HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/25
REGULATION (EU) No 1176/2011 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 16 November 2011
on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
developing and strengthening the internal market,
EUROPEAN UNION,
fostering international trade and competitiveness, a
European Semester for strengthened coordination of
economic and budgetary policies (European Semester),
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
an effective framework for preventing and correcting
Union, and in particular Article 121(6) thereof,
excessive government deficits (the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and
correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and
enhanced financial market regulation and supervision,
including macroprudential supervision by the European
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
parliaments,
(5) The
strengthening
of
economic
governance
should
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank ( 1 ),
include a closer and more timely involvement of the
European Parliament and the national parliaments.
While recognising that the counterparts of the
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and
European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue
Social Committee ( 2 ),
are the relevant institutions of the Union and their repre
sentatives, the competent committee of the European
Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure ( 3 ),
an exchange of views to a Member State which is the
subject of a Council recommendation or decision in
accordance with Article 7(2), Article 8(2) or
Whereas:
Article 10(4) of this Regulation. The Member State's
participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.
(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the
Member States within the Union should be developed
in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines
(6) The
Commission
should
have
a
stronger
role
in
the
and the employment guidelines, as provided for by the
enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-
and should entail compliance with the guiding principles
site missions, recommendations and warnings.
of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances
and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of
payments.
(7) In
particular,
surveillance
of
the
economic
policies
of
the
Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary
surveillance to include a more detailed and formal
(2)
There is a need to draw lessons from the first decade of
framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic
functioning of the economic and monetary union and, in
imbalances and to help the Member States affected to
particular, for improved economic governance in the
establish corrective plans before divergences become
Union built on stronger national ownership.
entrenched. Such broadening of the surveillance of
economic policies should take place in parallel with a
deepening of fiscal surveillance.
(3) Achieving
and
maintaining
a
dynamic
internal
market
should be considered an element of the proper and
smooth functioning of the economic and monetary
(8) To
help correct such excessive macroeconomic
union.
imbalances, it is necessary to lay down a detailed
procedure in legislation.
(4)
The improved economic governance framework should
rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for
sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union
(9) It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral
strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on
surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and
4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the
detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the
( 1 ) OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.
prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic
( 2 ) OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 53.
imbalances within the Union. It is essential that the
( 3 ) Position of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 (not yet
published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of
procedure should be aligned with the annual multilateral
8 November 2011.
surveillance cycle.

---

L 306/26
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(10) That
procedure
should
establish
an
alert
mechanism
for
(15) Based
on
the
multilateral
surveillance
procedure
and
the
the early detection of emerging macroeconomic
alert mechanism, or in the event of unexpected,
imbalances. It should be based on the use of an indicative
significant economic developments that require urgent
and transparent ‘scoreboard’ comprising indicative
analysis for the purpose of this Regulation, the
thresholds, combined with economic judgement. This
Commission should identify the Member States to be
judgement should take into account, inter alia, nominal
subject to an in-depth review. The in-depth review
and real convergence inside and outside the euro area.
should be undertaken without the presumption that an
imbalance exists and should encompass a thorough
analysis of sources of imbalances in the Member State
under review, taking due account of country-specific
economic conditions and circumstances and of a wider
set of analytical tools, indicators and qualitative
information of country-specific nature. When the
(11) In
order
to
function
efficiently
as
an
element
of
the
alert
Commission is undertaking the in-depth review, the
mechanism, the scoreboard should consist of a limited
Member State should cooperate to ensure that the
set of economic, financial and structural indicators
information available to the Commission is as complete
relevant to the detection of macroeconomic imbalances,
and correct as possible. Furthermore, the Commission
with corresponding indicative thresholds. The indicators
should give due consideration to any other information
and thresholds should be adjusted when necessary, in
which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned is
order to adapt to the changing nature of macroeconomic
relevant, and which the Member State has put forward to
imbalances due, inter alia, to evolving threats to macro
the Council and to the Commission.
economic stability, and in order to take into account the
enhanced availability of relevant statistics. The indicators
should not be understood as goals for economic policy
in themselves but as tools to take account of the evolving
nature of the macroeconomic imbalances within the
Union.
(16) The
in-depth review
should be discussed
within
the
Council, and within the Eurogroup for the Member
States whose currency is the euro. The in-depth review
should take into account, where appropriate, Council
recommendations or invitations addressed to Member
States under review adopted in accordance with Articles
(12) The Commission should closely cooperate with the
European Parliament and the Council when drawing up
121, 126 and 148 TFEU and under Articles 6, 7, 8 and
the scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and
10 of this Regulation, and the policy intentions of the
macrofinancial indicators for Member States. The
Member State under review, as reflected in its national
Commission should present suggestions for comments
reform programmes, as well as international best
to the competent committees of the European Parliament
practices as regards indicators and methodologies.
and of the Council on plans to establish and adjust the
When the Commission decides to undertake an in-
indicators and thresholds. The Commission should
depth review in the event of significant and unexpected
inform the European Parliament and the Council of
economic developments that require urgent analysis, it
any changes to the indicators and thresholds and
should inform the Member States concerned.
explain its reasons for suggesting such changes.
(17) When assessing macroeconomic imbalances, account
(13) In
developing
the
scoreboard,
due
consideration
should
should be taken of their severity and their potential
also be given to catering for heterogeneous economic
negative economic and financial spill-over effects which
circumstances, including catching-up effects.
aggravate the vulnerability of the Union economy and
are a threat to the smooth functioning of the
economic and monetary union. Actions to address
macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in competi
tiveness are required in all Member States, particularly in
the euro area. However, the nature, importance and
urgency of the policy challenges may differ significantly
(14) The
crossing
of
one
or
more
indicative
thresholds
need
depending on the Member States concerned. Given
not necessarily imply that macroeconomic imbalances
vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment
are emerging, as economic policy-making should take
required, the need for policy action is particularly
into account interlinks between macroeconomic
pressing in Member States showing persistently large
variables. Conclusions should not be drawn from an
current-account deficits and competitiveness losses.
automatic reading of the scoreboard: economic
Furthermore, in Member States that accumulate large
judgement should ensure that all pieces of information,
current-account surpluses, policies should aim to
whether from the scoreboard or not, are put in
identify and implement measures that help strengthen
perspective and become part of a comprehensive analysis.
their domestic demand and growth potential.

