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27.5.2013 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
140/11
REGULATION (EU) No 473/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 21 May 2013
on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the
correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
EUROPEAN UNION,
positions and the surveillance and coordination of
economic policies
( 3 ) and the procedure for the
avoidance of excessive government deficit laid down in
Article 126 TFEU and further specified in Council Regu
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
lation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up
Union, and in particular Article 136 in combination with
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit
Article 121(6) thereof,
procedure ( 4 ). The SGP has been further strengthened by
Regulation (EU) No
1175/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) and Council Regulation
(EU) No 1177/2011 ( 6 ). Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of
budgetary surveillance in the euro area ( 7 ) added a
system of effective, preventive and gradual enforcement
mechanisms in the form of the imposition of sanctions
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national
on Member States whose currency is the euro.
parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank ( 1 ),
(3) The
strengthening
of
the
SGP
has
enhanced
the
guidance
provided to Member States concerning prudent fiscal
policy-making, and, for the Member States whose
currency is the euro, has reinforced and made more
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure ( 2 ),
automatic the imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance with prudent fiscal policy-making, in order
to avoid excessive government deficits. Those provisions
have created a more comprehensive framework.
Whereas:
(4) In
order
to
ensure
closer
coordination
of
economic
(1) The
Treaty
on
the
Functioning
of
the
European
Union
policies and sustained convergence of the economic
(TFEU) requires that Member States regard their
performance of Member States, the European Semester,
economic policies as a matter of common concern,
as established in Article 2-a of Regulation (EC)
that their budgetary policies are guided by the need for
No 1466/97, provides a framework for economic
sound public finances and that their economic policies
policy coordination. The European Semester includes
do not risk jeopardising the proper functioning of
the formulation, and the surveillance of the implemen
economic and monetary union.
tation, of the broad guidelines of the economic policies
of the Member States and of the Union (broad economic
policy guidelines) in accordance with Article 121(2)
TFEU; the formulation, and the examination of the
(2) The
Stability
and
Growth
Pact
(SGP)
aims
to
secure
implementation, of the employment guidelines that
budgetary discipline across the Union and sets out the
must be taken into account by Member States in
framework for preventing and correcting excessive
accordance with Article 148(2) TFEU (employment
government deficits. It is based on the objective of
guidelines); the submission and assessment of Member
sound government finances as a means of strengthening
States' stability or convergence programmes under that
the conditions for price stability and for strong
Regulation; the submission and assessment of Member
sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability,
States' national reform programmes supporting the
thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's
Union’s strategy for growth and jobs and established in
objectives for sustainable growth and jobs. The SGP
line with the broad economic guidelines, with the
includes the multilateral surveillance system laid down
employment guidelines and with the general guidance
in Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997
( 3 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.
( 1 ) OJ C 141, 17.5.2012, p. 7.
( 4 ) OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.
( 2 ) Position of the European Parliament of 12 March 2013 (not yet
( 5 ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 12.
published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of
( 6 ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 33.
13 May 2013.
( 7 ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 1.

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Official Journal of the European Union
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to Member States issued by the Commission (the annual
(9) Gradually
strengthened
surveillance
and
coordination,
as
growth survey) and the European Council at the
set out in this Regulation, will further complete the
beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance; and
European Semester for economic policy coordination,
surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic
will complement the existing provisions of the SGP
imbalances under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of
and strengthen the surveillance of budgetary and
the European Parliament and of the Council of
economic policies in Member States whose currency is
16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction
the euro. A gradually enhanced monitoring procedure
of macroeconomic imbalances ( 1 ). Where appropriate,
should contribute to better budgetary and economic
opinions issued in the context of an economic part
outcomes, macro-financial soundness and economic
nership programme, as established by this Regulation,
convergence, to the benefit of all Member States whose
should also been taken into account.
currency is the euro. As part of a gradually strengthened
process, closer monitoring is particularly valuable to
Member States that are subject to an excessive deficit
procedure.
(5) To
enable
the
Union
to
emerge
stronger
from
the
crisis,
both internally and at an international level, by boosting
competitiveness, productivity, growth potential, social
cohesion and economic convergence, the European
(10) Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary
Council, in its conclusions of 17 June 2010, adopted a
forecasts can considerably hamper the effectiveness of
new Union’s strategy for growth and jobs which also
budgetary planning and, consequently, impair
contains objectives in the fields of poverty, education,
commitment to budgetary discipline. Unbiased and
innovation and the environment.
realistic macroeconomic forecasts can be provided by

