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5.7.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
176/37
DECISIONS
COMMISSION DECISION
of 8 March 2011
on measure C 18/10 (ex NN 20/10) implemented by the French Republic for aeronautic suppliers
(‘the Aero 2008 guarantee’)
(notified under document C(2011) 1378)
(Only the French text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2011/393/EU)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
(5) The
Commission
decision
to
initiate
the
procedure
was
published in the Official Journal of the European Union ( 2 ).
The Commission called on interested parties to submit
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
their comments on the measure in question.
Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2)
thereof,
(6) The
Commission
did
not
receive
any
comments
from
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
interested parties.
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
(7) On
20
September
2010,
the
French
Republic
sent
its
pursuant to the provisions cited above ( 1 ),
observations to the Commission.
Whereas:
(8) By
letter
of
15
November
2010,
the
Commission
asked
I.
the French Republic for additional information. The
PROCEDURE
French Republic replied by letter of 15 December
(1) On
17
October
2008,
the
Commission
of
its
own
2010, registered on the same day by the Commission’s
motion initiated the procedure in respect of the
services.
exchange rate guarantee granted by Coface to aeronautic
suppliers (‘the measure’ or ‘the Aero 2008 guarantee’)
(CP 294/08).
(9) The
French
Republic
sent
additional
information
by
letter
of 31 January 2011, registered on the same day by the
(2) Requests
for
information
were
sent
to
the
French
Commission’s services.
Republic on 4 November 2008, 15 May 2009 and
30 September 2009. The French Republic replied on
8 December 2008, 18 June 2009 and 30 October
2009 respectively. The replies were registered on those
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE
same days.
II.1. Legal basis
(10) The
authorities
of
the
French
Republic
submitted
that
the
(3) A
meeting
between
the
Commission’s
services
and
the
legal basis of the measure was Articles L 432-1, L 432-2,
authorities of the French Republic took place on
R 442-1 and R442-8-4 of the Insurance Code.
17 December 2009. Following that meeting, the French
Republic notified additional information on 22 February
2010.
II.2. Beneficiaries
(4)
By letter of 20 July 2010, the Commission informed the
(11) The
potential
beneficiaries
of
the
measure
are
aeronautic
French Republic that it had decided to initiate the
suppliers at Tier 2 or below ( 3 ).
procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU in respect
of the measure.
( 2 ) See footnote 1.
( 3 ) This measure does not therefore concern Tier 1 and Super Tier 1,
( 1 ) OJ C 268, 2.10.2010, p. 4.
which are partners sharing the risk with aircraft manufacturers.

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L 176/38
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
5.7.2011
(12) There is no limit on the size of the beneficiaries.
2002. Natixis is a subsidiary of the BPCE Group which
Suppliers in which an aircraft manufacturer holds more
arose from the 2009 merger of the Banque Populaire and
than a 25 % stake are not eligible.
the Caisse d’Epargne.
(13) Firms
in
difficulty
do
not
have
access
to
the
measure
at
(20) The total volume to be financed is limited to the
issue.
exchange rate risk in respect of supplies totalling EUR
500 million. The amounts actually covered to date
represent only a small proportion (approximately EUR
10 million) of the maximum. The undertakings
(14) Suppliers
operating
in
France,
including
those
that
have
concerned may apply for the guarantee until
an establishment or their headquarters in France and
15 December 2012.
supply aircraft manufacturers outside France, may be
eligible for the measure. On the other hand, suppliers
that do not have an establishment in France and
(21) Any
aeronautic
supplier
interested
in
the
Aero
2008
supply an aircraft manufacturer established in a country
guarantee must apply for the exchange rate guarantee
other than France are not covered.
and prove that it relates to supplies invoiced in dollars.
It will then receive an offer from Coface covering an
amount of turnover in dollars and a ‘guaranteed’
(15) According
to
information
provided
by
France,
the
under
exchange rate in relation to the dollar. The Commission
takings which have benefited from this provision to date
des garanties determines those two conditions, taking into
are AD Industrie, Aerofonctions, Axon Cable and
account the initial application lodged by the supplier. The
Exameca. These are aeronautic suppliers established in
amounts covered are limited to a proportion of all the
France to which Coface granted an exchange rate
dollar contracts entered into by the insured undertaking.
guarantee at the end of 2008.
The offer covers a maximum period of 5 years. The
supplier may accept or refuse Coface’s offer. The
amount of turnover guaranteed cannot be amended
after Coface gives its approval formalising the issue of
II.3. Economic background
the guarantee.