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/27
(18) The
economic
adjustment
capacity
and
the
track
record
functioning of the economic and monetary union, an
of the Member State concerned as regards compliance
excessive imbalance procedure should be initiated that
with earlier recommendations issued under this Regu
may include issuing recommendations to the Member
lation and other recommendations issued under
State, enhanced surveillance and monitoring
Article 121 TFEU as part of multilateral surveillance, in
requirements and, in respect of Member States whose
particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies
currency is the euro, the possibility of enforcement in
of the Member States and of the Union, should also be
accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the
considered.
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November
2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area ( 2 ) in the
event of sustained failure to take corrective action.
(19) A
procedure
to
monitor
and
correct
adverse
macro
economic imbalances, with preventive and corrective
elements, will require enhanced surveillance tools based
on those used in the multilateral surveillance procedure.
This could include enhanced surveillance missions to
(23) A
Member State subject to the excessive imbalance
Member States by the Commission, in liaison with the
procedure should establish a corrective action plan
European Central Bank (ECB) for Member States whose
setting out details of its policies designed to implement
currency is the euro or Member States participating in
the Council's recommendations. The corrective action
the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European
plan should include a timetable for implementing the
Central Bank and the national central banks of the
measures envisaged. It should be endorsed by a recom
Member States outside the euro area laying down the
mendation of the Council. That recommendation should
operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism
be transmitted to the European Parliament.
in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union ( 1 )
(ERM II), and additional reporting by Member States in
case of severe imbalances, including imbalances that
jeopardise the proper functioning of the economic and
monetary union. Social partners and other national stake
(24) The
power
to
adopt
individual
decisions
establishing
holders should, where appropriate, be involved in the
non-compliance with the recommendations adopted by
dialogue.
the Council within the framework of the corrective
action plan should be conferred on the Council. As
part of the coordination of the economic policies of
the Member States conducted within the Council, as
(20) If
macroeconomic
imbalances
are
identified,
recommen
provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual
dations, where appropriate involving the relevant
decisions are an integral follow-up to the recommen
committees, should be addressed to the Member State
dations adopted by the Council on the basis of
concerned to provide guidance on appropriate policy
Article 121(4) TFEU in the context of the corrective
responses. The policy response of the Member State
action plan.
concerned should be timely and should use all available
policy instruments under the control of public
authorities. Where appropriate, relevant national stake
holders, including social partners, should also be
involved in accordance with the TFEU and national
(25) In applying this Regulation, the Council and the
legal and political arrangements. The policy response
Commission should fully respect the role of national
should be tailored to the specific environment and
parliaments and social partners, as well as differences
circumstances of the Member State concerned and
in national systems, such as the systems for wage
should cover the main economic policy areas, potentially
formation.
including fiscal and wage policies, labour markets,
product and services markets and financial sector regu
lation. The commitments under ERM II should be taken
into account.
(26) If the Council considers that a Member State is no longer
affected by an excessive macroeconomic imbalance, the
excessive imbalance procedure should be closed
(21) The
warnings
and
recommendations
by
the
ESRB
to
following the Council's abrogation, on a recommen
Member States or to the Union address risks of a
dation from the Commission, of its relevant recommen
macrofinancial nature. These should also warrant appro
dations. That abrogation should be based on a compre
priate follow-up action by the Commission in the context
hensive analysis by the Commission showing that the
of the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances, where
Member State has acted in line with the relevant
appropriate. The independence and confidentiality of the
Council recommendations and that the underlying
ESRB should be strictly observed.
causes and associated risks identified in the Council
recommendation opening the excessive imbalance
procedure no longer exist, taking account, inter alia, of
macroeconomic developments, prospects and spill-over
(22) If severe macroeconomic imbalances are identified,
effects. The closure of the excessive imbalance
including imbalances that jeopardise the proper
procedure should be made public.
( 1 ) OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21.
( 2 ) See page 8 of this Official Journal.