independent bodies or bodies endowed with functional
autonomy vis-à-vis the budgetary authorities of a Member
State and which are underpinned by national legal
provisions ensuring a high degree of functional
autonomy and accountability. Such forecasts should be
(6) In
order
to
ensure
the
proper
functioning
of
the
used throughout the budgetary procedure.
economic and monetary union, the TFEU allows the
adoption of specific measures in the euro area which
go beyond the provisions applicable to all Member
States to strengthen the coordination and surveillance
of their budgetary discipline. Such reinforced coor
(11) Strong
public
finances
are
best
ensured
at
the
planning
dination and surveillance should be accompanied by
stage and gross errors should be identified as early as
commensurate involvement of the European Parliament
possible. Member States should benefit not just from
and of national parliaments as appropriate. Active use,
the setting of guiding principles and budgetary targets
where appropriate and necessary, should be made of
but also from a synchronised monitoring of their
specific measures provided for in Article 136 TFEU.
budgetary policies.
(12) Setting
up
a
common
budgetary
timeline
for
Member
(7) The
application
of
this
Regulation
should
be
in
full
compliance with Article 152 TFEU and the recommen
States whose currency is the euro should better
dations issued under this Regulation should respect
synchronise the key steps in the preparation of national
national practice and institutions for wage formation.
budgets, thus contributing to the effectiveness of the SGP
This Regulation takes into account Article 28 of the
and of the European Semester for economic policy coor
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
dination. This should lead to stronger synergies by facili
and, accordingly, does not affect the right to negotiate,
tating policy coordination among Member States whose
conclude or enforce collective agreements or to take
currency is the euro and by ensuring that Council and
collective action in accordance with national law and
Commission recommendations are appropriately inte
practice.
grated in the budgetary procedure of the Member

States. That procedure should be consistent with the
framework for economic policy coordination in the
context of the annual cycle of surveillance which
includes, in particular, the general guidance to Member
States issued by the Commission and the European
(8)
Article 9 TFEU provides that, in defining and imple
Council at the beginning of the cycle. Member States'
menting its policies and activities, the Union is to take
budgetary polices should be consistent with the recom
into account requirements linked to the promotion of a
mendations issued in the context of the SGP and, where
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate
appropriate, with recommendations issued in the context
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and
of the annual cycle of surveillance, including the macro
a high level of education, training and protection of
economic imbalances procedure as established by Regu
human health.
lation (EU) No 1176/2011, and with opinions on
economic partnership programmes, as established by
( 1 ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25.
this Regulation.

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27.5.2013 Official
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(13) As
a
first
step
of
that
common
budgetary
timeline,
monitoring of compliance with country-specific
Member States should make public their national
numerical fiscal rules should be supported at national
medium-term fiscal plan at the same time as their
level by independent bodies or bodies endowed with
stability programmes preferably by 15 April and no
functional autonomy. It is important to note that given
later than by 30 April. Those fiscal plans should
the diversity of possible and existing arrangements, while
include indications on how the reforms and measures
not the preferred option, it should be possible for more
set out are expected to contribute to the achievement
than one independent body to be in charge of moni
of the targets and national commitments established
toring compliance with those rules as long as there is a
within the framework of the Union's strategy for
clear allocation of responsibility and as long as there is
growth and jobs. The national medium-term fiscal plan
no overlap of competency over specific aspects of the
and the stability programme can be the same document.
monitoring. Excessive institutional fragmentation of
monitoring tasks should be avoided. In order for moni
toring bodies to fulfil their mandate effectively, national
legal provisions ensuring a high degree of functional
autonomy and accountability should underpin such
(14) One
important
milestone
of
that
common
budgetary
bodies. The design of those monitoring bodies should
timeline should be the publication of the draft central
take into account the existing institutional setting and
government budget by 15 October. Since compliance
the administrative structure of the Member State
with the rules of the SGP is to be ensured at the level
concerned. In particular, it should be possible to endow
of the general government and achievement of the
a suitable entity of an existing institution with functional
budgetary objectives requires consistent budgeting
autonomy provided that such an entity is designated to
across all subsectors of the general government, the
carry out specific monitoring tasks, has a distinct
publication of the draft central government budget
statutory regime and complies with the other principles
should be accompanied by the publication of the main
referred to in this recital.
parameters of the draft budgets of all the other
subsectors of the general government. Such parameters
should include, in particular, the projected budgetary
outcomes of the other subsectors, the main assumptions
underlying those projections and the reasons for
(18) This
Regulation
does
not
impose
on
Member
States
expected changes with respect to the stability
additional requirements or obligations with regard to
programme assumptions.
country-specific numerical fiscal rules. Strong country-
specific numerical fiscal rules consistent with the
budgetary objectives at the level of the Union and
monitored by independent bodies are a cornerstone of
the strengthened budgetary surveillance framework of the
(15) The
common
budgetary
timeline
also
provides
for
the
Union. The rules with which those bodies should
budget to be adopted or fixed upon annually by 31
comply, and their specific tasks, are set out in this Regu
December together with the updated main budgetary
lation.
parameters for the other subsectors of the general
government. Where, for objective reasons beyond the
control of the government, the budget is not adopted
by 31 December, reversionary budget procedures
should be put in place to ensure that the government
(19) Member States whose currency is the euro are
remains able to discharge its essential duties. Such
particularly subject to spill-over effects from each
arrangements could include the implementation of the
other's budgetary policies. Member States whose
government's draft budget, of the preceding year's
currency is the euro should consult the Commission
approved budget, or of specific parliament-approved
and each other before adopting any major fiscal policy
measures.
reform plans with potential spill-over effects, so as to
allow an assessment of the possible impact for the
euro area as a whole. They should also consider their
budgetary plans to be of common concern and submit
them to the Commission for monitoring purposes in
(16) With
a
view
to
better
coordinating
the
planning
of
their
advance of their becoming binding. The Commission,
national debt issuance, the Member States should report
in cooperation with the Member States, should propose
ex ante on their public debt issuance plans to the
guidelines in the form of a harmonised framework for
Eurogroup and to the Commission.
the specification of the content of draft budgetary plans.
(17) Compliance
with
effective
rules-based
fiscal
frameworks
(20) In
the exceptional cases where, after consulting the
can be important in supporting sound and sustainable
Member State concerned, the Commission identifies in
fiscal policies. Council Directive 2011/85/EU of
the draft budgetary plan particularly serious non-
8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary
compliance with the budgetary policy obligations laid
frameworks of the Member States ( 1 ) established that
down in the SGP, the Commission, in its opinion on
the draft budgetary plan, should request a revised draft
( 1 ) OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 41.
budgetary plan, in accordance with this Regulation. This