(16) According to France, aircraft manufacturers have
increasingly required their suppliers to submit bids in
dollars (USD). In the event of a weak dollar, medium-
(22) If the dollar is weak in relation to the guaranteed rate,
term or long-term supply contracts of this kind pose
the undertakings which have taken out the guarantee will
problems for both French and non-French suppliers
be refunded 100 % of the exchange rate loss. If the dollar
who have their main cost base in the euro zone.
is strong, the undertakings must repay a share of the gain
to Coface. The insured undertaking can choose to receive
25 % or 50 % of the rise in the dollar when the rate is
adjusted. The compensation which the undertaking must
(17) France
has
explained
that
some
aeronautic
undertakings
pay to Coface is then calculated using the adjusted rate.
face difficulties in obtaining a EUR/USD exchange rate
There are two variants of this profit-sharing payment:
guarantee which meets their needs. Although exchange
rate hedging products are common on the financial
markets, the specific characteristics of the guarantees
— Variant 1: the adjusted rate is equal to the initial
offered are not always adapted to the specific needs of
guaranteed rate less the difference between that
undertakings. In particular, according to the French
initial rate and the exchange rate on the day the
authorities, more often than not the banks offer
payment is booked (as given by the daily reference
hedging against fluctuations between EUR and USD for
rate fixed by the ECB) subject to the guaranteed
a maximum period of 2 years.
sharing percentage.
II.4. Description of the measure
— Variant 2: as for Variant 1, but with a ceiling of 15
cents on the sharing payment (that is to say, the
(18) The
Aero 2008 guarantee is a hedging mechanism
difference between the initial guaranteed rate and
against the risk of fluctuation in the USD-EUR
the exchange rate on the day the payment is booked),
exchange rate. Aeronautic suppliers which have entered
into supply contracts denominated in dollars gain if the
dollar is strong but suffer loss if it is weak. The guarantee
enables them to insure against loss suffered as a result of
(23) The amount which suppliers with an exchange rate
a weak dollar while, to a certain extent, making gains if
guarantee have to pay will be less in the case of a
the dollar is strong.
strong dollar than the amount they receive if the dollar

is comparably weak. Sharing the gain gives suppliers the
opportunity to take advantage of a strong dollar to a
certain extent. Waiving a part of the gain from a
(19) The
measure
at
issue
is
administered
by
Coface.
Coface
is
strong dollar allows in return a reduction in the cost
one of the principal French export credit insurance
of the premium necessary to cover them if the dollar
companies. It has belonged to the Natixis Group since
is weak.

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EN
5.7.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
176/39
(24) The
premiums
which
suppliers
must
pay
in
order
to
payment. If the insured undertaking defaults, Coface will
obtain the Aero 2008 guarantee are determined and
be required to fulfil its contractual obligation to honour
invoiced upon subscription. Insured undertakings may
the guarantee on behalf of the State. A third party who
opt for immediate payment or staggered payments.
has bought the promise of payment in the event of a
Suppliers who choose the latter option must pay 25 %
strong dollar will receive a payment from the bank
of the premium when concluding the contract and the
account of the French State, which runs the risk of not
balance in respect of each year covered on 31 January of
being reimbursed at all or of not being reimbursed in full
the year in question. In this case, a rate equivalent to the
by the defaulting supplier.
EURIBOR 12-month rate plus 60 base points is invoiced
to cover the credit risk on the payment of the
premium ( 4 ). Two of the four undertakings which took
(29) If the suppliers stagger a part of the payment of the
out the guarantee chose staggered payments: AD
premium, the French State also runs the risk of
Industrie and Exameca.
suffering a loss if the outstanding amount of premiums
is not paid during the year covered.
(25) The
suppliers
must
provide
invoices
as
proof
of
the
amounts paid in dollars.
(30) The
measure
was
launched
in
the
autumn
of
2008.