---

L 306/28
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(27) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the estab
(2) ‘excessive imbalances’ means severe imbalances, including
lishment of an effective framework for the detection of
imbalances that jeopardise or risks jeopardising the proper
macroeconomic imbalances and the prevention and
functioning of the economic and monetary union.
correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances,
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
because of the deep trade and financial interlinks
between Member States and the spill-over effects of
CHAPTER II
national economic policies on the Union and the euro
area as a whole, and can therefore be better achieved at
DETECTION OF IMBALANCES
the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures in
Article 3
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In
Alert mechanism
accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set
out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond
1. An
alert
mechanism
shall
be
established
to
facilitate
the
what is necessary to achieve that objective,
early identification and the monitoring of imbalances. The

Commission shall prepare an annual report containing a quali
tative economic and financial assessment based on a scoreboard
with a set of indicators the values of which are compared to
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
their indicative thresholds, as provided for in Article 4. The
annual report, including the values of the indicators of the
scoreboard, shall be made public.
CHAPTER I
SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
2. The Commission's annual report shall contain an
economic and financial assessment putting the movement of
Subject matter
the indicators into perspective, drawing, if necessary, on other
1. This Regulation sets out detailed rules for the detection of
relevant economic and financial indicators when assessing the
macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and
evolution of imbalances. Conclusions shall not be drawn from a
correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the
mechanical reading of the scoreboard indicators. The assessment
Union.
shall take into account the evolution of imbalances in the
Union and in the euro area. The report shall also indicate
whether the crossing of thresholds in one or more Member
States signifies the possible emergence of imbalances. The
2. This
Regulation
shall
be
applied
in
the
context
of
the assessment of Member States showing large current-account
European Semester as set out in Regulation (EU) No
deficits may differ from that of Member States that accumulate
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
large current-account surpluses.
16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of
economic policies ( 1 ).
3. The
annual
report
shall
identify
Member
States
that
the
Commission considers may be affected by, or may be at risk of
being affected by, imbalances.
3. The
application
of
this
Regulation
shall
fully
observe
Article 152 TFEU, and the recommendations issued under this
Regulation shall respect national practices and institutions for
wage formation. This Regulation takes into account Article 28
4. The
Commission
shall
transmit
the
annual
report
to
the
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and accordingly does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude
and Social Committee in a timely manner.
or enforce collective agreements or to take collective action in
accordance with national law and practices.
5. As
part
of
the
multilateral
surveillance
in
accordance
with
Article 2
Article 121(3) TFEU, the Council shall discuss and carry out an
Definitions
overall assessment of the Commission's annual report. The
Eurogroup shall discuss the report as far as it relates to
For the purposes of this Regulation:
Member States whose currency is the euro.
(1) ‘imbalances’ means any trend giving rise to macroeconomic
developments which are adversely affecting, or have the
Article 4
potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the
economy of a Member State or of the economic and
Scoreboard
monetary union, or of the Union as a whole;
1. The
scoreboard
comprising
the
set
of
indicators,
shall
be
used as a tool to facilitate early identification and monitoring of
( 1 ) See page 12 of this Official Journal.
imbalances.