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L 140/14
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Official Journal of the European Union
27.5.2013
will be the case, in particular, where the implementation
the general government and its subsectors, taking into
of the draft budgetary plan would put at risk the
account in particular financial risks associated to
financial stability of the Member State concerned or
contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on
risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the
public budgets.
economic and monetary union, or where the implemen
tation of the draft budgetary plan would entail an
obvious significant violation of the recommendations
adopted by the Council under the SGP.
(25) Additional
reporting requirements
for Member States
whose currency is the euro and which are subject to
an excessive deficit procedure should enable a better
(21) The
Commission's
opinion
on
the
draft
budgetary
plan
exchange of information between the Member States
should be adopted as soon as possible and in any event
concerned and the Commission, and, as a consequence,
by the end of November, taking into account, to the
the identification of risks in the compliance of a Member
extent possible, the specific national fiscal schedule and
State with the deadline which has been set by the
parliamentary procedures, in order to ensure that Union's
Council to correct its excessive deficit. In the event of
policy guidance in the budgetary area can be appro
such risks being identified, the Commission should issue
priately integrated in the national budgetary preparations.
a recommendation to the Member State concerned
In particular, the opinion should include an assessment
setting out appropriate measures to be taken within a
of whether the budgetary plans appropriately address the
given timeframe. Upon request, the Commission should
recommendations issued in the context of the European
present its recommendation to the parliament of the
Semester in the budgetary area. At the request of the
Member State concerned. Compliance with the recom
parliament of the Member State concerned or of the
mendation should lead to a prompt correction of any
European Parliament, the Commission should be
developments putting at risk the correction of the
prepared to present its opinion to the parliament
excessive deficit within the established deadline.
making the request, after it has been made public.
Member States are invited to take into account, in the
process of adopting their budget law, the Commission
opinion on their draft budgetary plan.
(26) Assessment of compliance with the Commission recom
mendation should be part of the continuous assessment
made by the Commission of effective action to correct an
(22) The
extent
to
which
that
opinion
has
been
taken
into
excessive deficit. When deciding whether effective action
account in a Member State's budget law should be part
to correct the excessive deficit has been taken, the
of the assessment, if and when the conditions are met,
Council should also base its decision on whether or
leading to a decision on the existence of an excessive
not the Member State complied with the Commission
deficit in the Member State concerned. In such a case,
recommendation, while giving due consideration to
no follow-up to the early guidance from the Commission
Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC)
should be considered as an aggravating factor.
No 1467/97.
(23) Also, based on an overall assessment of the draft
budgetary plans by the Commission, the Eurogroup
should discuss the budgetary situation and prospects
(27) Indeed,
Regulation
(EC)
No
1467/97,
which
sets
out
in
for the euro area as a whole.
detail the excessive deficit procedure based on Article 126
TFEU, embeds elements of flexibility which allow
unexpected adverse economic events to be taken into
account. Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of that Regulation
provide that if effective action has been taken in
(24) Member
States
whose
currency
is
the
euro
and
which
are
compliance with, respectively, a recommendation under
subject to an excessive deficit procedure should be
Article 126(7) TFEU or a decision to give notice under
monitored more closely, in order to secure a full,
Article 126(9) TFEU, and unexpected adverse economic
sustainable and timely correction of the excessive
events with major unfavourable consequences for
deficit. Closer monitoring by means of additional
government finances occur after the adoption of that
reporting requirements should ensure prevention and
recommendation or decision to give notice, the Council
early correction of any deviations from the Council
may decide, on a recommendation from the
recommendations to correct the excessive deficit. Such
Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under
monitoring should complement the provisions set out
Article 126(7) TFEU or a revised decision to give notice
in Regulation (EC) No
1467/97. Those additional
under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised recommendation
reporting requirements should be proportionate to the
or revised decision to give notice, taking into account the
stage of the procedure to which the Member State is
relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of Regulation
subject, under Article 126 TFEU. As a first step, the
(EC) No 1467/97 may, in particular, extend the deadline
Member State concerned should carry out a compre
for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a
hensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for
rule.