Eleven undertakings applied to Coface for a formal
offer, which four of them accepted; two of them then
(26) According to the French authorities, all the transactions
revised downwards the amount initially requested. All
carried out by Coface under Aero 2008 are on behalf of
those offers were accepted in November and December
the French State. For those transactions, Coface uses a
2008. According to the information provided by the
special bank account of the French State. Although the
French authorities, no offers were accepted in 2009 or
French State is the holder of the account, Coface has
2010.
access to it for financial transactions such as the
purchase of options. The premiums paid by the bene
ficiaries are transferred directly to this account. This
(31) Two of the four guarantees apply until the end of 2013
means that Coface as such does not bear any risk since
(that is, for 5 years), one expired in 2010 (after 2 years)
it administers the measure on behalf of the French State.
and one expired in 2009 (after 1 year). The guarantees
It is the French State which, in this case, bears the
which last until 2013 relate to annual batches of
financial risk of the measure.
deliveries. The total value of supplies concerned is close
to USD 19 million. Since some suppliers chose to cover
only a part of their deliveries, the guarantees relate to
(27) The
premiums
Coface
charges
are
calculated
on
a
case-
some USD 12 million. Three of the four suppliers
by-case basis. According to France, they reflect the
obtained cover for supplies of less than USD 2,8
market prices for the underlying exchange rate risk
million each. Axon Cable retains a 25 % ‘share’ of the
instruments. The financial instruments bought by
gain if the dollar is strong, while the other suppliers
Coface in the name and on behalf of the French State
retain 50 % of the gain.
cover all of its own exchange rate risk for the whole
duration of the guarantee at the time the guarantee is
offered to the supplier.
(32) The
table
below
was
made
available
by
France
at
the
meeting held in December 2009. It summarises the
suppliers involved, the guarantees granted each year
(28) If the dollar is strong, the supplier must reimburse Coface
and the annual guaranteed exchange rate. AD Industrie
the amount resulting from the difference between the
and Axon Cable did not accept the total amount offered
guaranteed rate and the reference rate on the date of
by Coface.
AD Industrie Aerofonctions Axon
Cable Exameca
2009
— USD
0,264
million/
USD 0,256 million/
—
[…] (*)
[…]
2010 USD
2
million/[…]
— USD
0,384
million/
USD 2,712 million/[…]
[…]
2011 USD
2
million/[…]
— USD
0,205
million/
—
[…]
2012 USD
2
million/[…]
— USD
0,511
million/
—
[…]
2013 USD
2
million/[…]
— USD
0,511
million/
—
[…]
TOTAL USD
8
million USD
0,264
million USD
1,866
million USD
2,712
million
( 4 ) This information was supplied by France in its observations of
20 September 2010.

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L 176/40
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
5.7.2011
AD Industrie Aerofonctions Axon
Cable Exameca
Maximum amount USD 12,7 million USD
0,264
million USD
3,74
million USD
2,712
million
offered by Coface
Premiums 2,54
% 2,48
% 1,35
% 2,55
%
Interest 50
% 50
% 25
% 50
%
(*) Business secret.
II.5. Summary of concerns which led to the opening
III. OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY INTERESTED
of the formal investigation procedure
PARTIES
(33) The
reasons
for
the
decision
to
initiate
the
procedure
laid
(39) The
Commission
did
not
receive
any
comments
from
down in Article 108(2) TFEU was that there was uncer
interested parties.
tainty as to whether State aid was absent and as to
whether or not the aid examined was compatible with
the rules on State aid.
IV. COMMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
(40) France
considers
that
the
premiums
invoiced
under
Aero
(34) First,
the
Commission
had
concerns
as
to
whether
the
2008 reflect the market value of the exchange rate
premiums paid by the beneficiary undertakings are
insurance granted and that the measure in question
consistent with market prices. Specifically, the
does not therefore constitute State aid within the
Commission took the view that the French authorities
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
had not shown that the premiums paid covered the
following factors: the administrative costs of Coface for
administering the guarantee, the risk of default by
suppliers, the credit risk in respect of staggered
(41) The French authorities sent the Commission a detailed
payment of premiums and a profit margin. The possi
description of the methodology used to determine the
bility therefore remained that there was a selective
amounts of the premiums invoiced under Aero 2008.
economic advantage for suppliers which took out the
guarantee. Given that the French State could be
considered to be responsible for the Aero 2008
(42) France
submitted
information
proving
the
exact
market
guarantee, it was possible that the measure may
value of the financial products required to set up the
constitute State aid within the meaning of
guarantee. The guarantee is subdivided into financial
Article 107(1) TFEU.
instruments which in combination show its payment
profile: forward purchases in EUR/USD, purchases and
sales of options in EUR/USD.
(35) Secondly,
the
Commission
was
uncertain
as
to
whether
there was market failure in respect of hedging
instruments against short-term and longer-term
(43) The market value of those financial instruments is
EUR/USD exchange rate fluctuations as regards SMES
calculated on the basis of data from Bloomberg
and large enterprises.
software, one of the market leaders in financial
information. France provided extracts from the
Bloomberg software for all of the financial instruments
(36) Thirdly,
the
Commission
was
uncertain
as
to
whether
the
making up the guarantees granted to the four suppliers
measure had an incentive effect, since the suppliers were
which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
able to obtain the exchange rate guarantee even if their
application was made after the date when the contract
was signed.