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/29
2.
The scoreboard shall comprise a small number of relevant,
indicators, the thresholds set and the methodology used, and
practical, simple, measurable and available macroeconomic and
it shall adjust or modify them where necessary. The
macrofinancial indicators for Member States. It shall allow for
Commission shall make changes in the underlying methodology
the early identification of macroeconomic imbalances that
and composition of the scoreboard and the associated
emerge in the short-term and imbalances that arise due to
thresholds public.
structural and long-term trends.
3. The
scoreboard
shall,
inter
alia,
encompass
indicators 8. The
Commission
shall
update
the
values
for
the
indicators
which are useful in the early identification of:
on the scoreboard at least on an annual basis.
(a) internal imbalances, including those that can arise from
public and private indebtedness; financial and asset market
Article 5
developments, including housing; the evolution of private
In-depth review
sector credit flow; and the evolution of unemployment;
1. Taking due account of the discussions within the Council
and the Eurogroup referred to in Article 3(5), or in the event of
(b) external imbalances, including those that can arise from the
unexpected, significant economic developments that require
evolution of current account and net investment positions
urgent analysis for the purpose of this Regulation, the
of Member States; real effective exchange rates; export
Commission shall undertake an in-depth review for each
market shares; changes in price and cost developments;
Member State that it considers may be affected by, or may be
and non-price competitiveness, taking into account the
at risk of being affected by, imbalances.
different components of productivity.
The in-depth review shall build on a detailed analysis of
4. In
undertaking
its
economic
reading
of
the
scoreboard
in country-specific circumstances, including the different starting
the alert mechanism, the Commission shall pay close attention
positions across Member States; it shall examine a broad
to developments in the real economy, including economic
range of economic variables and involve the use of analytical
growth, employment and unemployment performance,
tools and qualitative information of country-specific nature. It
nominal and real convergence inside and outside the euro
shall acknowledge the national specificities regarding industrial
area, productivity developments and its relevant drivers such
relations and social dialogue.
as research and development and foreign and domestic
investment, as well as sectoral developments including energy,
which affect GDP and current account performance.
The Commission shall also give due consideration to any other
information which the Member State concerned considers to be
The scoreboard shall also include indicative thresholds for the
relevant and has communicated to the Commission.
indicators, to serve as alert levels. The choice of indicators and
thresholds shall be conducive towards promoting competi
tiveness in the Union.
The Commission shall undertake its in-depth review in
conjunction with surveillance missions to the Member State
The scoreboard of indicators shall have upper and lower alert
concerned in accordance with Article 13.
thresholds unless inappropriate, which shall be differentiated for
euro and non-euro area Member States if justified by specific
features of the monetary union and relevant economic circum
stances. In developing the scoreboard, due consideration shall
2. The
Commission's
in-depth
review
shall
include
an
be given to catering for heterogeneous economic circumstances,
evaluation of whether the Member State in question is
including catching-up effects.
affected by imbalances, and of whether these imbalances
constitute excessive imbalances. It shall examine the origin of
the detected imbalances against the background of prevailing
economic circumstances, including the deep trade and
5. The
work
of
the
ESRB
shall
be
taken
into
due financial interlinks between Member States and the spill-over
consideration in the drafting of indicators relevant to financial
effects of national economic policies. The in-depth review
market stability. The Commission shall invite the ESRB to
shall analyse relevant developments related to the Union
provide its views regarding draft indicators, relevant to
strategy for growth and jobs. It shall also consider the
financial market stability.
relevance of economic developments in the Union and the
euro area as a whole. It shall, in particular, take into account:
6. The
Commission
shall
make
the
set
of
indicators
and
the
thresholds in the scoreboard public.
(a) where appropriate, Council recommendations or invitations
addressed to Member States under review adopted in
7. The
Commission
shall
assess
on
a
regular
basis
the
appro
accordance with Articles 121, 126 and 148 TFEU and
priateness of the scoreboard, including the composition of
under Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 of this Regulation;