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The Council should assess the existence of unexpected
(31) The
power
to
adopt
opinions
on
economic
partnership
adverse economic events with major unfavourable
programmes, as established by this Regulation should be
consequences for government finances against the
conferred on the Council. Those opinions are comple
economic forecasts in its initial recommendation or
mentary to the excessive deficit procedure laid down
decision to give notice. In the case of a severe
under Article 126 TFEU in accordance with which the
economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union
Council is to decide on the existence of an excessive
as a whole, the Council may also decide, on a recom
deficit and on the measures required to put an end to it.
mendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised
recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a
revised decision to give notice under Article 126(9)
TFEU, provided that that does not endanger fiscal
sustainability in the medium term. In addition,
Article 2(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 provides
(32) Recalling the importance of sound public finances,
that, in implementing the debt ratio adjustment
structural reform and targeted investment for sustainable
benchmark, account shall be taken of the influence of
growth, the Member States' Heads of State or
the cycle on the pace of debt reduction. Thus, a Member
Government signed a Compact for Growth and Jobs
State would not be considered as having breached the
on 29 June 2012, demonstrating their determination to
debt criterion laid down in Article 126(2)(b) TFEU if that
stimulate job-creating growth in parallel to their
is only because of negative cyclical conditions.
commitment to sound public finances. The Compact
includes, in particular, measures to boost the financing
of the economy. EUR 120 000 million (equivalent to
around 1 % of the Union's Gross National Income) are
being mobilised for fast-acting growth measures. As
recommended in the annual growth survey in 2012
(28) Also,
since
budgetary
measures
might
be
insufficient
to
and 2013, the Member States should strive to maintain
ensure a lasting correction of the excessive deficit,
an adequate pace of fiscal consolidation while preserving
Member States whose currency is the euro and are
investment aiming to achieve the Europe 2020 goals for
subject to an excessive deficit procedure should present
growth and jobs.
an economic partnership programme detailing the policy
measures and structural reforms needed to ensure an
effective and lasting correction of the excessive deficit,
building on the latest update of their national reform
programme and their stability programme.
(33) The
Commission is monitoring the impact of tight
budget constraints on growth enhancing public expen
diture and on public investment. The Union's fiscal
framework offers scope to balance the acknowledgement
(29) Furthermore,
strengthening economic governance has
of productive public investment needs with fiscal
involved a closer dialogue with the European Parliament.
discipline objectives: while fully respecting the SGP, the
While recognising that the counterparts of the European
possibilities offered by the Union's existing fiscal
Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the
framework to balance productive public investment
relevant institutions of the Union and their represen
needs with fiscal discipline objectives can be exploited
tatives, the competent committee of the European
in the preventive arm of the SGP. The Commission has
Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in
announced its intention to report on the scope for
an exchange of views to a Member State which is the
possible action within the boundaries of the existing
subject of a Commission recommendation or of a
Union fiscal framework.
Council opinion in accordance with this Regulation.
The Member State's participation in such an exchange
of views is voluntary.
(34) The
European
Parliament's
resolution
of
20
November
2012 with recommendations to the Commission on
the report of the Presidents of the European Council,
(30) In order to specify the extent of the reporting obligations
the European Commission, the European Central Bank
for Member States subject to an excessive deficit
and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and
procedure, the power to adopt acts in accordance with
Monetary Union’ and the Commission's Communication
Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the
of 28 November 2012 entitled ‘A blueprint for a deep
Commission in respect of the content and scope of
and genuine EMU’ outline, respectively, the views of the
such reporting. It is of particular importance that the
European Parliament and of the Commission on the
Commission carry out appropriate consultations during
steps needed to achieve a deeper and better integrated
its preparatory work, including at expert level. The
economic and monetary union. Following the report
Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated
‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’,
acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appro
the European Council, in its conclusions in December
priate transmission of relevant documents to the
2012, set out its views on a number of issues with a
European Parliament and to the Council.
view to the further strengthening of EMU,

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HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
institutions for wage formation. In accordance with Article 28
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
this Regulation shall not affect the right to negotiate, conclude
or enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in
accordance with national law and practice.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
3. This
Regulation
shall
apply
to
Member
States
whose
currency is the euro.
Subject matter and scope
1. This
Regulation
sets
out
provisions
for
enhanced
moni
toring of budgetary policies in the euro area and for ensuring
that national budgets are consistent with the economic policy
Article 2
guidance issued in the context of the SGP and the European
Definitions
Semester for economic policy coordination, by:
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the following defi
nitions shall apply:
(a) complementing the European Semester, as established in
Article 2-a of Regulation (EC) No
1466/97, with a
(a) ‘independent bodies’ means bodies that are structurally inde
common budgetary timeline;
pendent or bodies endowed with functional autonomy vis-à-
vis the budgetary authorities of the Member State, and
which are underpinned by national legal provisions
ensuring a high degree of functional autonomy and
(b) complementing the procedure for the prevention and
accountability, including:
correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, as
established by Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011;
(i) a statutory regime grounded in national laws, regu
lations or binding administrative provisions;
(c) complementing the multilateral surveillance system of
budgetary policies, as established by Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97, with additional monitoring requirements in
(ii) not taking instructions from the budgetary authorities
order to ensure that Union policy recommendations in
of the Member State concerned or from any other
the budgetary area are appropriately integrated in the
public or private body;
national budgetary preparations;
(iii) the capacity to communicate publicly in a timely
(d) complementing the procedure for correcting a Member
manner;
State's excessive deficit, as established by Article 126
TFEU and by Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, with closer
monitoring of the budgetary policies of Member States
subject to an excessive deficit procedure in order to secure
(iv) procedures for nominating members on the basis of
a timely and lasting correction of an excessive deficit;
their experience and competence;
(v) adequate resources and appropriate access to
(e) guaranteeing the consistency between budgetary policies
information to carry out their mandate;
and measures and reforms taken in the context of the
procedure for prevention and correction of excessive macro
economic imbalances as established by Regulation (EU)
No 1176/2011 and, where appropriate, in the context of
an economic partnership programme as referred to in
(b) ‘independent macroeconomic forecasts’ means macro
Article 9.
economic forecasts produced or endorsed by independent
bodies;
2. The
application
of
this
Regulation
shall
be
in
full (c) ‘medium-term budgetary framework’ means medium-term
compliance with Article 152 TFEU and the recommendations
budgetary framework as described in point (e) of Article 2
issued under this Regulation shall respect national practice and
of Directive 2011/85/EU;