(44) The
market values thus established include a profit
margin for the financial institutions from which Coface
buys those instruments. According to information
(37) Fourthly,
the
Commission
was
uncertain
as
regards
the
provided by France, the exchange rate risk products
proportionality of the measure, which is not limited to
offered by the banks do not in general include the
undertakings that are known to have difficulties in
payment of a premium since the banking sector earns
obtaining exchange rate guarantees from their banks.
money on the guaranteed rates and the option prices.
The margins in question are in incorporated by design
in the prices of the financial products making up the
guarantee offered to the suppliers and are therefore
(38) Fifthly,
the
Commission
had
concerns
as
to
whether
the
covered by the premiums invoiced by Coface.
potential positive impact of that aid could outweigh its
Moreover, the guaranteed forward rate chosen is always
negative impact, so as not to distort trading conditions to
higher than the forward rate for the year in which the
an extent contrary to the common interest.
rate is fixed by Coface.

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EN
5.7.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
176/41
(45) In order to cover the additional administrative costs related to the handling of the measure by Coface,
a margin of 40 base points is included in the amount of the premium. That margin represents
between 17 % and 32 % ( 5 ) of the total value of the premiums invoiced to the four undertakings
which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
(46) The French authorities have also given a detailed explanation of how the risk of default by the
supplier is taken into account in calculating the premiums invoiced. As described in recital 28, in the
event of a strong dollar, the default of the supplier may lead to financial loss for the French State.
(47) The risk of default by the supplier is determined by Coface on the basis of the Score@rating rating
system of French undertakings launched by Coface in 2002 which is based on its 20 years of
experience in rating businesses. With its Score@rating, Coface obtained the status of External Credit
Assessment Institution (ECAI) from the Commission bancaire for its rating activities in France. That
approval was granted in accordance with the Basel II rules. The following table gives the equivalences
between different recognised rating systems ( 6 ).
ECAI Coface
Banque de
France
Fitch Moody’s S
&
P Risk
Weight
Basel mapping
1 10
to
9 3++
to
3+ AAA
to Aaa to Aa3 AAA
to 20 %
AA-
AA-
2
8
3 A+
to
A- A1
to
A3 A+
to
A- 50
%
—
3 7
to
6 4+ BBB+
to Baa1 to
BBB+ to
100 %
BBB-
Baa3
BBB-
Evaluation of long-term
4 5
to
4 4
to
5+ BB+
to
BB- Ba1
to
Ba3 BB+
to
BB- 100
%
risk
5
3 5
to
6 B+
to
B- B1
to
B3 B+
to
B- 150
%
6 2
to
1 8
to
9 CCC+
and Caa1 and
CCC+ and
150 %
below
below
below
(48) Score@rating is a risk rating which divides probability of default into phases. The risk analysed is
default by the undertaking under the terms of the law, or a failure to pay of equivalent seriousness.
Each rating, measured on a scale of 1 to 10, corresponds to an average annual default rate. The table
below shows the annual default rate corresponding to different Score@rating ratings ( 7 ):
Very high risk Average
risk Low
risk
Score@rating
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
Annual default rate 25
% 10
% 4
% 2
% 1,3
% 0,7
% 0,4
% 0,15
% 0,05
% 0
%
(49) In order to deal with the risk of default by the insured undertaking in the event of a strong dollar,
Coface must be covered for the probability of default by financial instruments ( 8 ). The Bloomberg
software can calculate the price of the instruments required to cover the credit risk on the day a
guarantee is quoted. The premium is therefore adjusted according to the default risk determined on
the basis of the Score@rating system and the cost of the instruments required to cover that risk.
( 5 ) The variation is explained by the fact that the margin in respect of administrative costs is fixed whereas other items
making up the cost of the premium are variable on the basis of the risk specific to the undertaking and the costs of
the necessary hedging instruments.
( 6 ) Source: Coface’s Internet site at: http://www.Coface.fr/CofacePortal/ShowBinary/BEA%20Repository/FR_fr_FR/pages/
home/wwd/i/_docs/Score@rating.pdf
( 7 ) Ibid.
( 8 ) This involves buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the forward rate guaranteed for (1 – sharing %) × the
guaranteed dollar amount or buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the guaranteed forward rate less
15 cents for profit-sharing × the guaranteed dollar amount if there is a ceiling on the sharing rate.