---

L 306/30
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
(b) the policy intentions of the Member State under review, as
and recommending that the Member State concerned take
reflected in its national reform programmes and, where
corrective action.
appropriate, in its stability or convergence programme;
The Council's recommendation shall set out the nature and
(c) any warnings or recommendations from the ESRB on
implications of the imbalances and shall specify a set of
systemic risks addressed to, or being relevant to, the
policy recommendations to be followed and a deadline within
Member State under review. The confidentiality regime of
which the Member State concerned is to submit a corrective
the ESRB shall be observed.
action plan. The Council may, as provided for in Article 121(4)
TFEU, make its recommendation public.
3. The
Commission
shall
inform
the
European
Parliament
and the Council of the results of the in-depth review and
shall make them public.
Article 8
Corrective action plan
Article 6
1. Any
Member
State
for
which
an
excessive
imbalance
procedure is opened shall submit a corrective action plan to
Preventive action
the Council and the Commission based on, and within a
1. If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in
deadline to be defined in, the Council's recommendation
Article 5, the Commission considers that a Member State is
referred to in Article 7(2). The corrective action plan shall set
experiencing imbalances, it shall inform the European
out the specific policy actions the Member State concerned has
Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup accordingly. The
implemented or intends to implement and shall include a
Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may
timetable for those actions. The corrective action plan shall
address the necessary recommendations to the Member State
take into account the economic and social impact of the
concerned, in accordance with the procedure set out in
policy actions and shall be consistent with the broad
Article 121(2) TFEU.
economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines.
2. The
Council
shall
inform
the
European
Parliament
of
the 2. The
Council,
on
the
basis
of
a
Commission
report,
shall
recommendation and shall make it public.
assess the corrective action plan within 2 months of submission
of that plan. If, upon a Commission recommendation, the
Council considers the corrective action plan sufficient, it shall
3. The recommendations of the Council and of the
endorse the plan by way of a recommendation listing the
Commission shall fully observe Article 152 TFEU and shall
specific actions required and the deadlines for taking them,
take into account Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
and shall establish a timetable for surveillance, paying due
Rights of the European Union.
attention to the transmission channels and recognising that
there may be long lags between the adoption of the corrective
action and the actual resolution of imbalances.
4. The
Council
shall
review
its
recommendation
annually
in
the context of the European Semester and may, if appropriate,
adjust it in accordance with paragraph 1.
3. If,
upon
a
Commission
recommendation,
the
Council
considers the actions or the timetable envisaged in the
corrective action plan insufficient, it shall adopt a recommen
CHAPTER III
dation addressed to the Member State to submit, within 2
EXCESSIVE IMBALANCE PROCEDURE
months as a rule, a new corrective action plan. The Council
shall examine the new corrective action plan in accordance with
Article 7
the procedure laid down in this Article.
Opening of the excessive imbalance procedure
1. If, on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in
Article 5, the Commission considers that the Member State
4. The
corrective
action
plan,
the
Commission
report
and
the
concerned is affected by excessive imbalances, it shall inform
Council recommendation referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3
the European Parliament, the Council and the Eurogroup
shall be made public.
accordingly.
Article 9
The Commission shall also inform the relevant European Super
visory Authorities and the ESRB. The ESRB is invited to take the
Monitoring of corrective action
steps that it deems necessary.
1. The
Commission
shall
monitor
implementation
of
the
Council's recommendation adopted under Article 8(2). For
that purpose, the Member State shall present to the Council
2. The
Council,
on
a
recommendation
from
the
Commission, and the Commission at regular intervals progress reports, the
may, in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU, adopt a recom
frequency of which shall be established by the Council in the
mendation establishing the existence of an excessive imbalance
recommendation referred to in Article 8(2).