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(d) ‘stability programme’ means stability programme as
(4) where appropriate, opinions on economic partnership
described in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97.
programmes, as referred to in Article 9.
In order to ensure consistency across the independent macro
CHAPTER III
economic forecasts referred to in point (b) of the first subpara
graph, the Member States and the Commission shall, at least
COMMON BUDGETARY PROVISIONS
annually, engage in a technical dialogue concerning the
Article 4
assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic
and budgetary forecasts in accordance with Article 4(5) of
Common budgetary timeline
Directive 2011/85/EU.
1. Member States shall, in the context of the European
Semester, make public, preferably by 15 April but no later
than 30 April each year, their national medium-term fiscal
plans in accordance with their medium-term budgetary
2. The definitions of ‘general government sector’ and of ‘sub
framework. Such plans shall include at least all the information
sectors of the general government sector’, set out in point 2.70
to be provided in their stability programmes and shall be
of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996
presented together with their national reform programmes
on the European system of national and regional accounts in
and the stability programmes. Such plans shall be consistent
the Community ( 1 ) shall also apply to this Regulation.
with the framework for economic policy coordination in the
context of the annual cycle of surveillance, which includes, in
particular, the general guidance to Member States issued by the
Commission and the European Council at the beginning of the
cycle. They shall also be consistent with the recommendations
3. The
application
of
this
Regulation
is
without
prejudice
to issued in the context of the SGP and, where appropriate, with
Article 9 TFEU.
recommendations issued in the context of the annual cycle of
surveillance, including the macroeconomic imbalances
procedure as established by Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011,
and with opinions on economic partnership programmes
referred to in Article 9.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION
Article 3
National medium-term fiscal plans and national reform
programmes shall include indications on how the reforms and
Consistency with the framework for economic policy
measures set out are expected to contribute to the achievement
coordination
of the targets and national commitments established within the
The Member States' budgetary procedure shall be consistent
framework of the Union's strategy for growth and jobs.
with:
Furthermore, national medium-term fiscal plans or national
reform programmes shall include indications on the expected
economic returns on non-defence public investment projects
that have a significant budgetary impact. National medium-
term fiscal plans and stability programmes may be the same
(1) the framework for economic policy coordination in the
document.
context of the annual cycle of surveillance, which
includes, in particular, the general guidance to Member
States issued by the Commission and the European
Council at the beginning of the cycle;
2. The draft budget for the forthcoming year for the central
government and the main parameters of the draft budgets for
all the other subsectors of the general government shall be
made public annually not later than 15 October.
(2) the recommendations issued in the context of the SGP;
3. The
budget
for
the
central
government
shall
be
adopted
or
fixed upon and made public annually not later than 31
(3) where appropriate, recommendations issued in the context
December together with the updated main budgetary
of the annual cycle of surveillance, including the macro
parameters for the other sub-sectors of the general government.
economic imbalances procedure as established by Regu
Member States shall have in place reversionary budget
lation (EU) No 1176/2011; and
procedures to be applied if, for objective reasons beyond the
control of the government, the budget is not adopted or fixed
( 1 ) OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1.
upon and made public by 31 December.

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4. National
medium-term
fiscal
plans
and
draft
budgets
CHAPTER IV
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be based on independent
macroeconomic forecasts, and shall indicate whether the
MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT OF MEMBER STATES DRAFT
budgetary forecasts have been produced or endorsed by an
BUDGETARY PLANS
independent body. Those forecasts shall be made public
together with the national medium-term fiscal plans and the
Article 6
draft budgets that they underpin.
Monitoring requirements
1. Member States shall submit annually to the Commission
and to the Eurogroup a draft budgetary plan for the forth
coming year by 15 October. That draft budgetary plan shall
Article 5
be consistent with the recommendations issued in the context
of the SGP and, where applicable, with recommendations issued
Independent bodies monitoring compliance with fiscal
in the context of the annual cycle of surveillance, including the
rules
macroeconomic imbalances procedure as established by Regu
lation (EU) No 1176/2011, and with opinions on the economic
1. Member
States
shall
have
in
place
independent
bodies
for partnership programmes referred to in Article 9.
monitoring compliance with:
2. As
soon
as
the
draft
budgetary
plans
referred
to
in
(a) numerical fiscal rules incorporating in the national
paragraph 1 have been submitted to the Commission, they
budgetary processes their medium-term budgetary
shall be made public.
objective as established in Article 2a of Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97;
3. The
draft
budgetary
plan
shall
contain
the
following
information for the forthcoming year:
(b) numerical fiscal rules as referred to in Article 5 of Directive
2011/85/EU.
(a) the targeted budget balance for the general government as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), broken down
2. Those
bodies
shall,
where
appropriate,
provide
public
by subsector of general government;
assessments with respect to national fiscal rules, inter alia
relating to:
(b) the projections at unchanged policies for expenditure and
revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government
(a) the occurrence of circumstances leading to the activation of
and their main components, including gross fixed capital
the correction mechanism for cases of significant observed
formation;
deviation from the medium-term objective or the
adjustment path towards it in accordance with Article 6(2)
of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;
(c) the targeted expenditure and revenue as a percentage of
GDP for the general government and their main
components, taking into account the conditions and
(b) whether the budgetary correction is proceeding in
criteria to establish the growth path of government expen
accordance with national rules and plans;
diture net of discretionary revenue measures under
Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;
(c) any occurrence or cessation of circumstances referred to in
the tenth subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC)
(d) relevant information on the general government expenditure
No 1466/97 which may allow a temporary deviation from
by function, including on education, healthcare and
the medium-term budgetary objective or the adjustment
employment, and, where possible, indications on the
path towards it, provided that such a deviation does not
expected distributional impact of the main expenditure
endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.
and revenue measures;

