to the implementation
decision addressed to the entities concerned and to the national
arrangements and measures set out in this paragraph.
competent authorities concerned.
After 3 November 2013, the ECB shall publish by means of
4. From
3
November
2013,
in
view
of
the
assumption
of
its
regulations and decisions the detailed operational arrangements
tasks, the ECB may require the national competent authorities
for the implementation of the tasks conferred on it by this
and the persons referred to in Article 10(1) to provide all
Regulation.
relevant information for the ECB to carry out a comprehensive
assessment, including a balance-sheet assessment, of the credit
From 3 November 2013, the ECB shall send a quarterly report
institutions of the participating Member State. The ECB shall
to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the
carry out such an assessment at least in relation to the credit
Commission on progress in the operational implementation of
institutions not covered by Article 6(4). The credit institution
this Regulation.
and the competent authority shall supply the information
requested.
If on the basis of the reports referred to in the third
subparagraph of this paragraph and following discussions of
5. Credit
institutions
authorised
by
participating
Member
the reports in the European Parliament and in the Council, it
States on 3 November 2013 or, where relevant, on the dates
is shown that the ECB will not be ready for exercising in full its
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be deemed
tasks on 4 November 2014, the ECB may adopt a decision to
to be authorised in accordance with Article 14 and may
set a date later than the one referred to in the first subparagraph
continue to carry out their business. National competent auth
of this paragraph to ensure continuity during the transition
orities shall communicate to the ECB before the date of appli
from national supervision to the SSM, and based on the avail
cation of this Regulation or, where relevant, before the dates
ability of staff, the setting up of appropriate reporting
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the identity of
procedures and arrangements for cooperation with national
those credit institutions together with a report indicating the
competent authorities pursuant to Article 6.
supervisory history and the risk profile of the institutions
concerned, and any further information requested by the ECB.
The information shall be submitted in the format requested by
3. Notwithstanding
paragraph
2,
and
without
prejudice
to the ECB.
the exercise of investigatory powers conferred on it under this
Regulation, from 3 November 2013, the ECB may start carrying
out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation other than
6. Notwithstanding
Article
26(7),
until
31
December
2015,
adopting supervisory decisions in respect of any credit insti
qualified majority voting and simple majority voting shall be
tution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding
applied together for the adoption of the regulations referred to
company and following a decision addressed to the entities
in Article 4(3).
concerned and to the national competent authorities concerned.
Notwithstanding paragraph 2, if the ESM unanimously requests
Article 34
the ECB to take over direct supervision of a credit institution,
Entry into force
financial holding company or mixed financial holding company
as a precondition for its direct recapitalisation, the ECB may
This Regulation shall enter into force on the fifth day following
immediately start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this
that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Regulation in respect of that credit institution, financial holding
Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Luxembourg, 15 October 2013.
For the Council
The President
R. ADIUS

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