---

EN
23.11.2011 Official
Journal
of
the
European
Union L
306/31
2. The
Council
shall
make
Member
States'
progress
reports held in abeyance. Nevertheless, monitoring shall continue in
public.
accordance with the timetable set out in the recommendation
under Article 8(2). The Council shall make public its reasons for
holding the procedure in a position of abeyance and recognising
3. The
Commission
may
carry
out
enhanced
surveillance the corrective policy actions taken by the Member State
missions to the Member State concerned, in order to monitor
concerned.
the implementation of the corrective action plan, in liaison with
the ECB when those missions concern Member States whose
currency is the euro or Member States participating in ERM II.
Article 11
The Commission shall, where appropriate, involve social
partners and other national stakeholders in a dialogue during
Closing of the excessive imbalance procedure
those missions.
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall
abrogate recommendations issued under Articles 7, 8 or 10 as
4. In
the
event
of
relevant
major
changes
in
economic soon as it considers that the Member State concerned is no
circumstances, the Council, on a recommendation from the
longer affected by excessive imbalances as outlined in the
Commission, may amend the recommendations adopted
recommendation referred to in Article 7(2). The Council shall
under Article 8(2) in accordance with the procedure laid
make a public statement reflecting that fact.
down in that Article. Where appropriate, the Council shall
invite the Member State concerned to submit a revised
corrective action plan, and shall assess that revised corrective
Article 12
action plan in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 8.
Voting within the Council
For the measures referred to in Articles 7 to 11, the Council
shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of
Article 10
the Council representing the Member State concerned.
Assessment of corrective action
1. On the basis of a Commission report, the Council shall
CHAPTER IV
assess whether the Member State concerned has taken the
recommended corrective action in accordance with the
FINAL PROVISIONS
Council's recommendation issued under Article 8(2).
Article 13
Surveillance missions
2. The
Commission
shall
make
its
report
public.
1. The
Commission
shall
ensure
a
permanent
dialogue
with
the authorities of the Member States in accordance with the
3. The Council shall make its assessment by the deadline set
objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission
by the Council in its recommendations adopted in accordance
shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of
with Article 8(2).
assessing the economic situation in the Member State and the
identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the
objectives of this Regulation.
4. Where it considers that the Member State has not taken
the recommended corrective action, the Council, on a recom
mendation from the Commission, shall adopt a decision estab
2. The
Commission
may
undertake
enhanced
surveillance
lishing non-compliance, together with a recommendation
missions for Member States which are the subject of a recom
setting new deadlines for taking corrective action. In this case,
mendation as to the existence of an excessive imbalance
the Council shall inform the European Council, and shall make
position under Article 7(2) for the purposes of on-site moni
public the conclusions of the surveillance missions referred to in
toring.
Article 9(3).
3. Where the Member State concerned is a Member State
The Commission's recommendation on establishing non-
whose currency is the euro or is participating in ERM II, the
compliance shall be deemed to have been adopted by the
Commission may, if appropriate, invite representatives of the
Council, unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the
European Central Bank to participate in surveillance missions.
recommendation within 10 days of its adoption by the
Commission. The Member State concerned may request that a
meeting of the Council be convened within that period to take
a vote on the decision.
4. The
Commission
shall
report
to
the
Council
on
the
outcome of the missions referred to in paragraph 2 and may,
if appropriate, decide to make its findings public.
5. Where the Council, on the basis of the Commission's
report referred to in paragraph 1, considers that the Member
State has taken the corrective action recommended in
5. When
organising
the
missions
referred
to
in
paragraph
2,
accordance with Article 8(2), the excessive imbalance
the Commission shall transmit its provisional findings to the
procedure shall be considered to be on track and shall be
Member State concerned for comments.

---

L 306/32
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
23.11.2011
Article 14
views to the Member State which is the subject of a Council
recommendation or decision under Article 7(2), Article 8(2) or
Economic Dialogue
Article 10(4).
1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions
of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council
3. The
Council
and
the
Commission
shall
regularly
inform
and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and
the European Parliament of the results of the application of this
accountability, the competent committee of the European
Regulation.
Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the
Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the
Article 15
European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to
appear before the committee to discuss:
Annual Reporting
The Commission shall report annually on the application of this
Regulation, including the updating of the scoreboard as set out
(a) information provided by the Council on the broad
in Article 4 and shall present its findings to the European
guidelines of economic policy pursuant to Article 121(2)
Parliament and to the Council in the context of the European
TFEU;
Semester.
(b) general guidance to Member States issued by the
Article 16
Commission at the beginning of the annual cycle of
Review
surveillance;
1. By
14
December
2014
and
every
5
years
thereafter,
the
Commission shall review and report on the application of this
(c) the conclusions of the European Council concerning orien
Regulation.
tations for economic policies in the context of the European
Semester;
Those reports shall evaluate, inter alia:
(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;
(d) the results of multilateral surveillance carried out under this
Regulation;
(b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic
policies and sustained convergence of economic
performances of the Member States in accordance with
(e) the conclusions of the European Council concerning the
the TFEU.
orientations for, and results of, multilateral surveillance;
Where appropriate, those reports shall be accompanied by a
proposal for amendments to this Regulation.
(f) a review of the conduct of the multilateral surveillance at
the end of the European Semester;
2. The
Commission
shall
send
the
reports
referred
to
in
paragraph 1 to the European Parliament and to the Council.
(g) the recommendations taken pursuant to Article 7(2),
Article 8(2) and Article 10(4) of this Regulation.
Article 17
Entry into force
2. The
competent
committee
of
the
European
Parliament This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following
may offer the opportunity to participate in an exchange of
its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Strasbourg, 16 November 2011.
For the European Parliament
For the Council
The President
The President
J. BUZEK
W. SZCZUKA

---