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of
the
European
Union L
140/19
(e) a description and quantification of the expenditure and
2. Notwithstanding
paragraph
1,
where,
in
exceptional
cases,
revenue measures to be included in the draft budget for
after consulting the Member State concerned within one week
the year to come at the level of each subsector in order
of submission of the draft budgetary plan, the Commission
to bridge the gap between the targets referred to in point (c)
identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the
and the projections at unchanged policies provided in
budgetary policy obligations laid down in the SGP, the
accordance with point (b);
Commission shall adopt its opinion within two weeks of
submission of the draft budgetary plan. In its opinion, the
Commission shall request that a revised draft budgetary plan
be submitted as soon as possible and in any event within three
weeks of the date of its opinion. The Commission's request shall
(f) the main assumptions of the independent macroeconomic
be reasoned and shall be made public.
forecasts and important economic developments which are
relevant to the achievement of the budgetary targets;
Article 6(2), (3) and (4) shall apply to revised draft budgetary
plans submitted pursuant to the first subparagraph of this para
(g) an annex containing the methodology, economic models
graph.
and assumptions, and any other relevant parameters under
pinning the budgetary forecasts and the estimated impact of
aggregated budgetary measures on economic growth;
The Commission shall adopt a new opinion on the revised draft
budgetary plan as soon as possible and in any event within
three weeks of submission of the revised draft budgetary plan.
(h) indications on how reforms and measures in the draft
budgetary plan, including in particular public investment,
address the current recommendations to the Member State
concerned in accordance with Articles 121 and 148 TFEU
3. The
Commission's
opinion
shall
be
made
public
and
shall
and are instrumental to the achievement of the targets set
be presented to the Eurogroup. Thereafter, at the request of the
by the Union's strategy for growth and jobs.
parliament of the Member State concerned or of the European
Parliament, the Commission shall present its opinion to the
parliament making the request.
The description referred to in point (e) of the first subparagraph
may be less detailed for measures with a budgetary impact
estimated to be lower than 0,1 % of GDP. Particular and
4. The
Commission
shall
make
an
overall
assessment
of
the
explicit attention shall be paid to major fiscal policy reform
budgetary situation and prospects in the euro area as a whole,
plans with potential spill-over effects for other Member States
on the basis of the national budgetary prospects and their inter
whose currency is the euro.
action across the area, relying on the most recent economic
forecasts of the Commission services.
4. Where
the
budgetary
targets
reported
in
the
draft
budgetary plan in accordance with paragraph 3 or the
The overall assessment shall include sensitivity analyses that
projections at unchanged policies differ from those in the
provide an indication of the risks to public finance sustainability
most recent stability programme, the differences shall be duly
in the event of adverse economic, financial or budgetary devel
explained.
opments. It shall also, as appropriate, outline measures to
reinforce the coordination of budgetary and macroeconomic
policy at the euro area level.
5. The specification of the content of the draft budgetary
plan shall be set out in a harmonised framework established
by the Commission in cooperation with the Member States.
The overall assessment shall be made public and shall be taken
into account in the annual general guidance to Member States
issued by the Commission.
Article 7
Assessment of the draft budgetary plan
The methodology (including models) and assumptions of the
most recent economic forecasts of the Commission services
1. The
Commission
shall
adopt
an
opinion
on
the
draft for each Member State, including estimates of the impact of
budgetary plan as soon as possible and in any event by 30
aggregated budgetary measures on economic growth, shall be
November.
annexed to the overall assessment.