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L 176/42
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
5.7.2011
(50) The factors described in recitals 40 to 49 form the basis for calculating the current premiums under
the Aero 2008 guarantee. The French authorities have provided a detailed breakdown of the
premiums invoiced to the four suppliers taking out the guarantee. This is illustrated in the table
below:
Axon Cable Exameca Ad
Industrie Aerofonction
Quotation date 5.12.2008 11.12.2008 14.11.2008 21.10.2008
Coface note on quotation […] […] […] […]
Year commencing 2009 2010 2010 2009
Year ending 2013 2010 2013 2009
Sharing percentage 25
% 50
% 50
% 50
%
15-cent ceiling? Yes Yes Yes yes
Payment period 3
months 2
months 3
months 3
months
Total amount USD 1
865
000 2
712
000 8
000
000 264
000
Market price of the guarantee […] […] […] […]
Credit risk […] […] […] […]
Margin for administrative costs 0,40
% 0,40
% 0,40
% 0,40
%
TOTAL 1,26
% 2,43
% 2,43
% 2,29
%
Coface premium 1,35
% 2,55
% 2,54
% 2,48
%
Difference related to execution
0,09 % 0,12
% 0,11
% 0,19
%
risk ( 1 )
( 1 ) This involves a premium to cover market volatility between the time when the contract is concluded and the market
conditions on the quotation date, ranging between 9 and 19 base points depending on market conditions on the
quotation date.
(51) According to the French authorities, the structure of the
no premium) and two others stated that the terms
premium as set out makes the guarantee less attractive
offered by Coface were not advantageous (in particular,
than the products offered by the banking sector. The
unattractive guaranteed rates). One undertaking stated
conditions offered under the Aero 2008 guarantee are
that its terms of payment were incompatible with the
therefore not more favourable than market conditions
guarantee offered, another stated that it had finally
and the premiums clearly incorporate the market value
managed to enter into an agreement in EUR and a
of the financial products required to set up the guarantee,
third undertaking stated that the negotiations with the
including a profit margin, Coface’s administrative costs,
purchaser had broken down at the end of the validity of
and the value of the default risk of the supplier. France
the guarantee commitment.
therefore argued that the measure does not involve
selective economic advantage and so does not constitute
State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE
(53) A
measure
constitutes
State
aid
within
the
meaning
of
(52) France
also
stated
that
seven
of
the
eleven
undertakings
Article 107(1) TFEU if it fulfils four conditions: it must
which received an offer from Coface decided to reject the
be granted by the State or through State resources, confer
offer. According to information provided by the French
a selective advantage to some undertakings or economic
authorities, two of the undertakings in question stated
activities, distort or threaten to distort competition, and
that the banks’ terms were more favourable (in particular,
be liable to affect trade between Member States.

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EN
5.7.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
176/43
(54) As
stated
in
recital
34,
the
decision
to
initiate
a
formal
profit margin and a margin to cover Coface’s adminis
investigation procedure was based, first, on the existence
trative costs, which removes the uncertainty expressed
of concerns about whether the premiums paid by the
when the formal investigation procedure was initiated.
beneficiary undertakings were consistent with market
The Commission observes that such an additional
prices. Specifically, the Commission took the view that
margin is not included by private banks, which merely
the French authorities did not show that the premiums
receive the margin included in the Bloomberg database
paid covered the following factors: the administrative
price. Accordingly, that margin may be considered to be
costs of Coface for administering the guarantee, the
consistent with the market price. The Commission takes
risk of default by suppliers, the credit risk in respect of
the view that France has also succeeded in demonstrating
staggered payment of premiums, and a profit margin.
that the default risk by the supplier ( 10 ) was reflected
The possibility therefore remained that there was a
correctly in the calculation of the amount of the
selective economic advantage for suppliers who took
premiums invoiced. In order to deal with the risk of
out the guarantee.
default by the insured undertaking, Coface must obtain
cover for the probability of default by:
(55) The Commission’s services analysed the information
provided by the French authorities following the
— buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the
opening of the procedure laid down in Article 108(2)
guaranteed forward rate for (1 – sharing %) × the
TFEU with a view to determining whether the measure
guaranteed dollar amount, or
is consistent with the market economy private investor
principle, that is to say, whether or not the conditions
offered by Coface are consistent with the market
— buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the
conditions offered by private operators.
guaranteed forward rate less 15 cents for profit-
sharing × the guaranteed dollar amount if there is a
ceiling on the sharing rate.
