Resolution of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council

of 17 October 2000

supplementing the resolutions of 23 June 1981, 30 June 1982, 14 July 1986 and 10 July 1995 as regards the security characteristics of passports and other travel documents

(2000/C 310/01)

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL,

Whereas:

In their resolutions of 23 June 1981(1), 30 June 1982(2), 14 July 1986(3) and 10 July 1995(4) the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting with the Council, established a passport of uniform format and made the necessary adjustments following entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.

Annex I, paragraph B of the resolution of 30 June 1982 has hitherto contained merely references to options for the security protection of passports, without reference to a definite level of security; this has led to the passports of the individual Member States having very different security characteristics; as a result, forgeries of EU passports and other travel documents of the Member States have multiplied.

Combating forgery of documents is an important element in the fight against organised crime and illegal immigration in the European Union and is therefore regarded by the Member States as an especially important aspect of their common interest.

It is therefore desirable that travel documents issued by the Member States fulfil the highest possible requirements with regard to protection against forgery and that the design of the documents and the security devices they contain ensure efficient recognition of attempted forgeries at passport control,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

- to introduce the minimum security standards in the production and issue of new travel documents at the earliest opportunity, and at the latest on 1 January 2005 (for passports) and not later than on 1 January 2006 (for identity cards and short-term passports with more than six months' validity,

- to have the option of laying down more stringent security measures for their travel documents,

- to apply the minimum security standards to all the travel documents of the Member States listed in Annex II,

AND HAVE FURTHER AGREED:

- to accept the minimum security requirements for travel documents of Member States as set out in Annex I.

(1) OJ C 241, 19.9.1981, p. 1.

(2) OJ C 179, 19.7.1982, p. 1.

(3) OJ C 185, 24.7.1986, p. 1.

(4) OJ C 200, 4.8.1995, p. 1.

ANNEX I

MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EU TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

1. Materials

Security features for the paper used for the pages of the travel document:

- no optical brighteners,

- at least duo-tone watermarks,

- security reagents to guard against attempts at tampering by chemical erasure.

Where possible:

- coloured fibres (partly visible, partly fluorescent under UV light) should also be incorporated.

The following are recommended:

- UV-fluorescent planchettes,

- security thread.

If the biographical data page is in sticker from:

- no optical brighteners,

- coloured fibres (partly visible, partly fluorescent under UV light),

- UV-fluorescent planchettes,

- the watermark may be dispensed with in the paper used for that page,

- security reagents to guard against attempts at tampering by chemical erasure.

The watermark may be dispensed within the paper used for the inside of the covers. Security reagents are required only if details (not biographical data) are present on the inside covers.

If a card for inserting biographical data in the travel document is made entirely of plastic, it is not usually possible to incorporate the authentication marks used in paper. In the case of stickers and cards, the lack of security marks in the materials should be compensated for by measures in respect of printing, over and above the following minimum standrads, by use of optically variable devices (OVDs), or by issuing technique.

2. Printing

Security printing techniques

- Background printing:

- two-colour printed pattens,

- rainbow colouring, where possible fluorescent,

- UV-fluorescent overprinting,

- effective anti-forgery motifs (especially on the biographical data page), with optional use of micro-printing,

- reagent inks must be used on paper passport pages and stickers.

The layout of the biographical data page must be such that it is distinguishable from the other pages of the passport.

- Form printing:

- with integrated micro-printing (unless already included in background printing).

- Numbering:

- on all inside pages of the passport,

- printed (where possible, with a special style of figures or typeface and in UV-fluorescent ink), or perforated, or, in cards inserted in a passport, integrated using the same technique as for entry of the biodata.

If a sticker is used for biographical data, printed numbering using fluorescent ink and a special style of figures should be obligatory.

If stickers or non-laminated paper inside pages are used for biographical data, intaglio printing with latent image effect, micro-text and optically variable ink should also be employed. Additional optically variable security devices should also be used on passport cards made entirely of plastic, at the least through the use of optically variable ink or equivalent measures.

3. Protection against photocopying

The current state of development of generally available digital reproduction techniques and the resulting potential for forgery means that in future high-grade security features in the form of OVDs or other equivalent devices will be required as safeguards against photocopying. Emphasis should be placed on the security of the biographical data page, based on an independent, complex OVD technology or other equivalent devices complementing other security techniques.

Appropriate integration of OVD components or other equivalent devices into the layered structure of the biographical data page should also to some extent protect the data against forgery, especially when the degree of integration of data and data carriers attained by the issuing technique described in Section 4 requires additional safeguards and the laminate materials to be used need to be effectively protected against imitation.

Subject to the minimum standards described in Section 4 on the need for lamination, OVDs used on the biographical data page may take on of the following forms:

- diffractive micro-structures which vary when viewed from different angles (DOVID = Diffractive Optically Variable Image Device with high resolution), integrated into the hot-sealed laminate or as an OVD overlay, or, on stickers or a non-laminated paper inside page, as metallised OVD (with intaglio overprinting),

- or other equivalent devices.

If a plastic card is personalised by laser engraving and a changeable laser image (CLI) is incorporated therein, the application of a diffractive OVD is recommended, at least in the form of a positioned metallised DOVID, to achieve an enhanced protection against reproduction.

4. Issuing technique

To ensure that data are properly secured against attempts at forgery, it will in future be necessary to integrate the biographical data, including the photo, holder's signature if it is included on the biographical data page and other main data, into the basic material of the document. Conventional methods of attaching the photograph should no longer be used.

To cater for existing document systems and ongoing development projects, the following issuing techniques may be used:

- laser printing,

- thermo-transfer,

- ink-jet printing,

- photographic,

- laser engraving.

To ensure that biographical issue data are adequately protected against tampering, hot-seal lamination with OVD security laminate should be made compulsory where laser printing, thermo-transfer or photographic techniques have been used. In any event, an inside cover page should no longer be used for biographical data. Travel documents of Member States must be issued in machine-readable form. The biographical data page must follow ICAO document 9303, part 1 and part 3, and the issuing technique must meet the specifications it lays down for machine-readable documents.

The most effective method of protecting against the fraudulent creation of stolen blank travel documents is to centralise the issuing procedure. Where travel documents continue to be issued on a regional or decentralised basis, appropriate security measures should be taken in terms of logistics, administration and issuing techniques. This applies particularly to the storage of blank documents and the means of issuing them, e.g. access to computerised issuing systems. Blanks should be stored in locked and appropriately supervised premises. With suitable programming, computerised systems may also be used to authenticate document issue, for example by affixing digital security devices (the "electronic seal").

ANNEX II

SCOPE

The minimum security standards for travel documents of the Member States shall apply to:

1. ordinary passports;

2. official passports, e.g. service passports and diplomatic passports;

3. short-term passports with more than six months' validity;

4. documents in lieu of passports, issued as travel documents:

(a) in the form of a passport (as a pass booklet);

(b) as identity cards (by analogy and complying with the specifications of ICAO Document 9303, Part 3).

Member States shall endeavour to apply these minimum security standards to travel document which they issue to nationals of third countries or stateless persons.