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5. The
Eurogroup
shall
discuss
opinions
of
the
Commission
4. The
Council,
acting
on
a
proposal
from
the
Commission,
on the draft budgetary plans and the budgetary situation and
shall adopt an opinion on the economic partnership
prospects in the euro area as a whole on the basis of the overall
programme.
assessment made by the Commission in accordance with
paragraph 4. The results of those discussions of the
Eurogroup shall be made public where appropriate.
5. A
corrective
action
plan
as
referred
to
in
Article
8(1)
of
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 may be amended in accordance
with Article 9(4) of that Regulation to replace the economic
Article 8
partnership programme provided for in this Article. Where such
a corrective action plan is submitted after the adoption of an
Reporting on debt issuance
economic partnership programme, the measures set out in the
1. Member
States
shall
report
to
the
Commission
and
the economic partnership programme may, as appropriate, be
Eurogroup, ex ante and in a timely manner, on their national
included in the corrective action plan.
debt issuance plans.
6. The implementation of the programme, and the annual
2. The
harmonised
form
and
content
of
the
report
referred budgetary plans consistent with it, shall be monitored by the
to in paragraph 1 shall be laid down by the Commission, in
Council and by the Commission.
cooperation with the Member States.
Article 10
CHAPTER V
Reporting requirements for Member States in excessive
ENSURING THE CORRECTION OF EXCESSIVE DEFICIT
deficit procedure
Article 9
1. Where the Council decides in accordance with
Article 126(6) TFEU that an excessive deficit exists in a
Economic partnership programmes
Member State, the Member State concerned shall, on a
1. If
the
Council,
acting
under
Article
126(6)
TFEU,
decides request from the Commission, be subject to reporting
that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Member
requirements in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 5 of this
State concerned shall present to the Commission and to the
Article, until the abrogation of its excessive deficit procedure.
Council an economic partnership programme describing the
policy measures and structural reforms that are needed to
ensure an effective and lasting correction of the excessive
deficit, as a development of its national reform programme
and its stability programme, and fully taking into account the
2. The
Member
State
shall
carry
out
a
comprehensive
Council recommendations on the implementation of the inte
assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the general
grated guidelines for the economic and employment policies of
government and its subsectors. The financial risks associated
the Member State concerned.
with contingent liabilities with potentially large impacts on
public budgets, as referred to in Article 14(3) of Directive
2011/85/EU shall also be covered by the assessment to the
extent that they may contribute to the existence of an
excessive deficit. The result of that assessment shall be
2. The
economic
partnership
programme
shall
identify
and included in the report submitted in accordance with Article 3(4a)
select a number of specific priorities aiming to enhance
or Article 5(1a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on action taken
competitiveness and long-term sustainable growth and
to correct the excessive deficit.
addressing structural weaknesses in the Member State
concerned. Those priorities shall be consistent with the
Union’s strategy for growth and jobs. Where appropriate,
potential financial resources shall be identified, including
credit lines of the European Investment Bank and other
3. The Member State shall report regularly to the
relevant financial instruments, as appropriate.
Commission and to the Economic and Financial Committee,
for the general government and its subsectors, the in-year
budgetary execution, the budgetary impact of discretionary
measures taken on both the expenditure and the revenue side,
targets for the government expenditure and revenues, and
3. The
economic
partnership
programme
shall
be
presented information on the measures adopted and the nature of those
at the same time as the report provided for in Article 3(4a) of
envisaged to achieve the targets. The report shall be made
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
public.

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27.5.2013 Official
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Union L
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The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in
Commission shall base its assessment, inter alia, on the
accordance with Article 14 specifying the content of the regular
reports submitted by the Member States in accordance with
reporting referred to in this paragraph.
Article 10(3) of this Regulation.
4. If the Member State concerned is the subject of a Council
recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU, the report referred
2. In the case of a risk of non-compliance with the deadline
to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall be submitted for the first
to correct the excessive deficit, the Commission shall address a
time six months after the report provided for in Article 3(4a) of
recommendation to the Member State concerned regarding full
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and thereafter on a six-monthly
implementation of the measures provided for in the recommen
basis.
dation or decision to give notice referred to in paragraph 1,
adoption of other measures, or both, within a timeframe
consistent with the deadline for the correction of its excessive
deficit. The recommendation by the Commission shall be made
5. If the Member State concerned is the subject of a Council
public and shall be presented to the Economic and Financial
decision to give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the report in
Committee. At the request of the parliament of the Member
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article shall also contain
State concerned, the Commission shall present the recommen
information on the actions being taken in response to the
dation to that parliament.
specific Council notice. It shall be submitted for the first time
three months after the report provided for in Article 5(1a) of
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and thereafter on a quarterly basis.
3. Within the timeframe set by the Commission recommen
dation referred to in paragraph 2, the Member State concerned
6. Upon request and within the deadline set by the
shall report to the Commission on measures adopted in
Commission, a Member State subject to an excessive deficit
response to that recommendation together with the reports
procedure shall:
provided for in Article 10(3). The report shall include the
budgetary impact of all discretionary measures taken, targets
for the government expenditure and revenues, information on
the measures adopted and the nature of those envisaged to
(a) carry out and report on a comprehensive independent audit
achieve the targets, and information on the other actions
of the public accounts of all subsectors of the general
being taken in response to the Commission recommendation.
government conducted preferably in coordination with
The report shall be made public and shall be presented to the
national supreme audit institutions, aiming to assess the
Economic and Financial Committee.
reliability, completeness and accuracy of those public
accounts for the purposes of the excessive deficit procedure;
4. On the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 3, the
Commission shall assess whether the Member State has
(b) provide available additional information for the purposes of
complied with the recommendation referred to in paragraph 2.
monitoring progress towards the correction of the excessive
deficit.
Article 12
The Commission (Eurostat) shall assess the quality of statistical
data reported by the Member State concerned under point (a) in
Impact on the excessive deficit procedure
accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of
25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the
1. The
extent
to
which
the
Member
State
concerned
has
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing
taken into account the Commission's opinion referred to in
the European Community (
Article 7(1) shall be taken into account by:

1 ).
Article 11
(a) the Commission when conducting a report under
Member States at risk of non-compliance with their
Article 126(3) TFEU and when recommending the
obligation under their excessive deficit procedure
imposition of a non-interest bearing deposit in accordance
with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011;
1. When assessing whether compliance with the deadline to
correct the excessive deficit, as established by a Council recom
mendation under Article 126(7) TFEU or a Council decision to
give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, is at risk, the
(b) the Council when deciding whether an excessive deficit
( 1 ) OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.
exists in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU.