(56) The
Commission
notes,
first,
that
the
French
authorities
undertook to ensure that when Coface determines the
applicable rate of the premium, it uses the same
(62) The value of the credit risk for a year’s cover is therefore
methodology for all undertakings applying for the
equal to the sum of the option price multiplied by the
guarantee, namely the methodology set out in
probability of default in respect of the year in question.
Section IV (
That default probability is determined by an inter

9 ).
nationally recognised rating system, as described in
recitals 47 and 48 and used by Coface and its clients
in their commercial transactions. The Commission
(57) The
Commission
finds
that
products
comparable
to
those
considers that the reason for the use by Coface of its
offered by Coface are also available on the markets.
own rather than external ratings is that it makes effi
ciency savings by doing so.
(58) The
Commission
then
verified
that
the
market
price
of
the guarantee invoiced by Coface is consistent with the
(63) On
the
basis
of
the
additional
information
provided
by
market price applied by private operators.
the French authorities and the undertaking of the French
authorities referred to in recital 56 of this Decision, the
Commission concludes that Coface’s price for the Aero
2008 guarantees is consistent with the market conditions
(59) The
Commission
takes
the
view
that
the
price
of
the
offered by private operators.
financial instruments required to set up the guarantee
are in fact market prices, as shown by the extracts
from the Bloomberg software provided by France, and
(64) The
Aero
2008
guarantee
may
therefore
be
considered
to
that they are accurately reflected in the premiums
operate in accordance with the market economy investor
invoiced by Coface.
principle. Accordingly, the suppliers who took out the
guarantee did not obtain any economic advantage.
(60) In
addition,
the
market
prices
of
those
financial
products
include a profit margin for the financial institutions from
(65) It
is
not
therefore
necessary
to
analyse
the
other
concerns
which Coface bought the instruments in question.
on which the opening of the formal investigation
procedure was based. Since the existence of selective
economic advantage is a condition required to show
(61) The
French
authorities
also
showed
that
an
additional
that there is State aid, it may be concluded that the
margin of 40 base points is invoiced in order to cover
Aero 2008 guarantee does not constitute a State aid
Coface’s administrative costs. As set out in recital 45, that
measure.
margin represents a substantial proportion of the value
of the premiums invoiced. The Commission therefore
( 10 ) Where Coface is liable to pay out compensation (weak dollar),
considers that the premiums invoiced incorporate a
default by the undertaking means that Coface does not have to
pay it compensation, whereas when the guarantee leads to a
repayment by the undertaking, the latter’s default results in a corre
( 9 ) Letter from the French authorities of 20 September 2010.
sponding loss for the State.

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L 176/44
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
5.7.2011
(66) As
far
as
the
conditions
applied
by
Coface
for
staggered
VI. CONCLUSION
payment of premiums are concerned, the Commission
considers, however, that the interest rate applied, that is
(68) In the light of the all of the foregoing, the Commission
to say, the 12-month EURIBOR rate plus 60 base points,
considers that the Aero 2008 guarantee does not
cannot be regarded as a rate consistent with market
constitute State aid within the meaning of
practices. In particular, the premium of 60 base points
Article 107(1) TFEU,
is a fixed premium which is not adjusted in relation to
the default risk of the supplier or the guarantee level.
Since France has provided no specific justification, the
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Commission will, in order to establish the reference
rate, apply the method for setting the reference and
discount rates laid down in its Communication on the
revision of the method for setting the reference and
Article 1
discount rates ( 11 ) (‘the Communication on reference
The measure implemented by the French Republic to aeronautic
rates’). By letter of 31 January 2011, the French
suppliers (‘the Aero 2008 guarantee’) does not constitute State
authorities gave an undertaking that the difference
aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU.
between the premiums obtained by applying Coface’s
interest rate and those determined on the basis of the
reference rates in the Communication on reference rates
would always remain under the de minimis threshold and
Article 2
that they would comply with all of the provisions of
Commission Regulation (EC) No
1998/2006 of
This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.
15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87
and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid ( 12 ).
Done at Brussels, 8 March 2011.
(67) The
Commission
therefore
concludes
on
the
basis
of
that
undertaking that the interest invoiced in respect of
For the Commission
staggered payment does not fulfil all the conditions of
Article 107(1) TFEU and does not therefore constitute a
Joaquín ALMUNIA
State aid measure.
Vice-President
( 11 ) OJ C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6.
( 12 ) OJ L 379, 28.12.2006, p. 5.

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