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2. The monitoring established by Articles 10 and 11 of this
of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the
Regulation shall be an integral part of the regular monitoring, as
day following the publication of the decision in the Official
provided for in Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, of
Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified
the implementation of action taken by the Member State
therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts
concerned in response to Council recommendations under
already in force.
Article 126(7) TFEU or Council decisions to give notice under
Article 126(9) TFEU to correct the excessive deficit.
4. As
soon
as
it
adopts
a
delegated
act,
the
Commission
shall
notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the
3. When
considering
whether
effective
action
has
been
taken Council.
in response to recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU or
to decisions to give notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the
Commission shall take into account the assessment referred to
in Article 11(4) in this Regulation and shall recommend, as
appropriate, that the Council take decisions under Article 126(8)
5. A
delegated
act
adopted
pursuant
to
Article
10(3)
shall
or Article 126(11) TFEU, giving due consideration to Article 3(5)
enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either
and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period
of two months of notification of that act to the European
Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that
period, the European Parliament and the Council have both
Article 13
informed the Commission that they will not object. That
period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of
Consistency with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 ( 1 )
the European Parliament or of the Council.
Member States subject to a macroeconomic adjustment
programme shall not be subject to Articles 6 to 12 of this
Regulation.
Article 15
Economic Dialogue
CHAPTER VI
1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union insti
tutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and
FINAL PROVISIONS
the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and
accountability, the competent committee of the European
Article 14
Parliament may invite, where appropriate, the President of the
Exercise of the delegation
Council, the Commission, the President of the European Council
or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the
1. The
power
to
adopt
delegated
acts
is
conferred
on
the committee to discuss:
Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.
(a) the specification of the content of the draft budgetary plan
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in
as set out in a harmonised framework established in
Article 10(3) shall be conferred on the Commission for a
accordance with Article 6(5);
period of three years from 30 May 2013. The Commission
shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power
not later than nine months before the end of the three-year
period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for
periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament
(b) the results of the discussion of the Eurogroup on the
or the Council opposes such extension not later than three
Commission opinions adopted in accordance with
months before the end of each period.
Article 7(1), to the extent that they have been made public;
3. The
delegation
of
power
referred
to
in
Article
10(3)
may
be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the
(c) the overall assessment of the budgetary situation and
Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation
prospects in the euro area as a whole made by the
Commission in accordance with Article 7(4);
( 1 ) Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experi
encing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their
financial stability (see page 1 of this Official Journal).
(d) Council acts referred to in Article 9(4) and in Article 12(3).

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2. The
competent
committee
of
the
European
Parliament 2. By 31 July 2013, the Commission shall report on the
may offer the opportunity to the Member State that is the
possibilities offered by the Union's existing fiscal framework
subject of a Commission recommendation under Article 11(2)
to balance productive public investment needs with fiscal
or Council acts as referred to in paragraph 1(d) to participate in
discipline objectives in the preventive arm of the SGP, while
an exchange of views.
complying with it fully.
3. The
European
Parliament
shall
be
duly
involved
in
the
Article 17
European Semester in order to increase the transparency and
Transitional provisions
ownership of, and the accountability for the decisions taken, in
particular by means of the economic dialogue carried out
1. Member
States
already
subject
to
an
excessive
deficit
pursuant to this Article.
procedure at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation
shall comply with the regular reporting in accordance with
Article 10(3), (4) and (5) by 31 October 2013.
Article 16
Review and reports on the application of this Regulation
2. Article
9(1)
and
Article
10(2)
shall
apply
to
Member
States that are already subject to an excessive deficit
1. By
14
December
2014,
and
every
five
years
thereafter,
the procedure at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation
Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the
only when a Council recommendation in accordance with
Council a report on the application of this Regulation, accom
Article 126(7) TFEU, or a Council decision to give notice in
panied, where appropriate, by a proposal to amend this Regu
accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, is taken after 30 May
lation. The Commission shall make that report public.
2013.
The reports referred to in the first subparagraph shall evaluate,
In such cases, the economic partnership programme shall be
inter alia:
presented simultaneously with the report submitted in
accordance with Article 3(4a) or Article 5(1a) of Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97.
(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;
3. Member
States
shall
comply
with
Article
5
by
31
October
2013.
(b) progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic
policies and sustained convergence of economic
performances of the Member States in accordance with
Article 18
the TFEU;
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following
(c) the contribution of this Regulation to the achievement of
that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European
the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs.
Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in
accordance with the Treaties.
Done at Strasbourg, 21 May 2013.
For the European Parliament
For the Council
The President
The President
M. SCHULZ
L. CREIGHTON

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